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Chapter 1
Introduction
Climate change is one of the most serious environmental challenges that humankind has ever
faced (Stern, 2006). Its main contributing factor is the accumulation of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions from anthropogenic sources, which have been steadily increasing since the Industrial
Revolution due to population and economic growth. In 2012, the average increase in global land
and ocean temperature reached about 0.82 ◦C compared to pre-industrial levels. The natural
system is sensitive to changes in climate. Since the 1850s there is an unequivocal decrease in
the amounts of snow and ice, and a significant rise in sea level due to higher temperatures.
Other observed consequences of climate change include: modifications in hydrological systems
impacting the quality and quantity of water resources; shifts in geographic ranges, seasonal
activities, migration patterns, and abundances of many species; negative net impacts on crop
yields (IPCC, 2014).
Dealing with climate change requires vast reductions in emissions – also known as mitigation –
in the near future. Otherwise, in a business-as-usual scenario, continued GHG emissions would
cause further increases in average temperature and changes in the climate system, increasing
the likelihood of sizable damages on human and natural systems (IPCC, 2014).
Tackling the climate change problem is vastly challenging. Some key points are discussed
below. First, the climate issue is an inter-temporal one. Emitted GHGs have lifespans ranging
from centuries to millennia. As such, undertaking current mitigation actions would impose
costs in the present (e.g. from divesting from fossil-intensive industries and investing into low-
carbon ones), while benefits would be felt far ahead in the future (once GHG concentrations are
reduced). This time gap between costs and benefits is likely to create incentives to postpone
timely action, at least until sizable damages occur, raising dangers for future generations (Keller
et al., 2007; Nordhaus, 2008).
Second, climate change can be viewed as a common good problem (Millard-Ball, 2012). Earth’s
atmosphere is shared by all living beings on our planet, and all benefit from it. However, living
beings, and especially humans, tend to be organized in clusters, such as regions, states, and
unions of states, with sometimes diverging interests. Reducing emissions unilaterally would
accrue all costs to the party undertaking the action, but bring benefits to all. This creates
free-riding incentives diluting the motivation to start unilateral mitigation actions.
Third, several questions arise regarding the distribution of mitigation duties across countries and
the right to develop economically. Past contributions to climate change can be mainly attributed
2
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to developed countries which, in their way up the progress ladder, have relied intensively on the
combustion of fossil fuels. If mitigation actions are undertaken, should efforts be proportional
to past emissions? How to involve in the mitigation agenda the high-growth economies, such as
China and India, which have contributed little in the past, but whose emissions are escalating
in the present? Could a stable and safe GHG concentration level be reached without the
participation of the least developed countries, that have not contributed significantly to climate
change, but will be the ones to suffer the most from it?
Reaching international agreements on climate change mitigation is subject to a common under-
standing of these key issues and, thus far, individual interests have often proved to be diverging.
Despite the pressing climate change problem, little progress can be observed so far in terms of
emission reductions.
Tackling the climate change problem appears to be a strenuous challenge indeed. It brings con-
sequences at various social, political, and geo-physical levels, and it requires concentrated efforts
from multiple scientific fields. This thesis aims to contribute to the climate change mitigation
debate from an economics and finance perspective. With a collection of three independent
research articles, different both in their specific focus and in the methodology used, this thesis
can only touch upon a reduced number of points related to the vast topic of climate change
mitigation. The first paper studies the optimal way to combine mitigation, adaptation, and
geoengineering as approaches to deal with climate change. The remaining two papers focus on
two mitigation mechanisms already in place: a cap-and-trade system implemented in Europe
and a program to reduce emissions from deforestation in developing countries. The analysis
aims to point to the weaknesses and possible ways of improvement in these human designed
mechanisms. The three papers that constitute this thesis are summarized below. The first
two papers of this thesis have been published in 2015. For copyright reasons, their final (pub-
lished) version appears in the Appendix; Chapters 2 and 3 include an intermediary (before
final revisions, but without major changes) version.
Chapter 2 presents the first study, which is entitled ‘Is there Room for Geoengineering in the
Optimal Climate Policy Mix?’. It represents a joint work with Olivier Bahn, Marc Chesney,
Jonathan Gheyssens and Reto Knutti, and is published in the journal of ‘Environmental Science
and Policy’ 2015. With the help of an integrated assessment model, we analyse in a dynamic
setting the optimal mix of policies to deal with climate change. Accounting for the possible
strengths and weaknesses of mitigation, adaptation, and geoengineering, we study which strat-
egy should be implemented and when, if decisions were taken at the global level. We find
that the optimal strategy to deal with climate change is mitigation, i.e. the reduction in GHG
emissions, through a fast transition from a carbon-intensive to a low-carbon economy. Due
to the already high levels of GHG concentrations, adaptation is used to reduce damages from
temperature increases. When the magnitude and persistence of geoengineering side-effects are
low, this strategy is also employed to control temperature levels.
In Chapter 3, we focus on a specific mitigation project: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation (known as REDD+). This paper is entitled ‘Baseline Choice and
Performance Implications for REDD’; it is a joint work with Jonathan Gheyssens and published
in the journal of ‘Environmental Economics and Policy’ 2015. REDD projects target reductions
in emissions from deforestation in tropical countries, where deforestation is a major contributor
to total GHG emissions. A typical cause of deforestation is the use of land for agriculture and
cattle ranching. Preventing forest owners in tropical countries to deforest would alter their
revenue flow. REDD projects offer financial compensation for reduced deforestation, and are
designed as international contracts in which funds are directed from developed to developing
countries. A key element of the incentive structure is the baseline, i.e. the threshold against
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which reductions in emissions from deforestation are computed and payments are made. In
this paper, we study different alternatives for setting the baseline and indicate which ones are
more likely to achieve the REDD goals. The methodology consists in solving (analytically and
numerically) a dynamic optimization problem.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I focus on a different existing mitigation strategy, namely the market
for emission allowances in Europe (the so-called European Union Emissions Trading System,
EU ETS). This study is entitled ‘Who is driving the volatility of the CO2 permit price? Evi-
dence from EU ETS Phase I’. I focus on the allowance price formation process and investigate
whether the trading activity of different market players has correlated significantly with the
large movements observed in permit prices during Phase I. The empirical analysis shows that,
depending on the sector of primary business activity, the trading activity of market players
tended to correlate differently with volatility. The paper discusses possible explanations for the
observed diverging trading behaviour. Although, generally, the trading activity - volatility re-
lation is found to be positive, I show that many players remained mostly inactive during Phase
I and a large share of them tended to trade mostly when volatility levels were low. This find-
ing suggests that, at times of frequent information arrivals, when prices tended to move more
pronouncedly, some market participants avoided to adjust their permit positions according to
the newly disclosed information. The paper discusses how these findings might indicate a lack
of market efficiency.
Summing up, this thesis is dedicated to the study of different aspects of climate change miti-
gation. It tries to emphasize that a timely reduction in GHG emissions is necessary in order
to avoid sizable damages from climate change. Although little progress is observed in terms of
mitigation programs at the global level, some regional projects are already in place, such as the
cap-and-trade scheme in Europe or the programs targeting reduced emissions from deforesta-
tion in tropical countries. This thesis tries to underpin specific design improvements for these
existing mitigation approaches. Although this thesis’ contribution might be considered modest
in relation to the vast aspects that the climate change problem entails, the analysis tried to
reach depth in the few areas it has focused on. I believe that only a continued discussion and
dedicated research from representatives of all backgrounds can lead to a deeper understanding
of how to successfully tackle the pressing climate change problem.

Chapter 2
Is there room for geoengineering in the
optimal climate policy mix?
Joint work with Olivier Bahn, Marc Chesney, Reto Knutti, and Jonathan Gheyssens.
Abstract
We investigate geoengineering as a possible substitute for mitigation and adaptation measures
to reduce damages from climate change. With the help of an integrated assessment model,
we distinguish between the effects of solar radiation management (SRM) on atmospheric tem-
perature levels and its side-effects on the environment. We account for the uncertainty in the
magnitude of side-effects and their persistency over time, and show that this geoengineering
option lacks robustness. The optimal climate portfolio represents a mix between mitigation,
adaptation, and SRM, and no strategy fully substitutes the others. We then analyse the welfare
consequences of basing the SRM decision on wrong assumptions about side-effects, and show
that total output losses are considerable and increase with the error horizon. This reinforces
the need to balance the climate portfolio in favour of mitigation.
Keywords: Climate change; Climate policy mix; Adaptation; Mitigation; Geoengineering
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2.1 Introduction
Climate change is one of the most serious challenges faced by humankind. One of its contributing
factors is the anthropogenic greenhouse gas (hereafter GHG) emissions that impact the radiation
budget and atmospheric temperature levels (Pinker et al., 2005). The projected temperature
increase for the end of the century falls in the range 1.4 - 5.8 ◦C above pre-industrial levels1
(Andreae et al., 2005; Stainforth et al., 2005), posing important risks for the wellbeing of many
managed and natural ecosystems. Avoiding climate change is challenging since its cause is
endogenous, the consequences entail uncertainty both in magnitude and in timing of occurrence,
and solutions to it would require a thorough modification in the organisation of human activities.
Solutions for dealing with climate change enter three main categories: mitigation, adaptation,
and climate geoengineering (Bellamy et al., 2013). International agreements and scientific
opinion support actions that achieve reductions in GHG emissions - mitigation - attempting
to curb the increasing trend in atmospheric GHG concentrations. Despite its direct impact
on temperature levels, its technical feasibility, and its ethical appeal, several factors limit the
implementation of mitigation: (i) the strong inertia in the carbon cycle leads to a gap between
the required large present costs (investments in clean technologies) and future benefits (lower
GHG concentrations) (Keller et al., 2007; Nordhaus, 2008); (ii) the decades to millennia long
lifespan of GHG render mitigation ineffective in case of sudden climate change damages; (iii) the
atmosphere is a common good and unilateral actions are discouraged by the potential existence
of free riders (Millard-Ball, 2012).
An alternative for dealing with climate change is adaptation, the development of strategies
that effectively reduce the impacts of climate change (Tol, 2005; Adger et al., 2007; Klein et al.,
2007). Adaptation covers a large array of sectors, and can be ‘proactive’ or ‘reactive’ (de Bruin,
2011). While proactive adaptation is directed towards infrastructure and medium- to long-term
economic transformations (Agrawala et al., 2011), reactive adaptation can be deployed almost
instantaneously to mitigate unforeseen or underestimated damages. Several features distinguish
adaptation from mitigation: (i) adaptation actions can be implemented unilaterally, giving full
control of the benefits to the countries developing them; (ii) adaptation measures are expected
to exhibit a fast implementation - fast benefits feature, avoiding deadlocks due to discounting
preferences. However, with uncertainty surrounding the magnitude of climate change effects and
the vulnerability of environmental equilibria, assessing the effectiveness of adaptation proves to
be challenging and might limit investments in adaptation (de Bruin and Dellink, 2011).
Given the increasing risk of an unmanageable temperature path and the current mitigation
and adaptation deadlock, new proposals suggest to rely on geoengineering for dealing with the
climate change problem (Keith, 2000; Crutzen, 2006; Brovkin et al., 2009). Geoengineering
solutions correspond to deliberate modifications of the climate system in order to alleviate
climate change impacts (Keith, 2000; Caldeira et al., 2013). One may distinguish between two
main techniques, namely Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) and Solar Radiation Management
(SRM).
In this paper, we focus on an SRM approach that targets the reduction of incoming solar ra-
diation by injection of sulphur in the stratosphere, believed to be one of the most efficient
geoengineering strategies to reduce global temperature (Nordhaus, 2001; Wigley, 2006; Shep-
herd, 2009). Its premise is the ability to keep temperature levels artificially low, instead of
reducing GHG emissions. SRM presents several advantages: (i) it involves low implementation
1The recent IPCC report notes that the most likely increase in temperature by 2100 will reach a level above 3 ◦C
(Edenhofer et al., 2014).
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costs (Crutzen, 2006; Robock et al., 2009); (ii) in case of rapid climate changes (when climate
tipping points are reached), with rare but catastrophic impacts, SRM could act as a quick and
effective temperature ‘backstop’ (Crutzen, 2006; Barrett, 2008); (iii) it can be implemented
either unilaterally or cooperatively (Barrett, 2008; Blackstock et al., 2009).
However, SRM brings along important risks, as it may produce unintended consequences and
harmful side effects (Victor, 2008). A comprehensive summary is given in Barrett et al. (2014).
Injecting sulphur particles into the upper atmosphere is expected to cause polar ozone depletion
(Crutzen, 2006; Tilmes et al., 2008; Solomon et al., 2009), acid deposition at the poles (Kravitz
et al., 2009), alter ecosystems (Stanhill and Cohen, 2001; Adams et al., 2003; Rasch et al., 2008),
and trigger regional imbalances (e.g., in the patterns of surface temperature, radiation, and the
hydrological cycle; Trenberth and Dai, 2007; Bala et al., 2008; Brovkin et al., 2009; Kravitz
et al., 2013; Niemeier et al., 2013; Schaller et al., 2013; Huneeus et al., 2014). Simulations
of sulphate injection predict disruptions in the Asian and African summer monsoons (Robock
et al., 2008). Stratospheric aerosol loading impacts the ratio of direct to diffuse light, with
consequences for terrestrial and marine photosynthesis and for technologies relying on direct
light (Rasch et al., 2008; Vaughan and Lenton, 2011).
Furthermore, SRM achieves only an ‘artificial’ reduction in temperature levels. With a contin-
ued increase in GHG concentrations, the injection of aerosols would need to raise proportionally,
and a disruption would lead to a significant jump in temperatures at the corresponding con-
centration level (Brasseur and Roeckner, 2005; Brovkin et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2013) with
probable dire consequences. Additionally, SRM will not be able to counteract other negative
consequences coming from high GHG concentrations, such as ocean acidification (Orr et al.,
2005; Doney et al., 2009), CO2 fertilisation of land plants, and other biogeochemical modifica-
tions (Ban-Weiss and Caldeira, 2010). Finally, with a lack of assessment of SRM impacts on the
whole (natural and human) system, there remains the possibility for unexpected consequences
– unknown unknowns (Kravitz et al., 2009; Vaughan and Lenton, 2011). The uncertainty is
reinforced by the fact that expected consequences of SRM (both positive and negative) are
estimated by comparison with natural volcanic eruptions, which are an imperfect analog to
continuous anthropogenic stratospheric forcing (Robock et al., 2013). Finally, there are impor-
tant societal and political dimensions to geoengineering (Markusson et al., 2013; Macnaghten
and Szerszynski, 2013; Wright et al., 2014).
Given these important caveats, support for geoengineering measures has been inconclusive
so far. Crutzen (2006), Wigley (2006), Carlin (2007), and Bickel (2013) advocate additional
research on geoengineering before a robust recommendation could be formulated. More recent
studies focus on modelling decision-making in the context of multiple sources of risk. Gramstad
and Tjotta (2010) propose an integrated assessment model (hereafter IAM) that allows for
parametric uncertainty in the impact of SRM on radiative forcing. They find that SRM passes
the cost-benefit test under all scenarios, but admit that other factors (such as the risk of SRM
interruptions) could lead to the rejection of such projects. Goes et al. (2011) use an IAM where
the total damage from climate change is a function of a rate-dependent temperature component,
and account for the failure to sustain aerosol forcing and for the subsequent unraveling of drastic
climate changes. In such a case, SRM is found to be an economically inefficient strategy. Bickel
and Agrawal (2012) rely on the model of Goes et al. (2011) and show that under modified
assumptions some totally different conclusions regarding the use of SRM can be found.
In this paper, we assess the optimal mix of policies to deal effectively with climate change. Our
methodology relies on the Ada-BaHaMa integrated assessment model (Bahn et al., 2012), which
allows for mitigation and adaptation actions, and enriches it by explicitly considering an SRM
strategy. In a cost-benefit framework, we model in a stylised manner the interactions between
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the climate and the economic systems. We distinguish between the different effects of SRM on
atmospheric temperature levels and on natural and socio-economic systems. While the desired
effects of SRM on radiative forcing can be estimated with a considerable degree of confidence
(Crutzen, 2006), the magnitude of undesired side-effects of sulfur injection remains a significant
unknown. We focus on this second uncertainty source, and unlike previous IAMs that consider
SRM side-effects to be constant over time (Goes et al., 2011; Bickel and Agrawal, 2012), we
model side-effects as a time-varying and persistent process with a stochastic component.
Our original contribution consists in assessing, within an integrated assessment framework, the
optimal policy mix when different strategies are available (mitigation, proactive and reactive
adaptation, and SRM). We focus on the possible interactions and substitutions between the
different policies, while accounting for the possible variability in the downside risks of SRM.
We show that the optimal strategy for dealing with climate change involves the joint use of
mitigation, adaptation, and geoengineering. While mitigation and adaptation are optimally
employed in the vast majority of analysed scenarios, SRM passes a cost-benefit test only when
its side-effects are low. We contribute to the geoengineering debate by underlying that SRM
should not be seen as the ultimate solution to climate change; large reductions in emissions are
necessary even in the optimistic SRM side-effect scenarios. Moreover, small deviations from
expected side-effects can potentially cause large welfare losses, and further reduce the use of
SRM.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 details our dynamic IAM and
its calibration. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 provide numerical results and analyse specific uncertainties
related to SRM. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Modelling approach
In this section we briefly review the original Ada-BaHaMa model (Bahn et al., 2012) and
detail the new modelling features: (i) the introduction of SRM as an instrument to control
temperature increase and (ii) a separate accounting of proactive and reactive adaptation.
2.2.1 Welfare maximisation
We consider a global decision maker that maximises total social welfare (W ) given by the
sequence of future discounted utility from per capita consumption (c). The welfare criterion is
given by:
W =
14∑
n=0
∆tR(t0 + n∆t)L(t0 + n∆t)U(c(t0 + n∆t)) (2.1)
We assume a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, with U(c(t)) = c(t)
1−µ−1
1−µ ,
where 1/µ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, per capita consumption is given by
c(t) = C(t)
L(t)
, C is the total consumption, L is the population size at time t, n is the number
of decades passed since t0, and ∆t is the decision time step. R represents the time preference
discount factor, with R(t0 + n∆t) = e
−r(n−1)∆t and r the yearly rate of time preference. We
perform the optimisation for fifteen time periods of one decade each, for the time horizon
spanning over the years 2005 and 2155, with t0 = 2005, n ∈ [0, 14], and ∆t = 10 years.
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The population size is calibrated on the 2007 version of DICE, hereafter DICE2007,2 and evolves
according to the following dynamics:
L(t) = L(t0)e
g
dg
(
1−e−
dg
n−1
)
(2.2)
where L(t0) is the initial (2005) population size, g is the initial growth rate of the population,
and dg is the rate of decrease for the growth rate of population.
Consumption comes from an optimised share of production (Y ). The Ada-BaHaMa distin-
guishes between two types of economy: a ‘carbon’ economy (our present economy, indexed 1)
where production is realised with a high level of fossil fuels, and a ‘low-carbon’ economy (in-
dexed 2, for instance a hydrogen economy) with small GHG contributions.3 After consumption,
the remaining share of production is used: (i) to invest in the production capital of the carbon
and low-carbon economies (I1, I2) and in the proactive adaptation capital (I3); (ii) to spend for
reactive adaptation (S3) and SRM measures (S4); and (iii) to pay for energy costs, where pE1
and pE2 are energy prices per unit of emission, E1 and E2 the emission levels, and φ1 and φ2 the
energy efficiency in the carbon-intensive and low-carbon economies, respectively. The presence
of damages (D) from climate change and SRM side-effects reduces the available production
such that:
(1−D(t))Y (t) = C(t) + I1(t) + I2(t) + I3(t) + S3(t) + S4(t)
+pE1(t)φ1(t)E1(t) + pE2(t)φ2(t)E2(t) (2.3)
Production occurs in the two economies according to an extended Cobb-Douglas production
function in three inputs: capital (K), labor (L), and energy (measured through GHG emission
level E):
Y (t) = A1(t)K1(t)
α1(φ1(t)E1(t))
θ1(t)L1(t)
1−α1−θ1(t)
+A2(t)K2(t)
α2(φ2(t)E2(t))
θ2(t)L2(t)
1−α2−θ2(t) (2.4)
where for each economy i (i = 1, 2): Ai is the total factor productivity, αi the elasticity of output
with respect to capital Ki, φi the energy efficiency and θi the elasticity of output with respect
to emissions. Capital stock in each economy evolves according to the choice of investment (Ii)
and a depreciation rate δKi through a standard relationship:
Ki(t+ ∆t) = Ii(t)∆t+ (1− δKi)∆tKi(t) (2.5)
The same dynamics apply for proactive adaptation capital (K3). Total labor (L) is divided
between the two economies:
L(t) = L1(t) + L2(t) (2.6)
The optimal policy consists in choosing at each time period the investment levels (I1, I2, I3),
the spending (S3, S4), the emissions (E1, E2), and the labor allocation (L1, L2).
2See: http://www.econ.yale.edu/ nordhaus/DICE2007.htm.
3We calibrate a baseline scenario—in which only the carbon economy is producing—to match as closely as possible
production, concentration, and temperature trajectories of the DICE2007 baseline. Production in the low-carbon economy
is more energy efficient, but also more costly, than in the carbon economy. Without distinguishing among specific
technologies, we rely on the MERGE model (Manne and Richels, 2005) for its calibration.
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2.2.2 Climate dynamics in the presence of SRM
GHG stocks evolve according to the dynamic equations of the DICE model (Nordhaus, 2008)
that distinguishes between three reservoirs: (i) an atmospheric one (MAT ), (ii) a quickly mixing
one in the upper oceans and the biosphere (MUP ), and (iii) a slowly mixing deep-ocean reservoir
(MLO) which acts as a long-term sink.
MAT (t+ ∆t) = ∆t(E1(t) + E2(t)) + ψ11MAT (t) + ψ21MUP (t) (2.7)
MUP (t+ ∆t) = ψ12MAT (t) + ψ22MUP (t) + ψ32MLO(t) (2.8)
MLO(t+ ∆t) = ψ23MUP (t) + ψ33MLO(t) (2.9)
where ψi,j are calibration parameters.
We extend the original Ada-BaHaMa to account for a solar radiation management (SRM)
strategy that increases the albedo effect through sulfur injection in the lower stratosphere.
The sulphate aerosols formed increase the stratospheric reflection of shortwave radiation back
to space (Stenchikov et al., 1998), reducing the radiative forcing from an increase in CO2
concentrations:
F (t) = ηlog2
(
MAT (t)
MAT (1750)
)
+ FEX(t)− FGE(t) (2.10)
where η = 3.7 W m−2 is the radiative forcing for a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentrations,
FEX the exogenous radiative forcing term, and FGE is the radiative forcing created by the
sulphates.
The radiative forcing from SRM depends on the amount of sulfur injected, the size of the
particles, and the location of injection (Vaughan and Lenton, 2011). Sulfur injection simulations
show that at high injection rates (above 40 Tg S) the efficacy on radiative forcing levels off
(English et al., 2012). However, for smaller injection rates, a linear relation approximates well
the impact of sulfur injected on radiative forcing.4 We follow Crutzen (2006) and allow for a
linear relation:
FGE(t) = ωG(t) (2.11)
where ω is the effectiveness factor of SRM, and G the yearly amount of sulfur injected in
the stratosphere measured in tetragrams of sulfur (Tg S). Based on the observations from the
volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo (June 1991), Crutzen (2006) finds ω to have a value of
approximately 0.75 W m−2 per Tg S.
The link between the increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations and temperature increase is
captured by the impact of radiative forcing on temperature. As in Ada-BaHaMa, we follow the
DICE model to compute the increase in earth’s mean surface temperature (TAT ) and in the
average temperature of the deep oceans (TLO) from pre-industrial levels:
TAT (t+ ∆t) = TAT (t) + ξ1 [F (t+ ∆t)− ξ2TAT (t)− ξ3 (TAT (t)− TLO(t))] (2.12)
TLO(t+ ∆t) = TLO(t) + ξ4 (TAT (t)− TLO(t)) (2.13)
where ξj (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) are calibration parameters.
4In our simulations, the optimal amount of sulfur injected never exceeds 15 Tg S per annum.
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2.2.3 Climate change damages and SRM side-effects
Ada-BaHaMa follows the approach used in MERGE (Manne and Richels, 2005) to link climate
change damages and their economic impacts. Here, we additionally account for negative exter-
nalities from sulfur injection. Total yearly damages (D) on production come from atmospheric
temperature increase (DTAT ) and side-effects from sulfur injection (DGE):
D(t) = DTAT (t) +DGE(t) (2.14)
2.2.3.1 Climate change damages and adaptation
The increase in temperature (TAT ) from pre-industrial levels entails damages that can be alle-
viated through adaptation (AD):
DTAT (t) = AD(t)
(
TAT (t)− Td
catT − Td
)2
(2.15)
where Td is the temperature deviation (from pre-industrial level) at which damages start to
occur, while catT represents the ‘catastrophic’ temperature level at which the entire production
would be wiped out. To have a comparable basis with the current literature on IAM with
adaptation, Td and catT are calibrated to replicate the damage intensity in DICE; see Bahn
et al. (2012).
We distinguish between reactive (flow) and proactive (stock) adaptation, similar to Bosello
et al. (2010) and Agrawala et al. (2011). We model the effectiveness of the two adaptation
strategies in reducing climate change damages as follows:
AD(t) = 1− αADp(t)
K3(t)
K3max(t)
− αADr(t)
S3(t)
S3max(t)
(2.16)
where αADp (respectively, αADr) is the maximum proactive (resp. reactive) adaptation effec-
tiveness, K3 (resp. S3) the amount of proactive adaptation capital (resp. reactive adaptation
spending), K3max (resp. S3max)
5 the maximum amount of adaptation capital (resp. spending)
that would ensure the optimal effectiveness of the proactive (resp. reactive) adaptation mea-
sures. Like K3max in our original model, S3max is modelled as an increasing function of the
temperature level:
S3max(t) = βADr
(
TAT (t)
Td
)γADr
(2.17)
where βADr and γADr are calibration parameters.
The two options are assumed to be complementary, in that the implementation of one enhances
the effectiveness of the other. On the one hand, reactive adaptation requires the existence of
some infrastructure; for instance, the deployment of new crops (better suited to new climatic
condition) possibly requires that tests have been conducted beforehand (pro-actively) in R&D
facilities. On the other hand, since investments in (proactive) adaptation are initiated much
earlier than their first use, they are based on expectations and can result in inadequate solutions
when damages start to occur. Reactive adaptation can marginally modify the solution to ensure
5We impose K3(t) ≤ K3max(t) and S3(t) ≤ S3max(t) at all time periods.
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maximum effectiveness. Adaptation effectiveness is modelled as follows:
αADp(t) = (αADp − αADp)
(
γ1
K3(t)
K3max(t)
+ γ2
S3(t)
S3max(t)
)
+ αADp (2.18)
αADr(t) = (αADr − αADr)
(
γ1
S3(t)
S3max(t)
+ γ2
K3(t)
K3max(t)
)
+ αADr (2.19)
where αADp and αADp (resp., αADr and αADr) are the minimum and maximum effectiveness
values for proactive (resp., reactive) adaptation, and γ1, γ2 calibration parameters (γ1 > γ2,
γ1 + γ2 = 1). We model adaptation effectiveness such that in particular: (i) the absence of one
adaptation strategy does not make the other ineffective, but reduces its potential; and (ii) only
maximum capital level (K3(t) = K3max(t)) and spending (S3(t) = S3max(t)) ensure maximum
effectiveness.
Calibration of the adaptation strategies follows the AD-DICE approach (de Bruin et al., 2009),
accounting for the additional reactive adaptation option and its complementarity with proactive
adaptation. The calibration of K3max and S3max relies on World Bank estimates (Margulis and
Narain, 2009). However, we assume that reactive adaptation is 50% more costly than proactive
adaptation to achieve its maximum potential.6 The calibration of the effectiveness parameters
αADp and αADr reflects stylised assumptions about the reactive-proactive relationship. First,
we assume that reactive adaptation is slightly more efficient than proactive adaptation, as
‘last-minute’ strategies are easier to adjust to observed damages. This assumption is coherent
with Agrawala et al. (2011), where reactive adaptation offsets on average 27% of gross dam-
ages and proactive adaptation only 21%. Our calibration is very close, with 25% for reactive
adaptation (αADr) and 22% for proactive (αADp). Second, the maximum effectiveness of to-
tal adaptation cannot be higher than 0.5. This is coherent with Nordhaus and Boyer (2000)
where total adaptation potential is 0.48 (compared to 0.47 in our calibration). And third, the
difference between minimum and maximum effectiveness for the two strategies is chosen to be
relatively small, which implies that proactive and reactive adaptation options are only weakly
complementary, similar to Agrawala et al. (2011).
2.2.3.2 SRM measures and side-effects
SRM implementation is expected to be inexpensive and fast (Barrett, 2008). Following Moreno-
Cruz and Keith (2013), we allow for linear SRM implementation costs (S4), proportional to the
yearly amount of sulfur injected in the atmosphere (G):
S4(t) = pGE(t)G(t) (2.20)
where pGE refers to the cost of injecting one tetragram of sulfur. Following Crutzen (2006), we
consider pGE = $25 billion per Tg S annually.
Despite the low implementation costs, SRM is believed to bring along important risks. A com-
prehensive, but not exhaustive, list of expected sulfur injection side-effects has been presented
in the introduction. In particular, injecting large amounts of sulfur in the upper atmosphere
may have potentially disruptive effects on weather patterns and the water cycle (Ramanathan
et al., 2001; Brovkin et al., 2009). Additional damages are expected in case sulfur particles
6Indeed, deployment of last minute strategies should incur organisational costs much higher than under a long-
planned strategy. Besides, compared to proactive adaptation, reactive adaptation should bear some of the infrastructure
and deployment costs upfront, which induces large overhead.
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enter the troposphere and add to the sulfur concentration in soil (Crutzen, 2006). Though we
are beginning to form a better image of the possible side-effects from sulfur injection, the exact
type and magnitude of side-effects are still to be quantified (Robock et al., 2013).
We model the magnitude of SRM side-effects (DGE) following the approach of Goes et al.
(2011), where sulfur injection damages depend on an intensity factor (αGE ∈ [0, 1]) and the
radiative forcing created by SRM (FGE), normalised by the radiative forcing for a doubling of
atmospheric CO2 concentrations (η). However, unlike previous IAMs that consider SRM side-
effects (parameter αGE) to be constant over time (Goes et al., 2011; Bickel and Agrawal, 2012),
we model side-effects as a time-varying and persistent process. Modifying the radiative forcing
through sulphate injection is expected to impact different Earth system processes, whose con-
sequences will be felt for periods beyond the lifetime of sulphates in the stratosphere (Brovkin
et al., 2009; Vaughan and Lenton, 2011). Therefore, we account for persistency in damages and
allow the intensity factor (αGE) to vary over time:
DGE(t+ ∆t) = λDGE(t) + αGE(t+ ∆t)
FGE(t+ ∆t)
η
ADGE(t) (2.21)
where λ (< 1) is a constant depreciation rate,7 αGE a time-varying random process, FGE the
radiative forcing created through SRM, η the radiative forcing for a doubling of atmospheric
CO2 concentrations, and ADGE ∈ [0, 1] a parameter describing the effectiveness of adaptation
to damages from sulfur injection. Eq. (2.21) accounts only for ‘direct’ effects (such as changes
in the water cycle); ‘indirect’ effects (such as ocean acidification) are addressed in Section 2.4.
Moreover, the decision maker could possibly reduce the SRM side-effects through adaptation
measures, in a similar manner to the adaptation to damages from temperature increase (see
Eq. (2.15)). However, the research on this issue is in its infancy, and the costs of reducing the
highly uncertain SRM damages are still to be estimated. For simplification, we consider that
no adaptation measures are available for side-effects from sulfur injection, i.e. ADGE(t) = 1,∀t.
Thus, we disregard both benefits and costs of such adaptation, and we focus instead on a large
range of values for SRM side-effects.
Considering the multitude of systems that SRM impacts and the likely existence of complex
feedback loops, we consider its short- and long-term disturbances to be unpredictable and to
evolve in a possibly non-monotonic manner.8 While some of the responses to stratospheric sulfur
are believed to be fast (e.g., precipitation), others would come with longer time scales (e.g.,
oceanic responses) (MacMynowski et al., 2011a,b; Robock et al., 2013). We therefore rely on a
binomial tree representation in order to model the possible evolution of (monetary) side-effects
over time (αGE). This approach allows us to capture the uncertainty in the size of side-effects
and the possible variability in effects due to interactions between different components of the
Earth system. The binomial representation assumes that at each moment of time, side-effects
can either increase or decrease compared to the previous state, such that:
7Given the lack of evidence on the strength of the persistency of SRM side-effects, we run a sensitivity analysis for λ,
with λ ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}.
8This time-varying representation of SRM side-effects is motivated by the view that ecosystems present dynamic and
non-linear resilience to shocks and perturbations (Holling, 1973; Gunderson, 2003). Complex socio-ecological systems
can have a highly optimised tolerance to a certain set of disturbances (Carlson and Doyle, 2002; Janssen et al., 2007),
but they would suffer if the disturbances evolve or change outside of their optimised tolerance zone, causing them to
move to new equilibria.
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with u the percentage increase, and d the percentage decrease.
The parameter αGE refers to percentage losses in world GDP (Y ) due to side-effects from
geoengineering, when the radiative forcing created through sulfur injections equals the radiative
forcing for a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentrations (FGE = η). To capture all possible
(from highly optimistic to very pessimistic) side-effect scenarios, we allow parameter αGE to
take values between 0 - 100% of world GDP. We define three levels of side-effects: an initial
level αGE(t0), and two boundary values for the final period T defining a minimum (αGE = 0)
and a maximum level (αGE = 1). Similarly to Goes et al. (2011), we run different scenarios in
which the initial size of side-effects (αGE(t0)) takes values in the range [0, 0.1],
9 where the upper
limit of the initial damages – from an SRM radiative forcing equal to the radiative forcing for a
doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentrations – of 10% would correspond to output losses from
an increase in temperature of about 5.2 ◦C .
Parameter u is calibrated to link αGE(t0) to αGE in a monotonically increasing path over 15
decades (until 2155): αGE = αGE(t0) · (1 + u)15. Similarly, a monotonically decreasing path is
obtained for αGE = αGE(t0) · (1 + d)15. Based on the binomial representation, for each initial
αGE(t0) we obtain 32,768 (= 2
15) different scenarios. The optimisation is realised under perfect
foresight regarding each of the distinctive αGE scenarios.
2.3 Optimal policy mix
2.3.1 Selected scenarios for SRM side-effects
In this section, we show what are the optimal decisions regarding investments and spendings for
production and climate measures, and the impact on temperature levels and atmospheric GHG
stocks, when different climate policy portfolios are available. Namely, we consider three avail-
able portfolios: (i) mitigation only; (ii) mitigation and adaptation; (iii) mitigation, adaptation,
and SRM.
The net benefits of the SRM strategy depend on the uncertain side-effects entailed by sulfur
injection; as detailed in Section 2.2.3.2. To illustrate the optimal decisions when the SRM
option is available, we hereby choose three scenarios for SRM side-effects. Section 2.3.2 reports
on optimal decisions over the entire distribution of possible damages.
Following Goes et al. (2011), we first choose a constant path for SRM side-effects, entitled
hereafter mild scenario. With our calibration, SRM is optimally employed in at least one
decade over the horizon 2005-2155 if the constant side-effects are at maximum 0.15% of total
output (αGE(t) = 0.015, ∀t). Additionally, we consider two illustrative cases, where the side-
effect paths are time-varying. The first scenario refers to strong damages, where αGE increases
monotonically from αGE(t0) = 0.015 to αGE(2155) = αGE. It corresponds to the upper edge
9Goes et al. (2011) consider constant αGE ∈ {0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.05}.
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of the distribution (of all possible paths for side-effects starting at 0.015) when all forecasted
impacts would be triggered (e.g., ozone depletion, unfavourable change in precipitation patterns,
warming of the tropical tropopause) and the total magnitude would be amplified by cross-
interactions. The second scenario refers to weak damages, where αGE decreases monotonically
from αGE(t0) = 0.015 to αGE(2155) = αGE. It corresponds to the lower edge of the distribution
when sulfur injection has only modest side-effects. Tackling the climate change problem at
its root requires mitigation, which corresponds in our model to a transition from the carbon
economy to the low-carbon one. Fig. 2.1 illustrates the optimal capital accumulation in the
two economies. In the mitigation-only scenario, there is a clear transition between the two
Fig. 2.1: Capital accumulation in the carbon and low-carbon economies.
economies: the carbon-intensive capital is rapidly phased out after 2055 and completely replaced
by the low-carbon capital before the end of the century. When adaptation is also available as
a policy tool (mitigation and adaptation portfolio), this transition does take place, but starts
one decade later. The SRM option has contrasted implications: under mild and strong side-
effects, the transition takes place similarly to the mitigation-adaptation portfolio, whereas the
transition never occurs under weak side-effects. In agreement with Barrett (2008), our results
indicate thus that there is no incentive to curb GHG emissions if SRM is available and its
side-effects are benign.
Fig. 2.2 captures adaptation and SRM decisions. When its side-effects are weak, SRM is the
main instrument to address climate change. It is used after 2045 (substituting for mitigation
efforts), together with low proactive adaptation efforts (after 2095). When its side-effects are
mild, SRM is only used (for two only decades 2065 - 2085) as a complement to adaptation and
mitigation strategies. SRM is not used when its side-effects are strong. Concerning adaptation,
we note that: (i) the accumulation of proactive adaptation capital starts before spending on
reactive adaptation; and (ii) the decreasing trend in adaptation towards the end of the horizon
reflects the stabilisation of temperature (see Fig. 2.3) reached through SRM and/or mitigation.
An interesting aspect is the relative dynamics of reactive adaptation and SRM, as they share
the advantages of rapid implementation and immediate reduction of damages. The weight given
to either measure depends on the magnitude of sulfur damages: (i) in case of strong side-effects,
between the two, only adaptation is used; (ii) for mild and weak side-effects, both measures
Chapter 2. Is there room for geoengineering in the optimal climate policy mix? 17
Fig. 2.2: Capital accumulation in proactive adaptation, and decade spending with reactive adaptation
and SRM.
enter the policy portfolio, with more weight given to SRM when its side-effects are lower. This
results from the limited effectiveness of reactive adaptation. Fig. 2.3 reveals that temperature is
Fig. 2.3: Atmospheric temperature and GHG concentrations.
kept below the 2 ◦C threshold proposed by the Copenhagen Accord only when SRM side-effects
are weak. This is achieved at the expense of: (i) a large deployment of SRM; and (ii) high GHG
concentrations, due to the absence of any mitigation. In the other scenarios, concentrations
and then temperature decrease slowly with the transition to the low-carbon economy. When
SRM side-effects are mild, the use of SRM for two decades (2065-2085) reduces the temperature
deviation for this period below the mitigation-only scenario; as SRM is stopped in 2085, the
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temperature level begins to increase and converges to the weak side-effects path, reflecting
the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere. The use of adaptation (in the ‘mitigation and
adaptation’, and ‘mitigation, adaptation, and SRM with strong side-effects’ portfolios) reduces
the damages from climate change, postponing the transition to the clean economy and resulting
in higher temperature increases than the mitigation-only portfolio.
Imposing the 2 ◦C limit yields an earlier implementation of mitigation and/or SRM. In our
parametrisation, with strong side-effects, investments in mitigation are advanced by two decades
(2035); with weak side-effects, SRM remains predominant and is implemented from 2035 on.
To reduce climate change damages, adaptation is still used with a similar timing (compared to
the unconstrained temperature cases) but requires less funding.
2.3.2 Distributional analysis for SRM side-effects
In this section, we examine policy decisions for all side-effect scenarios from the binomial tree
representation. We allow for seven different initial side-effect levels from SRM, i.e. αGE(t0) ∈
{0.001, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.1}. For each αGE(t0), 32,768 different paths describing the
evolution of side-effects over time are obtained; see Section 2.2.3.2.
We analyse first the frequency with which the different climate policies (mitigation, reactive
and proactive adaptation, and SRM) are used. The frequency indicator is computed as the
number of scenarios in which the policy is employed in at least one decade over the horizon
2005-2155, divided by the total number of scenarios corresponding to each αGE(t0). However,
the frequency indicator tells nothing regarding the probability associated with the different αGE
paths.
Fig. 2.4 illustrates that the optimal policy portfolio depends on the initial value of SRM damages
(αGE(t0)). Namely, the use of SRM is strongly dependent on the initial SRM side-effects, such
that SRM is implemented in at least one decade in almost 100% of the scenarios when αGE(t0)
is 0.1%, declining abruptly as αGE(t0) increases, to the point that SRM is employed in about
11% of the scenarios when αGE(t0) is 10%. Despite the availability of the inexpensive SRM
Fig. 2.4: Policy frequency
different αGE(t0) (at λ = 0.5).
Fig. 2.5: Policy frequency
different λ (at αGE(t0) = 0.03).
option, mitigation and adaptation strategies are an important part of the optimal climate
policy portfolio. Proactive and reactive adaptation strategies are employed in all scenarios,
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independent of the SRM side-effects. The use of mitigation increases from about 80% when
initial side-effects are low, to 93% of the scenarios when αGE = 0.1.
The SRM strategy occupies the smallest share of total investments and spendings among the
different policies; see Fig. 2.B.2 in the Appendix. Its share decreases to a negligible level as
side-effects increase and SRM is less employed. Moving from the carbon-intensive to the low-
carbon technology requires investments that sum up to about 70% of the budget, with less
variability as SRM side-effects increase and SRM is consequently less used. Investments in
proactive adaptation and spendings with reactive adaptation are stable on average, being little
influenced by sulfur injection side-effects and SRM decisions.
Another parameter that strongly influences the use of SRM is the persistency of SRM side-
effects over time (parameter λ). Fig. 2.5 illustrates that for moderate initial SRM damages
(αGE(t0) = 0.03), SRM is used mostly as a complement to mitigation and adaptation even when
side-effects from sulfur injection are active only during the implementation period (λ = 0). The
SRM option becomes quickly unattractive as the persistency of side-effects increases. Moreover,
at higher persistency levels, the implementation of SRM is postponed towards the end of the
decision horizon. The start of mitigation and adaptation policies is not impacted on average
by SRM side-effects persistency; see Fig. 2.B.4 in the Appendix.
Due to the uncertainty related to the initial side-effects value and the persistency of damages
over time, the variability in SRM use is very large, and therefore the SRM option does not
constitute a robust climate policy. Even in the optimistic SRM side-effects scenarios, SRM
will play the role of a (rather modest) complement to adaptation and mitigation, and rarely a
substitute, as highlighted also by the breakdown of total investments and spendings.
2.4 Indirect and unexpected SRM side-effects
The previous section indicates that SRM should be used when its side-effects are low and their
persistency is limited. Here, we discuss additional concerns with SRM and analyse the adjust-
ments in the optimal policy mix.
Failure to continue with SRM
An important concern with SRM is the potential damage that would be caused by a failure to
sustain the sulfur injection (Robock et al., 2009; Goes et al., 2011). We analyse, in the case of
weak side-effects, the consequences of SRM interruption (e.g., following a technical breakdown)
from 2105. Our results confirm that temperature increases rapidly after the SRM failure, and
that the benefits to be gained from mitigation are then limited due to the inertia in the climate
system. Moreover, we find that proactive and reactive adaptation play an important role im-
mediately after the SRM interruption, partly reducing the damages from the sudden increase
in temperature; see Fig. 2.B.5 in the Appendix.
GHG concentrations
Our model accounts for direct SRM side-effects, but scientists point also to indirect side-effects
such as ocean acidification (Orr et al., 2005). This arises from high CO2 concentrations in the
absence of mitigation. Damages to ocean ecosystems may occur starting with CO2 concentra-
tion levels of 450 ppm (Cao and Caldeira, 2008). In our distributional analysis, no scenario is
consistent with such a level, and, in fact, no scenario keeps concentration levels below 550 ppm.
The percentage of scenarios that reach concentration levels in the range [550, 650] ppm strongly
depends on the initial SRM side-effects: only 6% of the scenarios when αGE(t0) = 0.001, and
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about 92% of scenarios when αGE(t0) = 0.1 (Fig. 2.B.3c in Appendix). Moreover, low initial
side-effects levels are associated also with longer periods during which high concentrations are
maintained (Fig. 2.B.3d). Finally, the average concentration level (and its right skewness) is
much higher for low αGE levels when SRM is widely used and mitigation efforts are scarce
(Fig. 2.B.3a, b).
When constraining for instance concentration levels to 550 ppm (in the case of αGE(t0) = 0.03,
where average MAT was 530 ppm), the use of SRM is reduced from 21.79% to 19.45% of all
scenarios, while the use of mitigation is increased from 88.68% to 100%. Adaptation continues
to be used in all scenarios.
Wrong assumptions about side-effects
Finally, the most important concern with SRM is probably that the type and magnitude of
side-effects remain largely unknown. Up to now, the optimal policy mix was evaluated under
perfect foresight, assuming that the side-effects were known along each scenario. Here, we
study the consequences of incurring a different (random) side-effect path than the one pre-
sumed. First, we compute following Eq. (2.21) the presumed SRM damages (DGE(t, s)) that
translate into output losses, where s is given by each SRM side-effects path from the binomial
representation. Next, we compute unexpected output losses (DGE(t, s
′)) that would arise if a
different side-effect path s′ occurs. More precisely, we replace in Eq. (2.21) αGE(t) by a factor
chosen randomly from the possible side-effect paths, while keeping the same levels for sulfur
injection. Forming wrong assumptions regarding the side-effects should only last for short pe-
riods. Indeed, although the earth system presents some inertia, the magnitude of side-effects is
ex-post identifiable via decreases in production. However, it might take several decades until
true realisations are identified. As an illustration, we consider an error horizon of one to three
decades and compare output losses10 under known (presumed) and random (unexpected) side-
effect paths. Fig. 2.6 reveals that output losses double on average when the side-effect path
has a different outcome than the one assumed, even for a ten-year horizon. With a twenty
to thirty-year horizon, the variance and right skewness of output losses increases further on
average, indicating that extreme losses have a higher chance of occurrence. The output loss
is higher in the case of larger initial SRM side-effects, indicating that when SRM implemen-
tation is optimal in only few of the possible αGE paths, misestimating the damages can be
very punitive; see Fig. 2.B.6 in the Appendix. Besides estimating welfare losses, we study the
adjustments to the optimal policy mix after observing the true damages. As an example, we
examine the (extreme) case where side-effects were assumed to be weak, but turn out to be
strong. With (presumed) weak side-effects, SRM is first implemented in 2065 at the expense
of any mitigation efforts. But suppose that after three decades the policy maker realises that
side-effects are actually strong. We simulate this situation by running the model from 2065 on
with the true αGE values, keeping all investment and spending decisions blocked for the error
horizon (2065-2085). The policy maker reacts by stopping all SRM activities from 2095 on.
A quick transition to the low-carbon economy takes place, but cannot prevent a temperature
increase to almost 3 ◦C. To alleviate some of the climate damages, adaptation (especially re-
active) is extensively used; see Fig. 2.B.7 in the Appendix. Overall, deviating during the error
horizon from the optimal policy in case of strong side-effects results in lower consumption levels
for the remaining horizon.
10For each scenario s ∈ [1, 32768], we compute the sum of presumed damages as: SDGE = ∑tGE+h∆tt=tGE DGE(t, s),
where tGE is the first period of SRM implementation in scenario s and h ∈ {1, 2, 3} decades of SRM implementation.
Unexpected damages are computed as: 1
5000
∑5000
i=1
∑tGE+h∆t
t=tGE
DGE(t, s
′
i), where αSE(t, s
′
i) is randomly selected from the
initial side-effect distribution over 5000 simulations.
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Fig. 2.6: Distribution of output losses under known and random SRM damages for different error
horizons (SDGE =
∑tGE+h∆t
tGE
DGE(t), αGE(t0) = 0.03, λ = 0.5).
Note: The figure captures the distributional characteristics of the average yearly GDP losses due to environmental side-
effects of sulfur injection, for two cases: (i) under perfect foresight, when the realisations of the αSE path are known,
and (ii) when the realisation of the αSE is random and differs from the assumed one. The three panels refer to three
different geoengineering implementation horizons, of one, two, and three decades respectively. Results refer to averages
over 10,000 simulations.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper extends the Ada-BaHaMa model with an explicit representation of reactive adap-
tation and geoengineering (SRM). Reactive adaptation is modelled as a flow, and allows for
its benefits to be internalized once with its costs, representing a climate policy that may avoid
problems with discounting preferences. Reactive adaptation complements proactive adapta-
tion, and its modelling gives a richer representation of possible adaptation strategies. SRM is a
potential alternative to traditional climate strategies, and we distinguish between its (desired)
effects on temperature levels and its (undesired and uncertain) side-effects on the environment.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to assess, within an integrated assess-
ment framework, the optimal policy mix when mitigation, proactive and reactive adaptation,
and SRM strategies are available. We focus on the possible interactions and substitutions be-
tween the different policies, while accounting for the possible variability and persistency in the
side-effects of SRM.
Our analysis reveals that the climate portfolio should give primary weight to mitigation and
adaptation. With large predominance, SRM takes the role of a complement to mitigation and
adaptation, and rarely a substitute, revealing that SRM will not provide the easy way out
of the climate problem, replacing mitigation. The use of SRM is strongly dependent on the
magnitude of its side-effects and their persistency through time. Due to the uncertainty related
to these two features, the variability in SRM use is very large, leading us to conclude that the
SRM option lacks robustness.
An extensive use of SRM brings additional concerns. One is the potential damage caused by
a failure to continue with sulfur injection. Another one consists in indirect side-effects, such
as ocean acidification. We investigate also possible welfare losses due to incorrect assumptions
about SRM side-effects. Our analysis shows that output losses rise considerably when side-
effects are different than presumed, even for short error horizons. Besides, longer horizons are
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more costly, with extreme losses having a higher chance of occurrence. Accounting for these
additional concerns reduces the use of SRM.
Although adaptation postpones the start of mitigation, it plays a vital role in reducing dam-
ages from sudden and sharp temperature increases in case the SRM option is unanticipatedly
stopped (e.g., in case of technical breakdown or if side-effects prove to be sizeable compared to
expectations). This particular feature highlights the importance of accounting for adaptation
in the climate policy portfolio, especially when analysing the mitigation - SRM trade-off.
In our cost-benefit approach, despite the predominant role of mitigation, we note that invest-
ments in the low-carbon economy start after 2055 at the earliest. However, when following a
cost-effectiveness approach to limit temperature increase to 2 ◦C, climate policies are imple-
mented 20 years earlier. Meeting the agreed 2 ◦C temperature target would thus require earlier
actions at the global level.
Our analysis could be improved along the following lines. First, our model assumes exogenous
technological progress. With an endogenous formulation, one might expect that (R&D) in-
vestments in low-carbon technologies start earlier to get ‘on-time’ the needed technologies for
mitigation. Second, being derived in a cost-benefit framework, our results (and in particular the
timing of mitigation) critically depend on the magnitude of the estimated climate change dam-
ages, calibrated in our model on DICE and AD-DICE. Recent papers (Stern, 2013; Pindyck,
2013) signal possible underestimations of climate change damages in the DICE-like integrated
assessment models; further research could help address these issues. Third, the deployment of
SRM depends on various unknowns, such as the type and magnitude of side-effects, and the
process governing their variability through time. The calibration of all involved parameters
in our model will benefit from revisions reflecting scientific advances. Finally, our model as-
sumes the existence of a well-functioning international cooperation for undertaking mitigation
and SRM at a global level. Future research could improve our understanding of the two poli-
cies by accounting for differentiated geographical impacts and investigating strategic country
behaviour.
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Appendix Chapter 2
2.A Parameter values
The following three tables present the calibration values of the model parameters. We calibrated a baseline scenario – in
which production is obtained only with the carbon-intensive technology – to match as closely as possible production, GHG
concentrations, temperature trajectories, and population dynamics of the DICE2007 model (Nordhaus, 2007). Without
distinguishing between specific technologies, the carbon-intensive and low-carbon economies are calibrated based on the
MERGE model (Manne and Richels, 2005). Calibration of the adaptation strategies follows the AD-DICE approach
(de Bruin et al., 2009), accounting for the additional reactive adaptation option and its complementarity with proactive
adaptation. The calibration of K3max and S3max relies on World Bank estimates (Margulis and Narain, 2009).
Table 2.A.1: Calibration parameters.
Parameter Value/Dynamics Definition
Time and preference
t ∈ [2005, 2155] Time period
t0 2005 Initial time period
n ∈ [0, 14] Decades passed since t0
∆t 10 years Decision time step
r 0.015 Yearly rate of time preference
µ 2 1/µ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for CRRA utility
Energy
Carbon economy
pE1 0.425 Energy price per unit of emissions
φ1(0) 0.65 Energy efficiency at t0
φ1(t) φ1(0)(e
υφ1κφ1 )/eυφ1 Energy efficiency at t
υφ1 −gφ1(0)/dgφ1
κφ1 exp(−dgφ1(n+ 1))
gφ1(0) 0.2 Growth rate of energy efficiency at t0
dgφ1 0.3 Rate of decrease for growth rate of energy efficiency
Low-carbon economy
pE2 0.55 Energy price per unit of emissions
φ2(0) 10 Initial value for energy efficiency
φ2(t) φ2(0)(e
υφ2κφ2 )/eυφ2 Energy efficiency at t
υφ2 −gφ2(0)/dgφ2
κφ2 exp(−dgφ2(n+ 1))
gφ2(0) 0.8 Growth rate of energy efficiency at t0
dgφ2 0.01 Rate of decrease for growth rate of energy efficiency
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Parameter Value/Dynamics Definition
Production
Y A(t){K1(t)α1(φ1(t)E1(t))θ1(t)L1(t)1−α1−θ1(t)+
K2(t)
α2(φ2(t)E2(t))
θ2(t)L2(t)
1−α2−θ2(t)} Cobb-Douglas production
A(t) A(t− 1)/(1− gA0e−(dgA)n) Total factor productivity (TFP)
A(0) 0.039 Initial value for TFP
gA0 0.11 Initial value for growth rate of TFP
dgA 0.005 Rate of decrease for growth rate of TFP
αi 0.3 Capital elasticity in production function
θi(0) 0.05 Initial value for energy elasticity in production function
gθi(0) -0.0116 Initial value for growth rate of energy elasticity
dgθi 0.008 Rate of decrease for growth rate of energy elasticity
θi(t) θi(0)(e
υθi
κθi )/eυθi Energy elasticity in production function
υθi gθ1(0)/dgθ1
κθi e
−dgθi (n+1)
i ∈ {1, 2} Index 1 denotes the carbon-intensive technology
Index 2 denotes the low-carbon technology
Capital accumulation
K1(t0) 137 Initial carbon-intensive technology capital (billion USD)
K2(t0) 0.0137 Initial low-carbon technology capital (billion USD)
K3(t0) 0 Initial proactive adaptation capital (billion USD)
δK1 0.1 Annual carbon capital depreciation rate
δK2 0.1 Annual low-carbon capital depreciation rate
δK3 0.1 Annual proactive adaptation capital depreciation rate
Labor
L(t) L0e
g
dg
(
1−e−
dg
n−1
)
World population at t
L0 6,409 2005 world population (millions)
g 0.08 Initial value for growth rate of population
dg 0.3 Rate of decrease for growth rate of population
GHG Stocks
MAT (t+ ∆t) ∆t(E1(t) + E2(t)) + ψ11MAT (t) + ψ21MUP (t) GHG concentrations in the atmosphere
MUP (t+ ∆t) ψ12MAT (t) + ψ22MUP (t) + ψ32MLO(t) GHG concentrations in the upper strata
MLO(t+ ∆t) ψ23MUP (t) + ψ33MLO(t) GHG concentrations in the lower strata
MAT (t0) 808.8 Concentration in atmosphere 2005 (GtC)
MUP (t0) 1,255 Concentration in upper strata 2005 (GtC)
MLO(t0) 18,365 Concentration in lower strata 2005 (GtC)
ψ11 0.810712 Carbon cycle transition matrix
ψ12 0.189288 Carbon cycle transition matrix
ψ21 0.097213 Carbon cycle transition matrix
ψ22 0.852787 Carbon cycle transition matrix
ψ23 0.05 Carbon cycle transition matrix
ψ32 0.003119 Carbon cycle transition matrix
ψ33 0.996881 Carbon cycle transition matrix
Radiative forcing
F (t) ηlog2
(
MAT (t)
MAT (1750)
)
+ FEX(t)− FGE(t) Total radiative forcing (Wm−2)
η 3.7 Radiative forcing from a doubling of MAT (Wm
−2)
MAT (1750) 596.4 Concentration in atmosphere 1750 (GtC)
FEX(2000) -0.06 Estimate of 2000 forcing of non-CO2 GHG
FEX(2100) 0.30 Estimate of 2100 forcing of non-CO2 GHG
FGE(t) ωG(t) Radiative forcing created by sulphates
ω 0.75 Effectiveness factor of sulfur injection
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Parameter Value/Dynamics Definition
Temperature increase
TAT (t+ ∆t) TAT (t) + ξ1[F (t+ ∆t)− Increase in earth’s mean surface temperature
ξ2TAT (t)− ξ3 (TAT (t)− TLO(t))]
TLO(t+ ∆t) TLO(t) + ξ4 (TAT (t)− TLO(t)) Increase in deep ocean’s mean surface temperature
ξ1 0.22 Climate-equation coefficient for upper level
ξ2 1.27 Climate-equation coefficient
ξ3 0.30 Transfer coefficient upper to lower stratum
ξ4 0.05 Transfer coefficient for lower level
Td 0.106 Temp level at which damages start to occur
catT 16 Catastrophic temperature increase
Adaptation
AD(t) 1− αADp(t) K3(t)K3max(t) − αADr (t)
S3(t)
S3max(t)
Total adaptation effectiveness
αADp(t) (αADp − αADp)
(
γ1
K3(t)
K3max(t)
+ γ2
S3(t)
S3max(t)
)
+ αADp Proactive adaptation effectiveness
αADr (t) (αADr − αADr )
(
γ1
S3(t)
S3max(t)
+ γ2
K3(t)
K3max(t)
)
+ αADr Reactive adaptation effectiveness
αADp 0.22 Max marginal proactive adaptation efficiency
αADr 0.25 Max marginal reactive adaptation efficiency
αADp 0.20 Min marginal proactive adaptation efficiency
αADr 0.23 Min marginal reactive adaptation efficiency
γ1 0.67 Learning effect parameter
γ2 0.33 Complementarity parameter
K3max(t) βADp
(
TAT (t)
Td
)γADp
Max K3 to ensure optimal effectiveness of proactive
S3max(t) βADr
(
TAT (t)
Td
)γADr
Max S3 to ensure optimal effectiveness of reactive
βADp 0.0138 Scale value
βADr 0.0021 Scale value
γADp 2.0081 Power value
γADr 2.0400 Power value
Geoengineering
S4(t) pGE(t)G(t) Annual spending with SRM
pGE(t) 25 Cost of injecting one tetragram sulfur (billion USD)
DGE(t+ ∆t)λDGE(t) + αGE(t+ ∆t)
FGE(t+∆t)
η
ADGE(t) Side-effects from SRM (% Y)
λ ∈ {0; 0.25; 0.50; 0.75; 1} Persistency parameter of SRM side-effects
ADGE(t) 1 Effectiveness of adaptation to SRM side-effects
αGE(t0) ∈ [0, 1] Initial value of SRM side-effects
αuGE(t+ ∆t) (1 + u)αGE(t) Upward move in SRM side-effects
αdGE(t+ ∆t) (1 + d)αGE(t) Downward move in SRM side-effects
αGE 1 Max SRM side-effects in 2155
αGE 0 Min SRM side-effects in 2155
u 15
√
αGE
αGE(t0)
− 1 Percentage increase in SRM side-effects
d 15
√
αGE
αGE(t0)
− 1 Percentage decrease in SRM side-effects
Chapter 2. Is there room for geoengineering in the optimal climate policy mix? 26
2.B Distributional analysis of SRM side-effects: supporting results
2.B.1 Start of the climate policy implementation
This paragraph discusses the optimal start of each climate policy (mitigation, proactive and reactive adaptation, SRM)
implementation. Fig. 2.B.1 displays the distributions of policy initiation (first year the policy is implemented) over each
of the αGE(t0) scenarios. While the implementation of mitigation and adaptation presents on average no dependency to
SRM side-effect magnitudes, the start of the SRM strategy is highly sensitive to the initial αGE .
Fig. 2.B.1: Year when policy implementation starts across different αGE(t0).
2.B.2 Budget allocation between investments and spendings
In this section, we analyse how is the budget optimally divided between investments (in the carbon and low-carbon
economies and proactive adaptation) and spendings (with reactive adaptation and SRM). We are interested in underlying
not only the relative monetary requirements of different climate policies, but also how these vary with respect to initial
SRM side-effects. For this purpose, we define in Eq. (2.B.1) an indicator of total discounted investments and spendings
(IS):
IS =
14∑
n=0
e−rn∆t∆t[I1(t0 + n∆t) + I2(t0 + n∆t) + I3(t0 + n∆t) + S3(t0 + n∆t) + S4(t0 + n∆t)] (2.B.1)
with t0 = 2005, n ∈ [0, 14], and ∆t = 10 years. IS captures total investments and spendings over the 2005 - 2155
horizon. Fig. 2.B.2 displays the distribution of total investments/spendings for each policy, depending on the initial
SRM side-effects (αGE(t0)).
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Fig. 2.B.2: Budget division across different αGE(t0).
Fig. 2.B.2 reveals that the investment/spendings budget is primarily distributed between the carbon and low-carbon
technologies. When the initial SRM side-effects are low (αGE(t0) = 0.001), investments in the carbon-economy predomi-
nate; as αGE(t0) increases, most investments are directed towards the low-carbon economy. The SRM strategy occupies
the smallest share of total investments and spendings among the different policies, and this share decreases to a negligible
level as side-effects increase.
2.B.3 Atmospheric GHG concentrations
Fig. 2.B.3 captures different aspects regarding the distribution of GHG concentrations attained for different levels of
initial SRM side-effects. Panels a) and b) illustrate average and maximum GHG concentrations, respectively. Panel c)
shows the percentage breakdown of scenarios that attain GHG concentration levels below and above 650 ppm. Panel d)
illustrates how many decades (out of 15) are GHG concentrations kept above 550 ppm.
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The percentage of scenarios that reach concentration levels in the range [550, 650] ppm strongly depends on the initial
SRM side-effects: only 6% of the scenarios when αGE(t0) = 0.001, and about 92% of scenarios when αGE(t0) = 0.1
(Fig. 2.B.3c in Appendix). Moreover, low initial side-effects levels are associated also with longer periods during which
high concentrations are maintained (Fig. 2.B.3d). Finally, the average concentration level (and its right skewness) is
much higher for low αGE levels when SRM is widely used and mitigation efforts are scarce (Fig. 2.B.3a, b).
Fig. 2.B.3: GHG concentrations across different αGE(t0).
2.B.4 Sensitivity to the persistency of SRM side-effects
The use of SRM is subject not only to the initial level of side-effects, but also to the persistency of damages over time
(parameter λ). Fig. 2.B.4 illustrates the distribution of years when different climate policies are initiated, depending on
the persistency of SRM side-effects.
Fig. 2.B.4 shows that on average the start of the mitigation and adaptation strategies is robust to the persistency of the
SRM side-effects. However, the start of the SRM implementation strongly depends on the persistency parameter: higher
persistency postpones the start of sulphur injection.
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Fig. 2.B.4: Year when policy implementation starts across different λ (at αGE(t0) = 0.03).
2.B.5 Failure to continue with SRM
Fig. 2.B.5 shows the evolution of capital, spendings, temperature deviation, and GHG concentrations in two scenarios.
In the first one (SRM (2065 - 2155) in black), SRM is implemented and continued as long as it is optimal. In the second
one, (SRM (stopped 2105) in blue) SRM is no longer available after 2105, and the decision maker need to adjust all the
decisions after this period.
Fig. 2.B.5 reveals that after SRM is stopped, a quick transition from the carbon-intensive to the low-carbon economy takes
place. Proactive and reactive adaptation strategies are quickly implemented to reduce damages from the temperature
increase. Due to inertia in the climate system, the abrupt emission reduction (following the rapid transition to the low-
carbon economy) translates only slowly into GHG concentration reduction. The deviation in atmospheric temperature
increases very fast, reaching 3.5 ◦C by 2155.
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Fig. 2.B.5: Changes in policy, temperature, and GHG concentrations after failure to continue with
SRM (αGE(t0) = 0.03, αGE(2155) = 0, λ = 0.5).
2.B.6 Unexpected SRM side-effects
Fig. 2.B.6 compares the sum of output losses under known (presumed) and random (unexpected) SRM side-effects.
Losses double on average when the side-effect path has a different outcome than the one assumed. The loss is higher in
the case of larger initial SRM side-effects.
Fig. 2.B.6: Expected vs. unexpected SRM damages across different αGE(t0) (λ = 0.5).
Fig. 2.B.7 shows the evolution of capital, spendings, temperature deviation, and GHG concentrations in the three
scenarios described in Table 2.B.1. Fig. 2.B.7 reveals that as the decision maker realizes that SRM side-effects are much
larger than initially estimated, all SRM activities are stopped, and a quick transition from the carbon-intensive to the
low-carbon economy takes place. Proactive and reactive adaptation strategies are immediately implemented to reduce
Chapter 2. Is there room for geoengineering in the optimal climate policy mix? 31
the damages caused by the large and sudden increase in temperature. GHG concentrations start a slow decline with the
transition to the low-carbon economy.
Fig. 2.B.7: Changes in policy, temperature, and GHG concentration after unexpected SRM side-
effects (αGE(t0) = 0.03, λ = 0.5).
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Table 2.B.1: Analysed expected and unexpected SRM side-effects scenarios.
Scenario Explanation Assumed SRM side-effects Realised SRM side-effects
S1 Known best-case scenario αGE(t0) = 0.03 αGE(t0) = 0.03
αGE(2155) = 0.001 αGE(2155) = 0.001
S2 Unexpected scenario αGE(t0) = 0.03 αGE(t0) = 0.03
αGE(2155) = 0.001 αGE(2155) = 1
S3 Known worst-case scenario αGE(t0) = 0.03 αGE(t0) = 0.03
αGE(2155) = 1 αGE(2155) = 1
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Baseline choice and performance
implications for REDD
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Abstract
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) projects are being
designed and implemented across tropical countries, intending to curb the contribution of de-
forestation to global greenhouse gas emissions. An important aspect of REDD implementation
is choosing the deforestation baseline against which reductions are measured. We solve a dy-
namic model of land conversion from forest to agriculture in the presence of a voluntary REDD
scheme, and assess the impact of four baseline types on REDD performance. We show that none
of the analysed baselines dominates the others in all key performance aspects, and that the final
baseline choice will need to maximise the trade-off between the different goals of REDD. We ar-
gue that the current proposal of rewarding reductions in emissions below the historical average
could be improved by using a forward-looking baseline; this is shown to better account for the
opportunity costs faced by landowners and to result in higher emission reductions. Moreover,
we advocate the switch from a single-threshold baseline to a corridor methodology, which would
provide continued incentives for reduced deforestation, even during periods of high opportunity
costs. We finally show how the selection of certain baseline attributes, such as corridor band-
width and symmetry, can enhance overall performance.
Keywords: Deforestation; REDD; Baselines; Effectiveness and Efficiency.
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3.1 Introduction
Emissions from deforestation and forest degradation rank as the second largest source of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere after fossil fuel combustion, contributing about 12% of global anthro-
pogenic emissions (van der Werf et al., 2009). Programs targeting the Reduction of Emissions
from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD and REDD+)1 have emerged as potential
instruments for stabilising atmospheric CO2 concentrations and mitigating climate change.
REDD programs target forest preservation in tropical areas, where deforestation is the largest
contributor to total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (van der Werf et al., 2009). Here, the
major drivers of deforestation have often been identified as timbering, land conversion to agricul-
ture, cattle ranching, and the establishment of new settlements (Pfaff et al., 2013). Restricting
deforestation would limit the development of such land use activities and alter the revenue flow
of landowners. To compensate for the foregone income from deforestation, REDD schemes offer
financial rewards for forest conservation.
REDD programs aim to achieve additionality, i.e. payments are intended to reward reductions
in emissions from deforestation below business-as-usual levels. However, these counterfactual
deforestation rates, which would occur in the absence of the policy, are not observable and,
therefore, highly challenging to assess. Thus, REDD payments are linked to reductions below
estimations of the business-as-usual, so-called baselines or reference levels.
The reward system of REDD can be financed through the creation of special funds or be designed
as a market mechanism (Palmer, 2010; Corbera and Schroeder, 2011). In the second case,
reducing deforestation below a reference level generates credits eligible for sale on various carbon
markets. International emitters2 that are above their compliance level and short of CO2 permits
might find reducing emissions internally to be expensive (Diaz et al., 2011) and could benefit
from the comparative affordability of REDD permits (Kindermann et al., 2008; Stern, 2008).
Despite this economic advantage, REDD projects remain complex to implement and prone
to failure. Various aspects appear problematic: the measurement of reductions in emissions
below business-as-usual levels; raising sufficient funds for implementation or establishing a link
with (immature) carbon markets; the risk that forest loss will be postponed in time (lack of
permanence) or transferred to unregulated areas (leakage); the existence of clear property rights
that would rule out false permit claims from encroachers (Angelsen, 2008a).
The success of REDD is critically sensitive to the incentive structure promoted by the schemes
(Griscom et al., 2009; Cattaneo et al., 2010; Busch et al., 2012). A central aspect is the estab-
lishment of the baseline against which reductions in deforestation are measured and financial
rewards are granted. However, setting the baseline is not a straightforward task. First of all, to
encourage participation and ensure significant reductions in GHG emissions, the baseline design
would need to ensure that REDD rewards cover the various opportunity costs of deforestation
(Irawan et al., 2013). In the same time, the selected baseline should achieve emission reduc-
tions in a cost-efficient manner, avoiding that payments greatly exceed opportunity costs and
result in windfall profits for landowners (Busch et al., 2012), instead of being used for reduc-
ing deforestation elsewhere. As well, flooding the carbon markets with REDD credits in large
supply would drive the emission allowance price down and possibly reduce the effectiveness of
the already weak markets (Doupe´, 2014, WP).
1While REDD gives priority to forest preservation, REDD+ targets additionally the sustainable management of forests
and the enhancement of carbon stocks.
2These emitters could be found among the European polluting companies who are regulated by the EU ETS and need
to comply with emission reduction targets.
Chapter 3. Baseline choice and performance implications for REDD 36
REDD programs allow candidate countries to prepare their own proposals of baseline compu-
tation, and submit them for approval by a team of experts, together with supporting evidence
(UNFCCC, 2011, Decision 12/CP.117). Several organisations have emerged with the goal of
assisting countries in participating successfully in REDD programs, by offering technical, le-
gal, and financial support. Among them, notable actors are the Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility, the Amazon Fund, the UN-REDD program, Norway’s International Climate and For-
est Initiative (NICFI), and the German REDD Early Movers Program. So far, the existing
REDD initiatives supported by these organisations have endorsed the decision of the UNFCCC
to compute reference levels based on past deforestation rates, adjusted to account for country
circumstances3 (UNFCCC, 2009, Decision 4/CP.15). The decision to opt for historical reference
levels is motivated by the desire to ensure transparency and credibility (The German REDD
Early Movers Program, 2014). In order to account for national circumstances, historical aver-
ages can be adjusted upwards for countries with historically low deforestation rates and high
remaining forest areas; downward adjustments are prescribed to countries with clear decreasing
trends in deforestation (FCPF Carbon Fund, 2013).
Despite its recognised advantages, the historical baseline lacks the ability to reflect future
drivers of deforestation. Moreover, provided as an average, it neglects the variability observed in
deforestation rates, coming from fluctuating economic conditions. The historical baseline might,
therefore, fail to account properly for the true opportunity costs that landowners face. Trying
to address these issues, several baseline methodologies have been proposed; for an overview see
Huettner et al. (2009) and Griscom et al. (2009). The contribution of our paper is to provide
further insights into how to choose the most robust baseline methodology.
Our paper joins the stream of literature dedicated to the optimal contract design of REDD
schemes (Huettner et al., 2009; Busch et al., 2009, 2011; Sathaye et al., 2011). We compare
the impacts of four different baseline methodologies on REDD success. We focus on two of
the most popular baseline categories: a retrospective baseline reflecting the historical average
deforestation, and a model-implied baseline that proxies the business-as-usual deforestation
path. We also analyse the so-called fixed corridor approach, which replaces the unique threshold
level with an upper and a lower bound. In addition, we propose a new baseline type, the variable
corridor approach, which aims to gather the strong points of the model-implied and the corridor
baselines.
Our analysis relies on several steps. First, we show how to model land use decisions in the
presence of REDD in a dynamic setting. In a second step, we rank baselines according to
different performance indicators: (i) a measure of forest preservation (effectiveness), (ii) an
indicator of the marginal cost of this preservation per hectare (efficiency), and (iii) a measure
of changes in the total income of the landowner (change in welfare). The economic analysis
is further put into perspective through a qualitative evaluation, accounting for environmental,
technical, and social concerns with REDD. Finally, the paper explores different possibilities to
improve the performance of each baseline category.
Previous research on REDD design overlooked the inter-temporality dimension in forest deci-
sions (Huettner et al., 2009; Busch et al., 2009, 2011). Huettner et al. (2009) ran a survey to
qualitatively compare three types of retrospective baselines, based on the historical deforesta-
tion rate, with a forward-looking baseline. We extend the types of baselines analysed beyond
those considered in Huettner et al. (2009) and focus on the economic incentives generated by
each baseline. Busch et al. (2009) approach the ranking of different baselines via a one-period
partial equilibrium model at the country level. They show that an effective national baseline
3We thank an anonymous referee for the input.
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simultaneously provides incentives to reduce deforestation in areas of high rates and ensures the
continuation with low deforestation practices in areas of low previous forest loss. Busch et al.
(2011) extend this approach by introducing different levels of annual REDD financing, either
through funds or access to a dedicated market. They highlight the importance of designing
baselines that minimise leakage to unregulated areas and are generous enough to guarantee the
participation of both countries with high or low deforestation rates. Cattaneo et al. (2010)
use a static partial equilibrium model to compare five different baseline designs from an eq-
uity perspective. They show that the crediting schemes considered obtain similar reductions in
deforestation, but differ greatly in terms of cost-efficiency and two measures of equity.
The highly dynamic nature of land use practices has been studied in numerous papers and
benefits from a large variety of models; for a review see Verburg et al. (2004). However,
only a few papers deal explicitly with dynamic land use changes in the presence of REDD,
and none of them tests for different baseline methodologies (Ollivier, 2012; Lu and Liu, 2013;
Vitel et al., 2013; Mosnier et al., 2014). We attempt to fill this gap by analysing our selected
baselines with a dynamic land use model. The dynamic model helps us illustrate the optimal
deforestation decisions at several points in time, and show how land owners choose to take part
in REDD depending on the time-varying opportunity costs for deforestation. Anticipating our
results, with the help of the dynamic approach we are able to demonstrate that some baseline
methodologies offer continued incentives to keep deforestation below business-as-usual levels,
while others achieve only temporary effectiveness. This finding is key for understanding how
we could potentially solve non-permanence issues with REDD and can only be grasped in a
dynamic setting.
Another important decision concerning REDD implementation is the choice of the adminis-
trative level at which emission reductions are calculated and payments are made. While the
accounting of emission reductions and the management of REDD payments is most likely to
take place at the national level, land use decisions are usually taken at the subnational (re-
gional or household) level. This reinforces the need to understand the incentives received by
the local landowners (Angelsen, 2010; Busch et al., 2012). Our model describes the decisions of
a single landowner who optimises over the rate of deforestation as he or she expands agriculture
activities. The single-agent approach is in line with the literature on optimal forest extraction
(Angelsen, 2007) and with a new literature trend arguing that REDD will face the same issues
as traditional integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), since it will have to
account for incentives at the community and individual levels (Blom et al., 2010). It is not
intended to suggest that the complexity of implementing REDD projects can be summarised
into a single-player model; nonetheless, we believe that our approach is relevant for highlight-
ing the behavioral changes at the micro level, which can then be used to inform national or
jurisdictional policy decisions.
The choice of the administrative level for REDD is expected to impact the effectiveness in
reducing deforestation. Implementing REDD at the site-level, and then aggregating results
at a larger (national) scale, may give way to leakage of deforestation to other areas (Busch
et al., 2012), and raises questions regarding the organisation of carbon payments at the local
level4. However, the estimation of reference levels is more likely to reflect the business-as-
usual deforestation path if set at the household level, since jurisdictions at lower scales may
have better information regarding the specific drivers of deforestation in the area (Busch et al.,
2012). Potential policies for avoiding leakage include: (i) the monitoring of deforestation rates
at the national level; and (ii) the setting of penalties for deforestation rates that exceed the
estimated business-as-usual level, coming from beneficiaries of REDD payments elsewhere. In
4We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this important point.
Chapter 3. Baseline choice and performance implications for REDD 38
this paper, we adopt the view that REDD should focus on providing incentives for reduced
deforestation at the local level, while ensuring national monitoring.
Our analysis reaches several conclusions that we hold relevant for the design of forest carbon
policies. First, solving for the optimal deforestation rate under a REDD regime, we show that
baseline choice impacts REDD performance at multiple economic, social, and environmental
levels. None of the considered baselines can fulfil all REDD criteria simultaneously, and base-
line choice needs to maximise the trade-off between the different goals. We argue that the
widespread current practice of rewarding emissions below the historical deforestation average
could be improved by implementing a forward-looking baseline that would better account for the
opportunity costs faced by landowners and would result in higher emission reductions. More-
over, we advocate the switch from a single-threshold baseline approach to a corridor method-
ology; this reduces losses from estimation errors and provides continued incentives for reduced
deforestation, even during periods of high opportunity costs.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 introduces our methodology and the
main assumptions of the dynamic model. In Section 3.3 a numerical application is performed
and the robustness of our results is tested. Section 3.4 concludes on the policy implications of
our results and the link with broader issues of REDD implementation.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Model setting
In our model, the owner of a large area of forested land decides if, when and to what extent
to exploit the forest for agricultural activities. To limit his or her deforestation, the owner is
offered the possibility to take part in a REDD program that grants carbon permits each time
the deforestation rate is below a pre-specified threshold. We model the voluntary participation
in REDD along the approach of Busch et al. (2009, 2011), where the owner can “opt in” as
long as he considers this to his or her advantage.5 In our model, reforestation options are not
accounted for; this assumes that costs for switching back from cropland to forest (together with
the forgone discounted cash-flows from agriculture) are large enough to render the reforestation
option unattractive.
The landowner’s revenues are a trade-off between the net income from land exploitation and
REDD rewards. The more the owner deforests, the higher the incomes from selling timber
and subsequently using land for agricultural activities, and the lower the number of received
REDD permits. Alternatively, lower deforestation (below the defined baseline level) results in
smaller incomes from agriculture and timbering, but higher REDD revenues. We choose an
approach similar to Busch et al. (2009), where the owner’s revenues from land exploitation are
modelled as a unique composite commodity, representing both the harvesting value of timber
and a perpetual discounted flow of agricultural activities on the land.6
The owner maximises the sum of total discounted profits, taking into account the parameters
that define the decision environment: the state of the forest, the dynamics of composite com-
modity and REDD permit prices, and the specified deforestation baseline. In our model, the
5In the paper of Busch et al. (2009, 2011) the owner will “opt in” if the REDD revenues are higher than the agricultural
rental price and “opt out” otherwise.
6Reducing the complexity of the harvesting function, which is not central for comparing the reference levels, allows
us to focus on the dynamic choice between maintaining the forest cover and harvesting.
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prices of the composite commodity (P cc(t)) and of the REDD permit (PR(t)) are exogenous
and follow deterministic dynamics:7
dP cc(t) = δP cc(t)dt (3.1)
dPR(t) = γPR(t)dt (3.2)
where δ and γ represent the respective growth rates of the two price processes. Being a com-
posite price, P cc(t) is a simplification of the actual commodity flow generated from harvesting
one hectare of forest and using the area for perpetual agricultural activities, which could be
modelled as follows:
P cc(t) = Ph(t) +
∫ ∞
t
A(s)e−ψsds (3.3)
Ph(t) represents the one-time timber harvest selling price, while A(t) are the annual monetary
flows from agricultural activities after land conversion. Land exploitation involves various
operational costs that we model with the help of a quadratic function:
C(t) = a1d(t) + a2d(t)
2 (3.4)
where d(t) is the amount of forest converted to agriculture at time t. We assume the param-
eters of the cost function (a1, a2) to be constant. This stylised representation is in line with
the classical approach of von Thu¨nen (1826): when land is abundant and homogeneous, the
agriculture expansion frontier depends on the cost of accessing new forest patches, which are
further away from the initial location and thus costlier to exploit (Angelsen, 1999).
The offsetting scheme proposed by REDD imposes no liability: the owner is rewarded if the
deforestation is below a certain reference level, but does not have to pay penalties in case this
limit is exceeded (Griscom et al., 2009; Huettner et al., 2009; Joanneum Research Institute,
2006). The owner’s revenues from REDD (RR(t)) can be described by a step function:
RR(t) = PR(t)(dB − d(t))+ (3.5)
where PR(t) is the REDD permit price at time t, dB the baseline level, and d(t) the actual
deforestation at t. REDD cash flows are zero for deforestation rates above the baseline, i.e.
(dB− d(t))+ = 0 if d(t) ≥ dB. REDD programs define reference levels (dB) in terms of tonnes
of CO2 equivalent per year. To simplify the presentation of results, we convert reference levels
into hectares of avoided deforestation, as described in Section 3.2.3. Unlike in the traditional
dynamic setting, we enforce a very loose constraint on the total owned patch of forest at t(0)(
F¯ (0)
)
. However, we impose a time window [0, T ] during which the optimisation occurs. While
F¯ (0) is not infinite, we consider its value so large that forest depletion is not likely;8 we allow
for a positive terminal stock at period T . However, future REDD schemes may have an explicit
time frame9 (Parker et al., 2008), which compels us to consider the time constraint as the most
binding for the landowner.
7Using deterministic processes simplifies the solution to the model, but leaves outside of the scope of our analysis the
role and influence of risk on the optimal land allocation decision. Under the hypothesis of a risk neutral landowner, the
presence of risk would have no specific effects. However, in presence of risk aversion, the decision between preservation
and deforestation will be significantly impacted by the relative volatility of the two prices and would favour the strategy
giving the smallest cash flow variability.
8We consider this setting to be in line with the reality of many land owners’ decision processes in tropical countries.
In Latin America, ownership rights tend to be concentrated in the hands of a few proprietors (Brockett, 1990; Borras Jr
et al., 2012).
9This time frame is expected to be aligned with the phases of the EU ETS or the successor of the Kyoto protocol.
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We first solve the model for the business-as-usual case (the benchmark when no REDD project
is in place), and then for four REDD crediting baselines: historical, model-implied, and two
types of corridor. We proceed now with the presentation of each methodology, and then assess
the incentives for avoiding deforestation observed in each case.
3.2.2 Baseline alternatives
3.2.2.1 Business-as-usual scenario (without REDD)
The business-as-usual (BaU) scenario illustrates the deforestation trend in the absence of REDD
or other forest conservation projects. Here, the land brings only timbering and agriculture
benefits, as reflected in the net cash flow (pi(·)) at time t:
pi(d(t)) = P cc(t)d(t)− (a1d(t) + a2d(t)2) (3.6)
where P cc(t) is the composite commodity price, d(t) the deforestation rate, and a1 and a2
are the parameters of the cost function. The optimal control problem can be described as a
maximisation over the deforestation rate of the total discounted net revenues resulting from
land exploitation:
max(d(t))t∈[0,T ]
{∫ T
0
e−rtpi(d(t))dt
}
(3.7)
where r is the discount rate and T marks the end of the decision horizon. The variation in the
stock of forested land is given by the following dynamics:
F˙ = −d(t) (3.8)
where F is the stock of forest and F˙ represents its variation between consecutive periods. We
follow the solution approach of Chiang (1992) for determining the optimal deforestation path;
see Appendix 1. The rate of deforestation at each moment of time is recursively linked to the
initial deforestation level:
d(t) = d(0)ert +
P cc(0)(eδt − ert)− a1(1− ert)
2a2
(3.9)
Reflecting the optimal deforestation path in the business-as-usual scenario, we denote d(t) =
dBaU(t); it will be used below for computing the REDD rewards in the model-implied and the
variable corridor scenarios.
3.2.2.2 Historical baseline
Most proposals include the historical average deforestation rate in the computation of the
crediting baseline.10 This comes as a recognition of the fact that average past deforestation,
although an imperfect measure, is one of the best predictors at hand for short-to-medium term
deforestation (Angelsen et al., 2009). We thus start the analysis of the deforestation behaviour
under REDD with a simple historical baseline, where the REDD threshold is flat and equal
to the average past deforestation rate. This baseline type is a simplification of what has been
proposed by Brazil (Parker et al., 2008).
10Out of the 6 baseline methodologies studied by Griscom et al. (2009), 5 rely partially or totally on historical reference
levels.
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The merit of the historical baseline consists of its fair simplicity of computation and implemen-
tation, as well as its appeal to land owners who need to get used to new operation rules. The
baseline has received support also for its ability to reflect local deforestation trends and avoid
the one-measure-for-all caveats.
The historical reference level faces, however, a number of limitations, starting with the fact
that many countries do not hold accurate data records of past deforestation (Guariguata et al.,
2008). Second, an imperfect predictor of future deforestation has high chances of undermining
the additionality principle and of distorting country participation, especially if one considers
the specific forest transition stage11 of each country (Angelsen, 2007). Forest-rich states with
low past deforestation, but which expect increasing trends, might decide to stay out of REDD
if the programs are based on historical baselines. On the other hand, nations with large past
deforestation rates and scarce remaining forests would gladly join, since rewards based on
historical averages would be generous relative to the required additional efforts (Angelsen,
2008a).
In the presence of REDD with a historical baseline, cash flows are generated by two counter-
balancing activities, i.e. forest exploitation and REDD:
pi(d(t)) = P cc(t)d(t)− (a1d(t) + a2d(t)2)+ PR(t) (dB − d(t))+ (3.10)
As captured in Eq. (3.10), the landowner’s profits are determined by the sales of the composite
commodity, less the operational costs; additionally, REDD revenues are eligible for deforestation
rates below the historical threshold (dB).
3.2.2.3 Model-implied baseline
An alternative to the retrospective historical baseline is the prospective method12 that in-
corporates projections of future deforestation trends. The model-implied baseline relies on a
time-varying level reflecting predicted deforestation paths under the business-as-usual scenario.
Here, the landowner is rewarded for deforesting less than in the absence of the REDD program.
If the forecasting is accurate, it enforces additionality, since only actual efforts would be re-
warded. However, the model-implied baseline is not exempt from criticism that stems primarily
from the baseline’s vulnerability to forecasting errors and the reliance on model assumptions.
We incorporate the specificity of the model-implied baseline into the revenue function, account-
ing for the fact that the reference level (dB(t)) can fluctuate across time according to the
projections of the model used:
pi(d(t)) = P cc(t)d(t)− (a1d(t) + a2d(t)2)+ PR(t) (dB(t)− d(t))+ (3.11)
Compared to the methodology of the historical baseline (Eq. (3.10)), the key difference in the
model-implied approach is the modification of the baseline level from a static threshold (dB)
to a dynamic one (dB(t)). In our model, dB(t) is chosen to match the estimated deforestation
11According to Angelsen (2007), “The FT describes a sequence where a forested region goes through four stages: (1)
initially high forest cover and low deforestation, (2) accelerating and high deforestation, (3) slow-down of deforestation
and forest cover stabilisation, and (4) a period of reforestation.”
12According to Huettner et al. (2009), prospective (forward-looking) methods attempt to model land use change taking
into account the various market drivers. The forecasting can be done by using either analytical, regression or simulation
models.
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pattern of the BaU scenario, such that:
dB(t) = dBaU(t) ∀t ∈ [0, T ] (3.12)
where dBaU(t) is the optimal deforestation in the business-as-usual scenario.
3.2.2.4 Fixed corridor
The corridor approach has been first proposed by Schlamadinger et al. (2005), and then reformu-
lated jointly in 2006 by the Joanneum Research Institute, the Union of Concerned Scientists, the
Woods Hole Research Center, and the Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazonia (Griscom
et al., 2009). This methodology modifies the historical baseline approach, by replacing the fixed
threshold with a corridor whose bounds are computed as levels below and above the average
past deforestation rate.
In this paper we analyse the so-called corridor 2 methodology,13 whereby the possible defor-
estation range is divided into three regions: (1) deforestation levels above the upper boundary
do not receive any REDD payments; (2) rates below the lower boundary are entirely eligible
for REDD permits, as they would under a fixed-baseline scheme; (3) deforestation levels within
the corridor are discounted proportionally to the distance from the upper boundary, such that
rewards are larger when deforestation approaches the lower bound, up to full payments if this
lower bound is reached, and conversely, rewards are smaller for deforestation rates close to the
upper bound, down to no payment if the upper bound is reached.
The corridor approach attempts to address an important feature of deforestation, namely its
frequent fluctuations over time. Movements are usually caused by shifts in key market parame-
ters, such as commodity prices, interest rates, or climate impacts (Joanneum Research Institute
(2006)). The corridor reward system admits that avoiding deforestation in boom years implies
higher opportunity costs, and is, therefore, more difficult to sustain than conservation efforts in
years of medium to low timber and agriculture prices. With the corridor system, the landowner
is encouraged to keep deforestation rates close to the average historical level, and is rewarded
(although modestly) even if slightly above it. The corridor could also be useful when measure-
ment errors hinder the estimation of the historical baseline. The corridor creates an “error”
band around the threshold, advantageous in absence of incomplete information about past de-
forestation rates. In the words of Joanneum Research Institute (2006), the “corridor approach
reduces the risk of missing a single-level target”.
With the corridor approach for REDD, the shape of the profit function reflects the design of
the reward program:
pi(d(t)) = P cc(t)d(t)− (a1d(t) + a2d(t)2) + PR(t)ω
(
dBU − d(t))+ (3.13)
where dBL = (1 − x)dB and dBU = (1 + x)dB represent the lower and upper bounds of the
corridor, respectively, dB is the historical deforestation rate, and x the corridor width. ω ∈ [0, 1]
is the weight (discount factor) imposed by the corridor. In Eq. (3.13) the third term represents
the income generated by the REDD project. The weighting system works as follows:
ω = 1− (d(t)− dB
L)+
dBU − dBL =
{
1− d(t)−dBL
dBU−dBL , if d(t) > dB
L
1 , if d(t) ≤ dBL
13The Corridor 1 method proposes that deforestation rates within the corridor accrue credits that would only be
eligible for sale once emissions go below the lower boundary of the corridor (Joanneum Research Institute, 2006).
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If the deforestation rate lies within the corridor (d(t) ∈ (dBL, dBU)), a linear weighting proce-
dure is activated: on one hand, fewer permits will be received than the difference between the
deforestation rate and the upper boundary (ω < 1). On the other hand, deforestation rates
below the lower boundary are rewarded full permits (ω = 1). The last term in the REDD
income, (dBU − d(t))+, ensures that rewards are received only for deforestation rates below the
upper bound of the corridor.
3.2.2.5 Variable corridor
Similar to the difference between the static historical baseline and its dynamic model-implied
counterpart, we suggest to modify the fixed corridor baseline by giving it a dynamic feature.
The variable corridor replaces the constant lower and upper corridor bounds with time-varying
levels, established below and above the deforestation rate of the dynamic business-as-usual
scenario. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time this baseline approach is proposed.
The variable corridor aims at bringing together the strong points of both the model-implied
and the fixed corridor baselines. First, linking corridor bounds to the business-as-usual defor-
estation trend is expected to offer not only a dynamic but also a forward-looking perspective
on deforestation paths, more likely to ensure additionality. Second, the corridor reward system
should be able to better deal with estimation errors of the business-as-usual deforestation, and
account for periodic fluctuations in deforestation levels, similarly to the fixed corridor. The rev-
enue function follows the methodology of the fixed corridor, but introduces dynamic corridor
bounds:
pi(d(t)) = P cc(t)d(t)− (a1d(t) + a2d(t)2) + PR(t)ω(t)
(
dBU(t)− d(t))+ (3.14)
where the weighting factor is time-varying due to the dynamic corridor bounds, with ω(t) =
1 − (d(t)−dBL(t))+
dBU (t)−dBL(t) , dB
L(t) = (1 − x)dB(t), dBU(t) = (1 + x)dB(t), dB(t) = dBaU(t), and x the
corridor width.
Summing up, in this paper we analyse four different REDD scenarios, namely two static and
two dynamic, allowing for either a single-threshold or a corridor approach. While the static
baselines are based on historical estimations of the deforestation rate, and are therefore retro-
spective, the dynamic baseline types are based on estimations of future deforestation trends,
and are prospective. We denote the single-threshold approaches as H the historical and MI the
model-implied. The fixed and variable corridors are labeled Cf and Cv hereafter. To summarise,
the REDD revenues (RR(t)) offered to the landowner for each baseline methodology are the
following:
Table 3.1: REDD revenues under different baseline methodologies.
Single-threshold Corridor
Static RRH(t) = PR(t) (dB − d(t))+ RRCf (t) = PR(t)ω (dBU − d(t))+
Dynamic RRMI(t) = PR(t) (dB(t)− d(t))+ RRCv(t) = PR(t)ω(t) (dBU (t)− d(t))+
H stands for historical baseline, MI for model-implied, Cf for fixed corridor, and Cv for variable
corridor.
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We solve for the optimal deforestation path under the business-as-usual scenario and the four
different baselines.14 We tackle the non-linearity in the profit function with the help of a
numerical approach; see Appendix 2.
3.2.3 Model calibration
Our model is general enough to accommodate the characteristics of many regions where REDD
could be implemented. For the numerical application, we take here the view of a forest owner
from Peru. As the sensitivity analysis shows, the results are robust and generalizable to different
regions of the world; see Appendix 3.D.
Peru is an important REDD candidate in terms of forest resources15 and market volume.16 The
annual deforestation rate for 1990 - 2005 is estimated at 0.14%, remaining at low levels relative
to its neighbouring countries (FAO, 2005). However, more recent estimates show that during
2000 - 2010 deforestation rates experienced an increasing trend,17 which is predicted to persist
in the near future mainly due to cropland expansion in the Andes (Wassenaar et al., 2007).
Several local projects developing REDD credits are currently in implementation phase in Peru18
(Hajek et al., 2011; Entenmann and Schmitt, 2013).
The list of parameters used for model fitting and their sources are presented in Table 3.2. In our
model, the average deforestation rate obtained in the business-as-usual scenario is about 200
ha/year. We allow the historical baseline level (dB) to vary in a large interval (between 1 ha
and 500 ha per annum), in order to cover a broad spectrum of scenarios. While REDD credits
are granted in terms of tons of CO2 reduced per year, we present our results in terms of hectares
of avoided deforestation. We convert the deforested area into tons of carbon emitted with the
help of a parameter (Ω), whose value for Peru can be found in the OSIRIS model for the above
and below ground biomass carbon and for soil carbon (Busch et al., 2009). Another converter
(ψ) transforms the quantity of tons of carbon emitted into tons of CO2 emitted (Assante, 2011).
With the help of the parameter λ we express the price of the composite commodity from Eur/m3
into Eur/ha, relying on the IPCC Good Practice Guide LULUCF (Penman et al., 2003). The
initial price of the commodity (P cc(0)) and its growth rate (δ) are computed for the Peruvian
market from the Annual Review and Assessment of the World Timber Situation (ITTO, 2010).
We use the State of the Forest Carbon Markets 2011 (Diaz et al., 2011) to set the initial
REDD permit price (PR(0)) and its growth rate. In our calibration, the growth rate of the
REDD permit price is above the growth rate of the composite commodity price (δ > γ). As
a robustness check, we ran the analysis allowing for the opposite relationship (δ ≤ γ). This
change impacts the amount of avoided deforestation, but does not modify the ranking of the
baselines.
The chosen level for the discount rate (r) is 2%, placing it slightly lower than the growth rates
of the composite commodity and the permit prices; we make here the assumption that forest
exploitation and REDD bring higher financial benefits than saving at the discount rate. In
14The analytical results can be provided by the authors upon request.
15With about 68 million hectares of tropical forest covering nearly 53% of its territory, Peru is fourth in the global
ranking, after Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Indonesia. About 89% of the total classifies as primary
forest (FAO, 2010).
16According to Diaz et al. (2011), the Peruvian and Brazilian Amazon dominate the forest carbon market, with Latin
America accountable for about 60% of the 2010 total primary market volume.
17The annual change in forest area was -0.22% for 2005-2010 (FAO, 2010).
18Hajek et al. (2011) compare 12 local REDD+ projects in south-eastern Peru, five of which were at feasibility and
seven at early implementation stage at the time of writing.
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reality, discount rates in developing countries take usually larger values and vary over time
(see the Appendix). Nonetheless, the sensitivity analysis shows that the ranking of baselines is
consistent across different values of the discount rate (r ∈ [0, 0.1]).
Finally, for the calibration of the production cost, we adapt the cost function of Angelsen
(1996), calibrating it to data from Verissimo et al. (1992) for the Amazonian forest.
Table 3.2: Calibration parameters for the numerical solution.
Note: The table captures values used for the calibration of the model parameters. S.A. stands for values used in the
sensitivity analysis.
Parameter Explanation Value Source
P cc(0) Composite commodity price 500 Eur/m3 ITTO (2010)
δ Growth rate of Pcc(t) 2.3% p.a. ITTO (2010)
S.A. [0, 0.04] p.a.
λ Eur/m3 to Eur/ha 158 m3/ha Penman et al. (2003)
PR(0) REDD permit price 5 Eur/tCO2 Diaz et al. (2011)
γ Growth rate of PR(t) 2.5% p.a. Diaz et al. (2011)
S.A. [0, 0.04] p.a.
Ω ha to tC emitted 179 tC/ha Busch et al. (2009)
S.A. [50, 200] tC/ha
ψ tC to tCO2 3.67 tCO2/tC Assante (2011)
a1 Cost parameter 1 3.3198 Eur/ha Angelsen (1996),
Verissimo et al. (1992)
a2 Cost parameter 2 798.0811 Eur/ha
2 Angelsen (1996),
Verissimo et al. (1992)
r Discount rate 2% p.a. -
S.A. [0, 0.01] p.a.
dB Historical baseline 200 ha p.a. -
S.A. [1, 500] ha p.a.
dBU Corridor upper boundary (1 + x)dB ha -
dBL Corridor lower boundary (1− x)dB ha -
x0 Initial corridor width 0.1 -
x Corridor width [0.1, 0.9] -
T Time horizon 100 years -
3.2.4 Performance indicators
We evaluate the performance of REDD programs under different baseline methodologies with
the help of three indicators, in line with the 3E Criteria proposed by Stern (2008).19 The
performance measures we consider are: effectiveness, landowner’s welfare, and efficiency, as
detailed in Table 3.3. First, the effectiveness indicator E1 measures the avoided deforestation,
and the inherent saved emissions. It quantifies the difference between the deforested area of the
business-as-usual (no REDD) and the different baseline scenarios for REDD, being therefore
a measure of additionality. Second, we measure the financial co-benefits of REDD with the
help of the E2 indicator, which quantifies the percentage change in landowner’s income due to
joining REDD. Finally, the efficiency indicator E3 provides an estimate of the average cost of
forest preservation per hectare of avoided deforestation. It divides the total received REDD
revenues by the number of hectares of forest saved under each baseline type compared to the
business-as-usual scenario. Here, the cost of each baseline scheme reflects realised (additional)
savings in emissions.
19Stern (2008) suggests the evaluation of REDD design proposals with the help of three criteria: effectiveness, efficiency,
and equity and co-benefits.
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Table 3.3: Performance indicators of baseline scenarios.
Note: Three measures of REDD performance under different baselines are computed. d(t) is the deforested area, pi(t)
the total income from land, RR(t) the REDD revenue at time t, and i ∈ {H, MI, Cf, Cv}; BaU business-as-usual, H
historical, MI model-implied, Cf fixed corridor, Cv variable corridor.
Indicator Definition Formula
1. Effectiveness Avoided deforestation from BaU (%) Ei1 =
SBaUTot −SiTot
SBaUTot
(E1) SiTot =
∫ T
0 d
i(t)dt
2. Land owner’s welfare Change in income from BaU (%) Ei2 =
ΠiTot−ΠBaUTot
ΠBaUTot
(E2) ΠTot =
∫ T
0 e
−rtpi(di(t))dt
3. Efficiency Average cost of avoiding 1 ha Ei3 =
SRRi
SBaUTot −SiTot
(E3) of deforestation from BaU (Eur/ha) SRRi =
∫ T
0 e
−rtRRi(t)dt
3.3 Results
This section presents the optimal deforestation paths for the business-as-usual and the four
REDD baseline approaches, and discusses the implications for baseline choice. The beginning
of Section 3.3.1 ranks the baselines according to their performance. Then, we explain the
differences in performance based on the structure of the financial incentives offered by each
baseline methodology. At the end of the section, we check the robustness of the baseline
ranking to changes in key parameters. Section 3.3.2 relaxes the initial assumptions regarding
corridor wideness and symmetry, and underlines possible design adjustments to increase baseline
performance. Section 3.3.3 extends the analysis of baseline performance to technical, social,
and environmental aspects of REDD.
3.3.1 A first comparison
We solve for the optimal deforestation paths under the business-as-usual and the four REDD
baselines; see Fig. 3.1. With our calibration, under each baseline scheme the optimal deforesta-
tion path is increasing in time, as agricultural activities become more attractive due to rising
composite commodity prices. We compare the performance of the baseline methodologies based
on the indicators introduced in Section 3.2.4. Table 3.4 shows that the baselines differ in their
performance, with each indicator revealing a new ranking of baselines.
First, we compare the baselines in terms of the ability to reduce deforestation. Fig. 3.1 is
illustrative for the effectiveness of REDD. In all baseline scenarios, the area of deforested land
remains lower or equal to the business-as-usual case; over the aggregated time horizon, REDD
programs are effective in reducing deforestation.20 However, the reduction in deforestation
does not hold at all moments of time for the static baselines: our dynamic model shows that
keeping reference levels constant while the opportunity costs of deforestation increase, will
determine the forest owner to opt out of the REDD project and follow the business-as-usual
path. This sheds light on the limited effectiveness of the static baselines, as opposed to the
prospective ones that offer continued incentives for reducing deforestation. We argue that, with
their temporary effectiveness, static baselines face higher non-permanence risks than dynamic
20For a more detailed illustration of deforestation paths for each period, see Fig. 3.B.3 in Appendix 3.B.
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Fig. 3.1: Optimal deforestation paths under BaU and different REDD baselines.
Note: H stands for historical baseline, MI for model-implied, H for historical, Cf for fixed corridor, and Cv for variable
corridor. The historical deforestation rate (dB) is 200 ha/year. Corridor width is x = 0.1.
baselines. Analysing the E1 indicator, we indeed observe that the variable corridor achieves the
best results, and it is followed at quite some distance by the model-implied baseline. The fixed
corridor and the historical baseline lag far behind in terms of effectiveness.
Second, imposing no liabilities for deforestation rates above the baseline, all scenarios have
a positive impact on landowner’s welfare compared to the business-as-usual case (E2). The
increase in welfare across all baselines points to the ability of REDD to foster the voluntary
opting-in of candidate countries, and alleviates some of the concerns with the need of additional
enforcement measures. In particular, the static baselines prove to be more generous: the fixed
corridor is the most attractive for the landowner, followed closely by the historical baseline.
The remaining two baselines achieve only modest changes in welfare, with the model-implied
baseline being the last ranked.
Third, in terms of cost-efficiency (E3), the prospective baselines strongly outperform the static
ones: the model-implied baseline is the top performer, with the variable corridor in second
position. The historical and fixed corridor baselines require almost twenty times higher costs
than MI.
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Table 3.4: Indicators of REDD performance under different baselines.
Baseline Effectiveness Welfare Efficiency
E1 (%) E2 (%) E3 (Eur/ha)
H 1.54 2.26 73,096.66
MI 4.77 0.23 4,680.18
Cf 1.76 2.76 78,043.75
Cv 9.08 0.92 9,318.13
3.3.1.1 The incentive structure of the baselines
In order to understand what drives the difference in baseline performance, we compare the
incentive structure of the four baseline methodologies. To ease the comparison, we explicit the
REDD revenues at different ranges of the deforestation rate; see Table 3.5. In particular, within
the corridor we define the deforestation rate in terms of the reference level (dB, dB(t)), the
corridor width (x), and a variable y, with y ∈ (0, x), such that:
(1) When d(t) ∈ (dBL, dB], we define d(t) = (1 − x + y)dB for the Cf case, and d(t) =
(1− x+ y)dB(t) for Cv;
(2) When d(t) ∈ (dB, dBU), d(t) = (1 + y)dB for the Cf case, and d(t) = (1 + y)dB(t) for Cv,
with dB(t) = dBaU(t).
Table 3.5: REDD revenues (RR(t)) according to the range of the deforestation rate.
Static baselines
d(t) ∈ [0, dBL] d(t) ∈ (dBL, dB] d(t) ∈ (dB, dBU ) d(t) ≥ dBU
H PR(t)(dB − d(t)) PR(t)(x− y)dB 0 0
Cf PR(t)((1 + x)dB − d(t)) PR(t)
(
2(x− y) + y2
2x
)
dB PR(t)
(x−y)2
2x
dB 0
Dynamic baselines
d(t) ∈ [0, dB(t)L] d(t) ∈ (dB(t)L, dB(t)] d(t) ∈ (dB(t), dB(t)U ) d(t) ≥ dB(t)U
MI PR(t)(dB(t)− d(t)) PR(t)(x− y)dB(t) 0 0
Cv PR(t)((1 + x)dB(t)− d(t)) PR(t)
(
2(x− y) + y2
2x
)
dB(t) PR(t)
(x−y)2
2x
dB(t) 0
To account for possible misestimations in the BaU deforestation path and to increase participa-
tion rates, the corridor approaches reward landowners for choosing deforestation rates below an
upper corridor bound, which is set above the corresponding single threshold (dBU = (1+x)dB,
dBU(t) = (1 + x)dB(t), with x > 0). We observe from Table 3.5 that by design, for the
same deforestation rate, a corridor approach always gives larger or equal financial incentives to
participate in REDD than the corresponding single-threshold approach. For all t ∈ [0, T ]:
RRH(t) ≤ RRCf (t) (3.15)
RRMI(t) ≤ RRCv(t) (3.16)
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The ranking of REDD payments influences the effectiveness of the baselines. Larger REDD
revenues decrease the opportunity costs of deforestation, bringing stronger incentives to take
part in REDD and keep deforestation below the baseline. Any decrease in deforestation will
inevitably take place below dBaU(t).
21 It follows that relations (3.15) and (3.16) hold also for
effectiveness with unchanged signs:
EH1 ≤ ECf1 (3.17)
EMI1 ≤ ECv1 (3.18)
Finally, we analyse the impact of higher REDD revenues on efficiency. Our efficiency indicator
(E3) is defined as a measure of total REDD revenues divided by the hectares of reduced de-
forestation below the business-as-usual. Therefore, an increase in REDD revenues will have a
double (yet opposed) impact on efficiency. First, higher RR(t) lead to lower efficiency (higher
E3). Second, higher RR(t) raise effectiveness (avoided deforestation), increasing efficiency (lower
E3). As can be observed from Table 3.4, the effect on welfare dominates the effect on effective-
ness22. It follows that the single-threshold approaches, with lower welfare increases, are more
efficient than the corresponding corridor approaches, with higher welfare increases. That is:
EH3 ≤ ECf3 (3.19)
EMI3 ≤ ECv3 (3.20)
Summing up, we have shown that the corridor approaches dominate the corresponding single-
threshold approaches in terms of effectiveness and welfare increase, but lag behind in terms of
efficiency. If sufficient REDD funding is available, which remains to be seen, we argue that
REDD promoters should opt for the corridor approach instead of the single-threshold one, in
order to achieve the needed reductions in emissions.
3.3.1.2 Sensitivity analysis
REDD initiatives are currently being designed in a plethora of tropical countries, with several
projects being already in implementation phase (Angelsen, 2010). In particular, Norway —
through its International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) — contributes to different multi-
and bilateral REDD initiatives in several countries, including Brazil, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Guyana, Indonesia, and Tanzania. The countries are distinct in terms of forest types,
stages in the forest transition, and national forestry policies, apart from large diversity in the
economic, social, and political contexts. To reach the REDD goals, NICFI recognises the need
to design projects that account for national and sub-national differences (NIFCI, 2011).
To be able to generalise our findings outside the region of Peru, we test the robustness of our
results across different settings. We focus on several key calibration parameters, describing
the forest type (the carbon content Ω), the crediting threshold of the static baselines (dB),
the time preference of the forest owner (the discount rate r), and the variables describing the
opportunity costs of deforestation and the received REDD financial incentives (the growth rates
of the composite commodity (δ) and REDD permit prices (γ)). The detailed analysis can be
found in Appendix 3.D.
21d(t) is bounded from above by dBaU (t), due to extraction cost constraints.
22For the full demonstration, see Appendix 3.C.
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We find that the ranking of baselines is robust to different settings. The variable corridor
continues to be the most effective in reducing deforestation. The fixed corridor offers the
highest increase in welfare from BaU. The model-implied baseline is the most efficient, having
the lowest costs per hectare of avoided deforestation. The sensitivity analysis underlines the
importance of understanding the benefits of the variable corridor approach, whose performance
can outpace significantly the other baselines, depending on the characteristics of the region
where REDD is being implemented.
3.3.2 Corridor bandwidth and symmetry
When large uncertainties surround the business-as-usual deforestation rate, or high variability
in opportunity costs is to be expected, one might be tempted to advocate a corridor approach
with a larger bandwidth, such that a broader range of deforestation rates would be accounted
for in the REDD payments. The corridor bandwidth should in this case be carefully chosen, to
provide effective incentives for forest protection and, at the same time, achieve cost-efficiency.
With this motivation, we test the sensitivity of baseline performance to two key adjustments
to the corridor methodology, namely corridor wideness and symmetry. We allow for increasing
bandwidths (x ∈ [0.1, 0.9]) that reflect different reward magnitudes granted for reducing defor-
estation. Additionally, we check the variation in performance when allowing for asymmetric
corridors. Namely, we consider both an upward- and a downward-biased corridor. For the
variable corridor, bounds are set such that:
(1) In the upward-biased case, dBL(t) = (1− x0)dB(t) and dBU(t) = (1 + x)dB(t);
(2) In the downward-biased case, dBL(t) = (1− x)dB(t) and dBU(t) = (1 + x0)dB(t).
where dB(t) = dBaU(t), x ∈ [0.1, 0.9] and x0 is fixed, with x0 = 0.1. The same applies for
the fixed corridor, but dB(t) is replaced as usually by the constant dB. On the one side, the
upward-biased corridor approach raises the upper bound of the corridor, leading to an extension
of the range of deforestation rates eligible for REDD revenues. This type of asymmetric corridor
is in line with the proposal of Schlamadinger et al. (2005) who suggest setting the upper bound
of the corridor so high that it minimises the probability that the deforestation rate will exceed
this limit. On the contrary, the downward-biased approach takes down the lower bound of the
corridor, imposing therefore heavier discounts on REDD rewards for deforestation rates in the
range (dBL, dB] (resp. (dBL(t), dB(t)]) for the fixed (resp. variable) corridor.
Fig. 3.2 displays the performance results of the variable corridor. The change in the perfor-
mance of the fixed corridor follows a similar pattern; see Fig. 3.E.1 in Appendix 3.E. First,
some effectiveness is always achieved (E1 > 0), for all corridor bandwidths and all symme-
try alternatives. Fig. 3.2 shows that, as bandwidth increases, effectiveness is higher for the
upward-biased corridors, but decreasing for symmetric and downward-biased corridors. Second,
increasing the corridor bandwidth achieves higher welfare improvements for the symmetric and
upward-biased corridor approaches. Downward-biased corridors exhibit decreasing welfare for
wider corridors. Third, cost-efficiency decreases for symmetric and upward-biased corridors,
and improves slightly for the downward-biased when increasing the corridor width.
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Fig. 3.2: Performance of the variable corridor at different corridor widths.
Note: The figure captures the performance of the variable corridor across different corridor bandwidths. The performance
is compared to the historical and the model-implied baselines. Considered corridors are symmetric (sym), upward (up),
and downward-biased (down).
3.3.2.1 The incentive structure of (a)symmetric corridors
The three symmetry scenarios provide distinct financial incentives, causing differences in per-
formance. The upward-biased corridor is by design the most generous one, followed by the
symmetric, and then the downward-biased corridor, i.e. RRup(t) ≥ RRsym(t) ≥ RRdown(t)
for all bandwidths23. Moreover, an increase in the corridor bandwidth (x) impacts the REDD
revenues differently, depending on the symmetry assumption. The overall impact of an increase
in bandwidth is twofold: (i) a linear impact on the number of REDD credits received for keep-
ing deforestation rates below the upper corridor bound, i.e. on n = dBU(t) − d(t), and (ii) a
non-linear impact on the weight (ω(t)) provided by the corridor; see Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Sensitivity of REDD revenues to corridor bandwidth and deforestation rate in the case of
the variable corridor.
Note: Table captures the sign of the partial derivatives of REDD revenues (RR(t)) with respect to corridor width (x)
and deforestation rate (d(t)) across different symmetry scenarios for the variable corridor, where RR(t) = PR(t)ω(t)n,
with optimal d(t) ∈ (dBL(t), dB). The optimal deforestation rate stays within the corridor, i.e. d(t) ∈ (dBL(t), dB(t)).
n = dBU (t)− d(t) is the number of REDD credits awarded, ω(t) = 1− (d(t)− dBL(t))/(dBU (t)− dBL(t)) is the weight
imposed by the corridor approach, and the lower and upper bounds of the corridor (dBL(t), dBU (t)) vary across the
three corridor symmetry assumptions. The computations are detailed in Appendix 3.E.
Symmetry Linear impact Non-linear impact Overall impact Second order impact
on REDD credits on weight on REDD revenues on REDD revenues
∂n
∂x
∂ω(t)
∂x
∂RR(t)
∂x
∂2RR(t)
∂x∂d(t)
Upward-biased + + + −
Symmetric + − + +
Downward-biased 0 − − +
The upward-biased approach achieves increasing welfare at larger corridor widths. With an
increase in x, both the number of REDD credits received and the weight provided by the
upward corridor increase. As captured in Fig. 3.2, welfare and effectiveness change in the
same direction when x increases, but the large increase in welfare obtained at wider corridors is
23For the demonstration, see Table 3.E.1 in Appendix 3.E.
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accompanied by only modest improvements in effectiveness that have the tendency to flatten out
as x increases. The stronger financial motivation has a diminishing effect on forest protection.
Downward-biased corridors exhibit negative partial derivatives with respect to x, showing that
here welfare improvements from BaU are lower for wider corridors. Larger bandwidths decrease
welfare and, as expected, effectiveness.
The symmetric corridor approach achieves higher welfare but lower effectiveness as bandwidth
increases. The overall positive impact on welfare follows, as usually, from the fact that its
REDD revenues are increasing in the corridor bandwidth. However, although the total impact
is positive, the linear and non-linear effects have opposite signs (Table 3.6). As bandwidth
increases, the landowner benefits on the one hand by receiving more REDD credits (higher n),
but loses on the other hand from stronger discounts imposed by the weighting factor (lower
ω(t)). The impact on effectiveness is confirmed when analysing the joint sensitivity of REDD
revenues to the deforestation rate and corridor bandwidth; see column 4 in Table 3.6. The
increase in profits due to an increase in x is higher at larger d(t), as indicated by the positive
second order partial derivatives. At larger corridor bandwidths, it benefits the landowner to
increase d(t), and therefore reduce effectiveness.
Summing up, with a lack of confidence in the estimates of the business-as-usual deforestation,
or with anticipated high seasonality in deforestation rates, wider corridors might need to be
accommodated, in a way that forest protection is still incentivised. Our results show that
increasing the corridor bandwidth ensures a higher effectiveness of reducing deforestation only in
the upward-biased corridor design, and is counter-beneficial for symmetric and downward-biased
cases. Both fixed and variable corridors benefit most from having an upward-biased corridor
reward system of moderate bandwidth (x = 0.4, 0.5), which guarantees strong effectiveness and
welfare results, at low efficiency losses.
3.3.3 Extended criteria for baseline evaluation
Our analysis thus far has highlighted three baseline alternatives with strong performance results:
the model-implied (MI), the upward-biased fixed corridor (Cf(up)), and the upward-biased
variable corridor (C(up)), with each baseline alternative performing best in a different area.
Although the three performance indicators considered so far capture the most important eco-
nomic aspects of the alternative baselines, other factors play an equally important role in the
REDD implementation process. In order to achieve a more holistic understanding of the base-
line characteristics, we complement the economic evaluation with a multi-tier analysis focusing
on the environmental, technical, and social performance of the baselines. Based on the study
of Huettner et al. (2009), we select five new criteria whose fulfilment can be easily evaluated
for our baselines, namely: easiness of implementation, low data requirements, accounting for
business cycles, accounting for opportunity costs, and endorsing reduced losses from estimation
errors.
The fulfilment of these additional qualitative factors cannot however be quantified in the same
manner as our three initial economic indicators. For this reason, we proceed by giving each
baseline type a score24 representing a rough estimation of how well it is expected to fulfil the
24The score allocated to each baseline takes values from 1 to 4 (4 is the number of baselines considered for compar-
ison: historical, model-implied, upward-biased fixed corridor, and upward-biased variable corridor), such that, for each
indicator, a score of 4 is awarded to the baseline believed to be most likely to fulfil the criterion, and a score of 1 to the
baseline least likely.
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performance criteria relative to the other baselines. The scores awarded to each baseline for
the three initial indicators and the new qualitative aspects are presented in Fig. 3.3. While
Fig. 3.3: Integrated performance of baseline approaches.
the economic analysis (based on E1, E2, and E3) favoured each of the baselines for a different
criterion, the integrative analysis sets the four baselines further apart, highlighting stronger
differences.
One of the new criteria reveals a strong point of the historical baseline (H). REDD projects,
especially in their initial phase, need to be designed as contracts with few and clear require-
ments in order to encourage the participation of diverse parties and create momentum for the
development of such forest protection initiatives worldwide. The historical baseline is likely
to benefit from the highest ease of implementation among the considered methodologies. If
data availability is not an issue, policy makers will be required low efforts for baseline com-
putation and landowners will be provided with contract guidelines they can easily relate to.
Together with the fact that historical deforestation rates have some predictive power for short-
to medium-term deforestation (Angelsen et al., 2009), the ease of implementation explains why
current REDD initiatives have opted to rely on the historical baseline for computing reductions
in deforestation.
The model-implied (MI) baseline provides rewards for reductions below the estimated counter-
factual deforestation, accounting for future opportunity costs. Its computation does not rely on
the availability of data records of past deforestation; instead, it requires information regarding
current agricultural prices and estimations of the future trend in prices. We argue that the MI
has comparatively less data restrictions than all the other baseline methodologies. Moreover, if
the estimation of the BaU deforestation path is truthful, the implementation of REDD with the
MI baselines favours additionality. Fig. 3.3 reminds us that this baseline stands out in terms
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of the cost-efficiency criterion, as highlighted in Section 3.3.1. This can be a strong point in
favour of the MI baseline, especially if future REDD rewards will be linked with compliance
carbon markets.
The upward-biased fixed corridor (Cf(up)) modifies the historical baseline by replacing the
single-threshold with a corridor. Section 3.3.2 showed that selecting an upward-biased corridor
can improve its effectiveness and welfare performance. Indeed, the upward-biased corridor
approach is the most attractive for the landowner from a welfare perspective. Despite large
financial transfers, the effectiveness of the Cf(up) remains limited and its efficiency performance
poor.
Overall, the integrative analysis appears to give highest support to the variable corridor ap-
proach. The upward-biased variable corridor (Cv(up)) is the most effective in reducing defor-
estation below business-as-usual levels; see again Section 3.3.1. Being a prospective method,
based on expectations regarding the future movement of timber and agriculture prices, as well
as REDD permit prices, the Cv(up) has a better ability to reflect the opportunity costs faced
by the landowner. Additionally, the corridor design brings two advantages. First, the scheme
offers REDD compensation also for deforestation rates that come close to the time-varying
baseline, even if not strictly below it; this accommodates possible future business cycles and
ensures (modest) positive REDD revenues should the economy be expanding (when opportunity
costs are high). Second, replacing the single-threshold by a corridor approach, and introducing
the weighting system for deforestation rates inside the corridor, the baseline has the ability to
reduce losses due to misestimation of the BaU baseline (Joanneum Research Institute, 2006).
Summing up, designing a baseline methodology that achieves all REDD goals simultaneously
proves to be highly challenging. Indeed, the analysed baselines exhibit strong attributes in dif-
ferent areas. For its ability to enhance environmental and economic performance, we consider
the upward-biased variable corridor to be the best candidate for achieving the most important
REDD goals.
Two delicate issues require further thought. The first one touches on the issue of additionality.
REDD aims to reward reductions in deforestation below business-as-usual levels. One limita-
tion of our analysis is that it is placed in a deterministic setting, where the business-as-usual
deforestation path is known. However, in reality many variables of the decision environment
are in fact stochastic, such as commodity and REDD prices, and asymmetries in information
might lay between REDD promoters (who evaluate emission reductions) and forest owners
(who benefit from REDD payments). This surrounds the estimation of the business-as-usual
deforestation path with large uncertainties. REDD projects implemented based on misspeci-
fied business-as-usual deforestation levels can provide undesired incentives to forest owners: if
the reference level is set (considerably) below the business-as-usual, the participation rate in
REDD will be low; in the opposite case, windfall profits will be distributed to forest owners
and the REDD rewards will not accurately reflect reductions in emissions. In both cases, the
high probability of setting reference levels with error casts doubt on the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of REDD. Implementing REDD in an uncertain environment might reveal other types
of differences between the prospective and static baselines.
The second key issue concerns permanence. With REDD, the issue of permanence has a different
dimension than on compliance carbon markets, like the EU ETS. There, being restricted to emit
less than a pre-specified cap, regulated companies continue with the same business activity,
but are given incentives to switch to a more efficient production process.25 Being costly, the
25This refers to relying on less emission intensive sources of energy, like renewables or the more common switch from
coal to gas for the generation of electricity.
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switch is likely not to be reverted, and emission reductions could remain ’permanent’. The
situation is not analogous to REDD, where the landowners cannot continue with their current
occupation (deforesting for expanding agriculture), but need to stop the expansion if they
want to receive payments (they cannot make the cutting down of trees less emission-intensive).
REDD payments are offered on a per-period basis, being linked with deforestation flows instead
of the remaining forest stocks. Thus, temporary reductions in deforestation can be reverted
in later periods, questioning the long-term success of REDD. We argue that payments should
instead be contingent on the emissions of the entire owned land parcel, such that all land uses
are covered by the regulation umbrella, and more efficient operations are incentivised, similar
to the mechanism of the cap-and-trade systems. However, this takes us away from the original
REDD concept, and future research could further investigate this topic.
3.4 Conclusions
REDD programs target reductions in emissions from deforestation below business-as-usual lev-
els. A key issue of REDD is the establishment of baselines, against which reductions in defor-
estation are measured. This paper assesses the performance of the most frequently proposed
baselines: historical, model-implied, and fixed corridor. Additionally, we introduce a new base-
line type – the variable corridor.
We solve for the optimal deforestation path in a dynamic setting where REDD projects are
available. One of our main findings is that baseline choice has a significant impact on land use
behaviour. Land owners choose different deforestation paths when incentivised by distinctive
baseline methodologies. We believe this point is key for implementing effective REDD programs.
We first evaluate the selected baselines based on three economic indicators that describe the
effectiveness, welfare increases, and cost-efficiency of reducing deforestation. We find that
each indicator points to a different baseline as the best performer. Our analysis shows that a
preference for strong effectiveness recommends the variable corridor. The fixed corridor provides
the highest increase in landowner’s welfare above business-as-usual. Efficiency reasons advocate
the model-implied baseline.
We then discuss additional environmental, social, and technical aspects important for REDD
implementation and the establishment of baselines. This analysis highlights stronger differences
among the baselines, and reveals that the prospective variable corridor achieves the best trade-
off among the economic and environmental REDD goals. Moreover, this performance can be
boosted by setting the upper bound of the corridor (asymetrically) high above the estimated
business-as-usual deforestation.
We conclude that the current widespread use of the historical baseline is no longer well moti-
vated. Much stronger effectiveness and efficiency could be achieved with the use of a forward-
looking baseline. Additionally, the currently used single-threshold methodology is also not
optimal; replacing the single-threshold approach with a corridor formed around the estimated
business-as-usual deforestation rate has higher potential of accounting for real opportunity costs
and offering continued incentives for reduced deforestation. Our results offer potential insights
for other emission regulation policies, such as EU ETS. There, regulated companies are allo-
cated emission allowances based on their emissions’ history, similar to the historical baseline in
REDD. Based on our analysis, we expect the EU ETS to benefit also in terms of effectiveness
and efficiency from replacing its historical cap with a forward-looking corridor approach. This
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could potentially address some of the permit overallocation problems, which have persisted
since the opening of the EU ETS.
Some additional concerns remain. This paper assumes that REDD funding is achieved through a
market-based mechanism. In comparison to voluntary funds, international carbon markets can
mobilise much larger amounts of money and favour cost-efficient emission reductions (Angelsen,
2008b). However, the weak carbon markets we face nowadays, characterised by low liquidity
and permit overallocation, will most probably have difficulties in handling additional amounts
of permits coming from the forestry sector. Therefore, when selecting the most appropriate
baseline type, one might postpone the implementation of the most effective one in order to
avoid collapses in permit prices until the stabilisation of the carbon market.
A robust understanding of the deforestation process would require an improved description
of the different stakeholders involved in REDD implementation. As Griscom et al. (2009)
point out, the selection of reference levels will be based not only on technical and economic
considerations, but also on political negotiations among participating countries. REDD projects
implemented at the national level will motivate countries to take a strategic position at the
negotiation table and try to influence the establishment of crediting levels in their favour. Under
these conditions, the adjusted deforestation decision will result in emission reductions of other
magnitudes than the ones presented in this study, and might as well reveal a different ranking of
baseline approaches. Future research, based on dynamic decision models with multiple players
defending contrasting interests, could be relevant for this issue.
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Appendix Chapter 3
3.A The optimal deforestation path in the business-as-usual sce-
nario
When no REDD program is in place, the net revenue of the landowner at time t is given by:
pi(d(t)) = P cc(t)d(t)− (a1d(t) + a2d(t)2) (3.A.1)
The optimal control problem can be described as follows:
max(d(t))t∈[0,T ]
∫ T
0
e−rtpi(d(t))dt (3.A.2)
such that: F˙ = −d(t) (3.A.3)
F (0) = F0 (3.A.4)
We build the current-value Hamiltonian as:
Hc = pi(d(t))− µd(t) (3.A.5)
The equations of motion follow immediately:
∂Hc
∂d(t)
: pi′(d(t))− µ = 0 (3.A.6)
−∂H
c
∂F
+ rµ = µ˙ (3.A.7)
F˙ = −d(t) (3.A.8)
The partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the forest stock is zero
(
∂Hc
∂F
= 0
)
. We obtain from Eq. (3.A.7)
that:
µ˙ = rµ⇒ dµ = µrdt⇒ µ(t) = µ(0)ert (3.A.9)
From Eq. (3.A.6) we know that pi′(d(t)) = µ(t), which holds for all t ∈ [0, T ]. It follows that pi′(d(0)) = µ(0). Introducing
this result in Eq. (3.A.9), we obtain that:
pi′(d(t)) = pi′(d(0))ert (3.A.10)
We explicit Eq. (3.A.10) with the help of the profit function given in Eq. (3.A.1). After some simplifications, the optimal
deforestation rate at time t is given by:
d(t) = d(0)ert +
P cc(0)(eδt − ert)− a1(1− ert)
2a2
(3.A.11)
The optimal deforestation at time t depends on the initial deforestation rate (d(0)), the discount rate (r), the initial price
of the composite commodity (P cc(0)) and its growth function (δ), and the parameters of the cost function (a1, a2). In
order to define the optimal deforestation path, the last element that needs to be defined is the initial deforestation rate
(d(0)). We iterate over a large grid of possible values and choose the initial deforestation that maximises total profits.
3.B The optimal deforestation path under REDD
The simultaneous presence of REDD rewards for lower-than-baseline and absence of penalties for higher-than-baseline
deforestation levels brings discontinuities to the profit function. The resulting non-smoothness in the objective function
impedes the application of standard optimisation methods. To overcome this difficulty, we develop a solution approach
based on regime switches. This method allows for a break in the continuity of the deforestation path, which would
otherwise be forced under the standard Hamiltonian procedure. A smooth deforestation path would not be able to
guarantee optimality in the context of a non-smooth objective function. Here, we allow the landowner to decide at each
moment of time whether to deforest below or above the reference level, i.e. he makes his choice between a REDD regime
(hereafter Regime 1) and a BaU regime akin to business-as-usual (hereafter Regime 2).
One observation is key for solving the optimisation problem: in the absence of stochasticities, the decision regarding
deforestation levels at each moment of time can be taken from the beginning for all future periods. While it could be
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possible in theory that the landowner switches between regimes multiple times, in practice the dynamic requirement at
equilibrium ensures smooth evolution for the deforestation path within each regime and limited shifts between regimes
over the entire horizon. We begin by explaining the solution approach for the historical and the model-implied cases.
Since it requires an additional modification, we present the solution to the corridor scenario at the end of this section.
For the historical and the model-implied baselines, the landowner chooses low deforestation rates and stays in Regime 1
as long as the total benefits from REDD and forest exploitation below the reference level remain higher that the total
benefits from forest exploitation above the reference level. Depending on the values of the parameters, the regime switch
can occur either from the beginning, somewhere during the lifetime of the maximisation period, or never at all. Formally,
the optimisation procedure can be described as follows:
maxd(t)|t∈[0,T ]
{∫ τ
0
e−rtpiR1(d(t))dt+
∫ T
τ
e−rtpiR2(d(t))dt
}
(3.B.1)
with R1 and R2 standing for Regime 1 and Regime 2, respectively. τ is the switching time from Regime 1 to Regime 2:
τ = inf{t ≥ 0|d(t) ≥ dB} (3.B.2)
We adapt the solution method of Chiang (1992) to allow for regime switches. The current-value Hamiltonian is defined
as:
Hc =
{
HR1 = piR1(d(t))− µ1(t)d(t) , if t ∈ [0, τ)
HR2 = piR2(d(t))− µ2(t)d(t) , if t ∈ [τ, T ] (3.B.3)
It is important to underline that if Regime 1 occurs in our parametrisation, it will precede Regime 2, due to the different
profit dynamics of the two activities. On the one hand, the landowner can gain from intensifying forest exploitation, as
long as his inflows do not exceed operating costs. In time, his revenues rise due to the increasing price of the composite
commodity. On the other hand, even if revenues from REDD increase due to rising permit prices, these profits are
limited, since the deforestation rate is bounded from above by the reference level and from below by zero (we do not
allow for reforestation). Therefore, even if initially marginal benefits with REDD could be higher than BaU marginal
benefits, this advantage would decrease over time. As a consequence, remaining in Regime 1 could become suboptimal
at a certain moment of time (τ), after which the landowner will move to Regime 2. Fig. 3.B.1 captures dominant profits
Fig. 3.B.1: Land use revenues.
Fig. 3.B.2: Land use revenues (view
from top).
of either REDD or BaU regimes at different deforestation rates. The hashed-area area represents cases where taking
part in the REDD project is optimal, while the grey area symbolises regions where the BaU scenario is optimal. Within
each section of the graph, lighter colours stand for higher profit values. As long as the deforestation rate is below the
fixed baseline, the optimal regime to choose is the REDD one; see Fig. 3.B.2. This holds for initial time periods. As
time passes, the overall optimum is to be found in the BaU regime. The two figures show that if a regime switch does
occur at some moment of time, this switch is expected to take place one time only, as the dominance alternation takes
place only once. Moreover, Fig. 3.B.1 shows that the REDD regime should precede the BaU, since for later periods of
time profits are increasing in the deforestation rate and the landowner will be better off opting for the BaU regime. The
solution for the optimal deforestation path is given by:
d(t) =

d(0)ert + P
cc(0)(eδt−ert)−a1(1−ert)−PR(0)(eγt−ert)
2a2
) , if t ∈ [0, τ)
d(τ)ert + P
cc(τ)(eδt−ert)−a1(1−ert)
2a2
, if t ∈ [τ, T ]
(3.B.4)
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Considering the lack of continuity at τ , we solve the landowner’s maximisation using a numerical search algorithm that
combines all possible combinations of Regime 1 and Regime 2 paths at different switching points26. We select the
combined path that yields the highest profits.
In the case of the corridor scenarios, the profit function is non-smooth at two points, i.e. at the boundaries of the corridor
(dBU and dBL for the fixed; dBU (t) and dBL(t) for the variable); the landowner will be able to switch between three
different regimes. Depending on the relationship between initial parameter values, he will choose an optimal deforested
area that satisfies:
d(t) =

d(0)ert +
Pcc(0)(eδt−ert)−a1(1−ert)−PR(0)(eγt−ert)
2a2
) , if t ∈ [0, τ1)
d(τ1)e
rt
a2− P
R(τ1)
dBU−dBL
a2− P
R(τ1)e
γt
dBU−dBL
+
Pcc(τ1)(eδt−ert)−a1(1−ert)−PR(τ1)(eγt−ert)
(
1+ dB
U+dBL
dBU−dBL
)
2
(
a2− P
R(τ1)e
γt
dBU−dBL
) , if t ∈ [τ1, τ2)
d(τ2)e
rt +
Pcc(τ2)(eδt−ert)−a1(1−ert)
2a2
, if t ∈ [τ2, T ]
(3.B.5)
in the fixed corridor case. For the variable corridor, the optimal deforestation rate will take the same form, with dBU (t)
and dBL(t) replacing dBU and dBL, respectively. In our setting, the order of the switching times (0 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ T )
is due to the combination of two characteristics of our model. First, the benefits of taking part in REDD decrease over
time: for later periods, net revenues from land exploitation outpace REDD revenues due to higher composite commodity
prices and larger deforestation rates. Second, REDD gains get marginally smaller as the deforestation level gets closer
to the upper corridor boundary until it eventually fades away for rates above the corridor. Therefore, the motivation to
stay in REDD decreases over time, but at different paces within each interval. The landowner’s optimisation problem
accounts for three possible regimes:
maxd(t)|t∈[0,T ]
{∫ τ1
0
e−rtpiR1(d(t))dt+
∫ τ2
τ1
e−rtpiR2(d(t))dt+
∫ T
τ2
e−rtpiR3(d(t))dt
}
(3.B.6)
To determine the optimal regime switching times (τ1 and τ2), we first define optimal paths within each regime for all
possible combinations of switching times. We then use a numerical search algorithm that selects the combination of the
three paths yielding the highest profits.
Fig. 3.B.3 captures the optimal deforestation path for the business-as-usual and the four REDD baseline methodolo-
gies. The large box on the left-hand side refers to the entire deforestation path, reproducing the results in Fig. 3.1. To
better understand the differences in optimal deforestation for each baseline, we detail in the other boxes on the right-hand
side the deforestation path for sub-periods of 25 years each.
26We allow for all possible switching points in the range [0, T ]
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Fig. 3.B.3: Optimal deforestation paths under BaU and different REDD baselines, detailed for sub-
periods of 25 years.
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3.C Efficiency of the single-threshold and corridor approaches
Proposition: The single-threshold baseline approach is more efficient that the corresponding corridor approach, that is:
EH3 ≤ ECf3 (3.C.1)
EMI3 ≤ ECv3 (3.C.2)
where Ei3 =
SRRi
SBaU
Tot
−Si
Tot
, SRRi =
∫ T
0
RRi(t)dt, SiTot =
∫ T
0
di(t)dt, i ∈ {H,MI,Cf,Cv}, and BaU stands for business-as-
usual.
Proof:
Let ST refer to the single-threshold approach and C to the corresponding corridor approach. For the proof we will use
three results from Section 3.3.1. First, we have seen in Section 3.3.1 that:
RRST (t) ≤ RRC(t) (3.C.3)
Since Relation (3.C.3) holds ∀t ∈ [0;T ], we can write that:∫ T
0
RRST (t)dt ≤
∫ T
0
RRC(t)dt⇔ SRRST ≤ SRRC (3.C.4)
Let us denote then:
SRRST = (1− a)SRRC (3.C.5)
with a ∈ [0; 1] such that Relation (3.C.5) is satisfied.
We have seen in Section 3.3.1 that:
EST1 ≤ EC1 (3.C.6)
From the definition of Ei1, it follows that:
SBaUTot − SSTTot
SBaUTot
≤ S
BaU
Tot − SCTot
SBaUTot
⇔ SBaUTot − SSTTot ≤ SBaUTot − SCTot (3.C.7)
Let us denote then:
SBaUTot − SSTTot = (1− b)
(
SBaUTot − SCTot
)
(3.C.8)
where b ∈ [0; 1] such that Relation (3.C.7) is satisfied.
Third, we observe from Table 3.4 that a > b, i.e. that the percentage gain in welfare (a) achieved by the corridor relative
to the single-threshold is larger than its gain in effectiveness (b). Therefore, accounting for Relations (3.C.5) and (3.C.8),
we can compare the efficiency of the single-threshold and corridor approaches:
EST3 − EC3 = SRR
ST
SBaUTot − SSTTot
− SRR
C
SBaUTot − SCTot
=
(1− a)SRRC
(1− b)(SBaUTot − SCTot)
− SRR
C
SBaUTot − SCTot
(3.C.9)
EST3 − EC3 = SRR
C
SBaUTot − SCTot
b− a
1− b (3.C.10)
With a > b, we get that:
EST3 ≤ EC3 (3.C.11)
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3.D Parameter calibration and sensitivity analysis
This section verifies the robustness of our results to several key calibration parameters, namely: the carbon content of
the forest, the discount rate, and the growth rates of the composite commodity and REDD permit prices.
3.D.1 The forest carbon content (Ω)
REDD programs aim to achieve reductions in emissions from deforestation below business-as-usual levels. While defor-
estation can be measured in terms of hectares of land where forest has been removed, the GHG emissions coming from
deforestation depend on the carbon content stored in the trees. The carbon content of one hectare of forest can vary
across geographical regions, depending on tree type and forest density.
Across the REDD candidate countries, the average carbon content varies widely. Fig. 3.D.1 captures the distribution of
average above and below ground carbon content of 85 REDD countries, grouped according to their deforestation patterns
and the geographical region27. The variability of the carbon content is very large even within each geographical and
FTT group.
The forest carbon content varies not only from country to country, but also within countries. Fig. 3.D.3 shows the above
ground carbon content across the territory of Peru28, which takes values from 0 to more than 150 tC/ha. The existence
of large differences between the carbon content of different regions brings a strong argument for the need to design REDD
projects that take into account regional characteristics.
The success of REDD is likely to depend on its ability to provide payments that correctly reflect the carbon content of
each project area. We test the sensitivity of the baseline performance to different levels of carbon content per hectare of
forest. This setting depicts a situation where REDD projects are implemented in several regions of a country, with the
average carbon content varying from region to region. Holding everything else constant, we assume identical conditions
regarding the composite commodity and REDD permit markets across the different regions.
Fig. 3.D.2 illustrates the performance of the four REDD baselines across different levels of average carbon content. It
demonstrates the robustness of the baseline ranking presented in Section 3.3.1. The variable corridor (Cv) continues to
be the most effective in reducing deforestation. The fixed corridor (Cf) offers the highest increase in welfare from BaU.
The model-implied baseline (MI) is the most efficient, having the lowest costs per hectare of avoided deforestation.
Additionally, we observe an increase in the difference in performance of the static versus dynamic baselines at higher
carbon contents. The results are particularly interesting in terms of effectiveness; it results that REDD projects employing
the variable corridor (Cv) approach will have a high potential in reducing deforestation and the inherent GHG emissions,
especially if they target high carbon content (HCC) areas. With the current international fora inclined to direct REDD
programs towards high carbon content areas, it appears especially important to understand and underline the benefits
of the variable corridor approach.
27Data source is the OSIRIS v.3-4 spreadsheet, available online at http://sp10.conservation.org/osiris/Pages/overview.aspx.
28Of course, not the entire territory of Peru is covered with forest and eligible for REDD projects. As mentioned in
Section 3.2.3, Peru has about 68 million hectares of tropical forest, covering nearly 53% of its territory.
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Fig. 3.D.1: Distributions of the average above and below ground carbon content across different
stages of FTT and world regions.
Note: The right panel groups countries according to the geographical region. The left panel groups countries based on
their deforestation patterns according to the Forest Transition Theory (FTT). HFHD is high forest, high deforestation;
HFLD is high forest, low deforestation; LFHD is low forest, high deforestation; LFLD is low forest, low deforestation.
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on OSIRIS v.3-4.
Fig. 3.D.2: Baseline performance across different average forest carbon contents (Ω).
Note: The figure captures the performance of the four baselines for different average carbon contents per hectare of
forest. The historical deforestation rate (dB) is 200 ha/year. Corridor width is x = 0.1.
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Fig. 3.D.3: Aboveground carbon content in Peru.
Source: The High-resolution Carbon Geography of Peru, Carnegie Institution for Science, 2014, available online at
http://carnegiescience.edu/news/per%C3%BA%E2%80%99s carbon quantified economic and conservation boon.
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3.D.2 The crediting threshold in the static baselines
In this section, we verify the change in the performance of the static baseline approaches to different crediting levels. The
REDD rewards of the historical and fixed corridor approaches depend on the fixed threshold dB (Table 3.5). As mentioned
in the baseline presentation (Section 3.2.2), the fixed threshold can be set equal to the average past deforestation in the
area. Aside from data availability and estimation issues, linking rewards to a single value over a larger horizon can result
in payments that reflect only partially actual efforts. There remains a certain level of risk involved in choosing a fixed
threshold, and we check now the sensitivity of baseline performance to various levels (dB) against which rewards are
accrued for the historical and fixed corridor schemes. The results are displayed in Fig. 3.D.4.
Fig. 3.D.4: Baseline performance across different fixed thresholds.
Note: The ranking of the four baselines changes across different historical deforestation rates. For the historical and fixed
corridor baselines, efficiency is not defined for deforestation averages below 60 ha/year, where deforestation reduction
and REDD costs are zero. Corridor width is x = x0 = 0.1.
We find that the ranking of baselines is robust to variations in the fixed threshold level dB. The historical and the
fixed corridor baselines gain ground at larger fixed thresholds, both in terms of effectiveness and welfare. However, these
improvements come at the high cost of large losses in efficiency.
The increase in welfare at higher dBs follows from the fact that the REDD revenues of the historical and fixed corridor
schemes are an increasing function of the fixed threshold. This is confirmed by the positive partial derivatives of the
REDD revenue functions of the static baselines with respect to dB. Moreover, the higher REDD revenues foster increases
in effectiveness, but also reductions in efficiency.
Our findings show that, if a static baseline is selected, the fixed threshold should be set above the average predicted
deforestation rate in order to achieve stronger effectiveness and welfare results.
3.D.3 The discount rate (r)
In our initial calibration, the discount rate was chosen slightly below the growth rates of the composite commodity and
REDD permit prices, depicting a setting in which forest exploitation and REDD bring higher financial benefits than
saving at the discount rate. However, the discount rate in many developing countries varies widely from country to
country and across time. Fig. 3.D.5 shows the discount rates for the years 2000 and 2012 in the Latin America region,
with r taking values in the range [0.5%, 19.5%].
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Fig. 3.D.5: Deposit rates (r) in the Latin America region in the years 2000 and 2012.
Source: Authors’ own graphical representation based on the data provided by the World Bank, World Development
Indicators, available online at http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/4.15.
We test the sensitivity of our results to changes in the discount rate. Fig. 3.D.6 shows the total deforested area under
BaU and the four REDD baseline methodologies. The BaU optimal deforestation rate is a decreasing function in r
(Eq. (3.A.11)), with higher impacts at later periods of time (as t approaches T ). We detail the impact on the static and
the dynamic baselines separately:
• Higher discount rates lower the total deforestation the static baselines. The landowner switches from REDD to
BaU in the second part of the optimisation horizon; see Fig. 3.D.7. After the switch, the optimal deforestation
follows the BaU path, achieving reductions in deforestation due to higher r.
• For the prospective baselines, whose reference levels depend on the BaU deforestation (dB(t) = dBaU (t)), the
impact of an increase in r on total deforestation is non-monotonous. The plots of total deforestation at different
r present an inflection point (at r = 8% for MI and r = 2% for Cv). For r lower than the inflection point, an
increase in r leads to a decrease in total deforestation; for r higher than the inflection point, an increase in r
leads to higher deforestation. Below the inflection point, an increase in r results in lower dB(t), requiring stronger
reductions in deforestation for obtaining the same REDD profits. Reducing the deforestation rate pays off until
some point (the inflection point), above which the time-varying threshold is so low that the opportunity costs
of REDD exceed the benefits, and the landowner is better off following the BaU scenario (exiting REDD and
increasing deforestation); see Fig. 3.D.7.
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Fig. 3.D.6: Total deforestation across different baselines and discount rates (r).
Fig. 3.D.7: Optimal deforestation across different baselines (r = 0.1).
Fig. 3.D.8 shows that the ranking of baselines across the three performance measures is robust across different discount
rates. Additionally, for higher discount rates, the difference in performance between the static and dynamic baselines
decreases in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, but widens considerably in terms of welfare. The results need to be
interpreted carefully. First, at higher r, both BaU and static baselines result in lower total welfare. The impact of
higher r on the change in welfare from BaU is measured by the E2 indicator. With the income under the static baselines
decreasing less than the BaU income, the percentage change in welfare appears to be increasing, despite the fact that
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welfare itself is decreasing in r. Second, with efficiency measured as total discounted REDD revenues per hectares of
avoided deforestation (the E3 indicator), an increase in r reduces heavily the nominator (lower total discounted revenues),
without increasing the forest area saved (we have seen that effectiveness is constant across different r). The improvement
in efficiency at higher r is, therefore, just a discounting effect.
Fig. 3.D.8: Baseline performance across different discount rates (r).
Note: The figure captures the performance of the four baselines for different discount rates. The historical deforestation
rate (dB) is at 200 ha/year. Corridor width is x = 0.1.
Summing up, we find that the ranking of baselines at different discount rates is consistent with the results presented
under the initial calibration (Section 3.3.1). Higher discount rates lower the amount of total deforestation, especially for
periods of time that are further away in the future. With lower deforestation also under the BaU, there is little room for
additionality obtained by REDD, and the effectiveness of the different baselines decreases. We argue that policy makers
interested in achieving high effectiveness, might prefer to direct REDD projects to countries of higher political stability,
where discount rates are lower.
3.D.4 The growth rate of the composite commodity price (δ)
REDD programs are currently being designed in many developing countries, and the opportunity costs of avoiding
deforestation are likely to vary widely across the different regions. The price dynamics of the alternative land use
— in our model the growth rate of the composite commodity price (δ) — represents a key parameter influencing the
opportunity costs of avoiding deforestation. Intuitively, the higher the growth rate of the composite commodity, the
larger the price of the commodity in the future, strengthening the incentives to deforest more at later periods of time.
With higher opportunity costs, REDD programs are expected to be less effective (Irawan et al., 2013).
We test the sensitivity of baseline ranking to different levels of opportunity costs, by varying the growth rate of the
composite commodity. We observe that, with our calibration, for δ > 0.04 REDD projects are no longer effective in
reducing deforestation below BaU.
Fig. 3.D.9 shows that the ranking of baselines is consistent with the results presented in Section 3.3.1 across all values
of δ. Higher values of δ increase deforestation under BaU and the four REDD scenarios, reducing the effectiveness of
REDD, as expected. As δ gets higher, landowners opt out of REDD and follow the BaU, with their welfare converging to
the BaU income. At lower effectiveness rates, payments for deforestation reductions under REDD are less cost-efficient.
The policy implication that arises from our analysis is that REDD programs need to be accompanied by payments
that stand up to the specific opportunity costs of the region; otherwise, where opportunity costs are very high, REDD
programs will be ineffective. This result is in line with the of findings of Irawan et al. (2013), who underline that REDD
might not be able to compete with some alternative land uses that have prohibitive opportunity costs.
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Fig. 3.D.9: Baseline performance across different growth rates of the composite commodity price (δ).
Note: The figure captures the performance of the four baselines for different growth rates of the composite commodity
price. The historical deforestation rate (dB) is at 200 ha/year. Corridor width is x = 0.1.
3.D.5 The growth rate of the REDD permit price (γ)
The success of REDD is critically dependent on the incentive structure offered by the scheme. A key element is the
amount of money rewarded per hectare of avoided deforestation, given by the REDD permit price (PR) and its growth
rate over time (γ).
Forest carbon projects have started their slow but steady increase at the end of the 1980s, and since then the largest
part of demand for forest offsets has come from the voluntary carbon markets. Since 2005, forest carbon markets have
experienced a significant boom, clearly marked by the development of REDD projects starting with 2010 (Diaz et al.,
2011). REDD projects do not result in unique prices per ton of avoided emissions from deforestation; instead, prices
vary according to demand levels, international regulation, and quality of the specific projects29. Fig. 3.D.10 captures
the historical distribution of forest carbon prices and illustrates two key characteristics of the market: (i) forest carbon
prices present large variability; and (ii) the trend in average prices after 2008 was increasing.
29Various international standards have emerged to distinguish between different forest projects, as for example the
Panda Standard in China.
Chapter 3. Baseline choice and performance implications for REDD 70
Fig. 3.D.10: Historical forest carbon price distributions (primary market).
Source: Diaz et al. (2011), Ecosystem Marketplace, available online at http://www.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/doc 2963.pdf. Values in parentheses show the number of reported prices included in
each year.
Motivated by the high price variability observed empirically, and by the fact that only increasing prices can motivate the
sustained reduction of deforestation in the long run, we test the robustness of our results to different growth rates of the
REDD credits price (γ).
Fig. 3.D.11 captures the performance of the four REDD baseline methodologies across different levels of γ. The baseline
ranking presented in Section 3.3.1 is robust to changes in the growth rate of the REDD price. As expected, low
future REDD prices diminish the incentives to avoid deforestation, and the modest reductions in deforestation are cost-
inefficient. On the contrary, if the forest owner expects large future increases in REDD prices, he is motivated to keep
the deforestation rates significantly lower than the BaU scenario; REDD projects are in this case likely to achieve high
effectiveness. Moreover, the higher the growth rate, the larger becomes the difference in effectiveness between the static
and the dynamic baselines.
The policy implication that results from our analysis is that it is not enough to ensure high future REDD payments in
order to achieve large reductions in deforestation, but it is necessary to choose carefully the baseline methodology. While
static baselines achieve limited effectiveness at high REDD rewards, a dynamic baseline approach, designed as a corridor
around the estimated BaU deforestation rate, will strongly increase the effectiveness of REDD.
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Fig. 3.D.11: Baseline performance across different growth rates of the REDD permit (γ).
Note: The figure captures the performance of the four baselines for different growth rates of the REDD permit price.
The historical deforestation rate (dB) is at 200 ha/year. Corridor width is x = 0.1.
3.E Corridor bandwidth and symmetry
The fixed corridor
Fig. 3.E.1: Performance of the fixed corridor at different corridor bandwidths (x).
Note: The figure captures the performance of the fixed corridor for different corridor widths and symmetry assumptions.
Considered corridors are symmetric (sym), upward (up), and downward-biased (down). Bounds in the downward-biased
case are set as dBU = (1 + x0)dB, dB
L = (1− x)dB; in the upward-biased case dBU = (1 + x)dB, dBL = (1− x0)dB,
with x ∈ [0.1, 0.9] and x0 = 0.1
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Fig. 3.E.2: Performance of the fixed corridor at different fixed thresholds (dB).
Note: The figure captures performance results of the fixed (symmetric, upward, and downward-biased) corridor. Three
cases of corridor width are considered (x ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6}) for different fixed thresholds (dB ∈ [1, 500] ha/year).
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Table 3.E.3: Double impact of varying the corridor width on REDD revenues.
Symmetry Characteristics Linear impact Non-linear impact
on REDD credits (n) on weight (ω)
Cf
Symmetric dBL = (1− x)dB ∂n∂x = dB > 0
∂ω
∂x =
d(t)−dB
2x2dB
dBU = (1 + x)dB ( ∂ω
∂x
< 0 if d(t) < dB)
n = (1 + x)dB − d(t) ( ∂ω
∂x
≥ 0 if d(t) ≥ dB)
ω = 1− d(t)−(1−x)dB
(1+x)dB−(1−x)dB
Upward-biased dBL = (1− x0)dB ∂n∂x = dB > 0
∂ω
∂x =
d(t)−(1−x0)dB
(x+x0)2dB
> 0
dBU = (1 + x)dB
n = (1 + x)dB − d(t)
ω = 1− d(t)−(1−x0)dB
(1+x)dB−(1−x0)dB
Downward-biased dBL = (1− x)dB ∂n∂x = 0
∂ω
∂x =
d(t)−(1+x0)dB
(x+x0)2dB
< 0
dBU = (1 + x0)dB
n = (1 + x0)dB − d(t)
ω = 1− d(t)−(1−x)dB
(1+x0)dB−(1−x)dB
Cv
Symmetric dBL(t) = (1− x)dB(t) ∂n∂x = dB(t) > 0
∂ω(t)
∂x =
d(t)−dB(t)
2x2dB(t) < 0
dBU (t) = (1 + x)dB(t) (since optimal d(t) < dB(t))
n = (1 + x)dB(t)− d(t)
ω(t) = 1− d(t)−(1−x)dB(t)
(1+x)dB(t)−(1−x)dB(t)
Upward-biased dBL(t) = (1− x0)dB(t) ∂n∂x = dB(t) > 0
∂ω(t)
∂x =
d(t)−(1−x0)dB(t)
(x+x0)2dB(t)
> 0
dBU (t) = (1 + x)dB(t)
n = (1 + x)dB(t)− d(t)
ω(t) = 1− d(t)−(1−x0)dB(t)
(1+x)dB(t)−(1−x0)dB(t)
Downward-biased dBL(t) = (1− x)dB(t) ∂n∂x = 0
∂ω(t)
∂x =
d(t)−(1+x0)dB(t)
(x+x0)2dB(t)
< 0
dBU (t) = (1 + x0)dB(t)
n = (1 + x0)dB(t)− d(t)
ω(t) = 1− d(t)−(1−x)dB(t)
(1+x0)dB(t)−(1−x)dB(t)
Chapter 4
Who is driving the volatility of the
CO2 permit price? Evidence from EU
ETS Phase I
Abstract
This paper studies the relation between the trading activity and the volatility of the Euro-
pean Emission Allowance (EUA) price during Phase I of the European Union Emission Trading
System (EU ETS). Our focus rests on the contrasting roles of different types of traders. We
distinguish market players according to three criteria: emission regulation, initial endowment
of permits relative to realized emissions, and exposure to other markets.
We find evidence of a positive and significant trading activity - volatility relation, which ap-
pears stronger when distinguishing between different types of traders. The positive relation
can be mainly attributed to the energy providers. In contrast, industrial companies seem to
have traded more frequently when volatility levels were lower. Finally, the non-liable players,
mostly represented by financial intermediaries, appear to have taken the role of a flexible coun-
terparty, adjusting to the needs of the liable sectors by trading more with the energy sector
when volatility was higher, and more with the industrial firms when volatility was lower. We
discuss possible explanations for these contrasted positions.
Understanding the link between the trading activity of different market players and price volatil-
ity is relevant for evaluating the efficiency of the EU ETS. Although the trading activity -
volatility relation is generally positive, many players remained often inactive and traded mostly
when volatility levels were lower. In this setting, new information is expected to be more slowly
incorporated into prices and market efficiency is not maximized.
Keywords: EU ETS; Permit price; Volatility; Liable and non-liable participants; Market ef-
ficiency.
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4.1 Introduction
Due to the pressing dangers of climate change and the low progress on mitigation agreements
at the international level, countries and regions have started to develop domestic solutions to
reduce emissions. The proposed regulations take different forms around the world, relying on
cap-and-trade schemes, carbon taxes, subsidies for energy efficiency improvements, and setting
of energy efficiency standards.
The theoretical fundaments of emission allowance markets have been consolidated in the last
half decade (Dales, 1968; Montgomery, 1972; Rubin, 1996; Cronshaw and Kruse, 1996), putting
forth the idea that tradable pollution rights would lead to a cost-efficient solution to handle
externalities from production. The European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) and
the regional carbon markets set in China1 are examples of existing quantity2 approaches to
pollution regulation.
The EU ETS started its activity in 2005 and aims to regulate the greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions of its area.3 The EU ETS has been divided into four compliance phases so far: Phase
I 2005-2007, Phase II 2008 - 2012, Phase III 2013-2020, and Phase IV 2021 - 2028. The first
period was intended to test and evaluate the performance of the emission market. The second
phase (2008 - 2012) imposed an emission reduction target in line with the Kyoto Protocol’s
first commitment period. The third trading period (2013 - 2020) brought along considerable
revisions to the system’s operational design, concerning, in particular, the permit allocation
procedure and the imposition of an EU-wide emissions cap. The rules of the expected fourth
phase are still under development. In this paper, we focus on the (pilot) Phase I of the EU
ETS.
The EU ETS works on a cap-and-trade principle. The heavy polluters of the European industry
are periodically assigned an overall limit for their emissions. At the beginning of each compliance
year, liable entities are allocated a number of European Union Allowance Units (EUAs). While
the allocation was done almost entirely for free in the first years of the EU ETS, beginning with
2013, auctioning became the main method for allocating allowances. Within the cap, liable
entities can trade EUAs according to their compliance needs. For emission levels below the
cap, unused permits are eligible for sale; at the end of each compliance year, penalties and
additional permits need to be provided in case of uncovered emissions. On the carbon markets,
both regulated (liable) and non-regulated (non-liable) entities can trade permits.
During the several years since the opening of the EU ETS, the permit price has diverted
significantly from its theoretical optimum, namely the marginal abatement cost. Instead, EUA
prices have been fairly volatile, experiencing at times jumps, and converging to zero due to excess
1In China, several ETS schemes have opened since 2013 in six provinces: Beijing, Guangdong, Hubei, Shanghai,
Shenzhen, and Tianjin, making China the second largest carbon market in the world after the EU ETS (World Bank,
2014).
2A pollution regulation based on a tax system is known as a price approach.
3The EU ETS currently covers more than 11,000 installations in 31 countries: the 28 European states as well as Iceland,
Lichtenstein, and Norway. The GHGs covered are carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), and perfluorocarbons
(PFCs). About 45% of the total EU emissions are currently covered by the EU ETS (European Commission, 2015).
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supply (Paolella and Taschini, 2008; Daskalakis et al., 2009; Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner, 2009;
Hintermann, 2010, 2012).
An extended thread of literature has steadily evolved since the opening of the EU ETS, trying to
pinpoint the drivers behind the atypical evolution of prices on this compliance market. The first
branch of literature considers that, in an efficient market, prices are related to fundamentals.
For Phase I, several studies identify energy prices and weather conditions as the main drivers
of carbon prices (Christensen et al., 2005; Bunn and Fezzi, 2007; Mansanet-Bataller et al.,
2007). Alberola et al. (2008a) confirm that carbon prices react to changes in energy prices, and
underline the additional influence played by unanticipated temperature changes during colder
periods. Finally, they show that institutional decisions regarding permit allocation exercise
at times a stronger impact on EUA prices than fundamentals. Hintermann (2010) finds that
carbon prices were more likely to reflect marginal abatement costs after April 2006, when fuel
prices, temperature levels, and precipitation began to exercise influence over EUA prices.
Due to the low evidence of abatement and highly volatile prices, researchers started to look
for price drivers that go beyond fundamentals related to abatement. The specificities of the
carbon market, as an artificially created one, make it susceptible to various market design
properties, such as the possibility of permits transferability from one compliance period to the
next (banking) and the allocation process (grandfathering). More importantly, the penalty level
and the (perceived) difference between allocated permits and realized emissions have shown a
strong influence on price formation (Chesney and Taschini, 2012; Hintermann, 2012).
The properties of the EUA price have also been analyzed from a time series perspective. During
Phase I, the carbon price has been documented to exhibit structural breaks, jumps, and heavy
tails (Paolella and Taschini, 2008; Daskalakis et al., 2009; Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner, 2009).
Recent studies draw attention to the indisputable presence of jumps; Chevallier and Se´vi (2014)
show that, for the period 2009 - 2010, carbon futures prices do not seem to contain a continuous
(Brownian motion) component, and can be better characterized by a centered Le´vy or Poisson
process.
In this paper, we contribute to the discussion on the dynamics of the EUA price by taking a
players-oriented approach. Namely, we examine the relation between the volatility of the al-
lowance price and the trading activity of different types of participants in the carbon market. On
mature financial markets, previous literature documents a strong and positive trading activity
- volatility relation (Clark, 1973; Harris and Raviv, 1993; Shalen, 1993). Moreover, the asso-
ciation is better explained when distinguishing between different types of traders (Daigler and
Wiley, 1999). Our focus is on the artificially created EU ETS market for emission compliance,
whose special setting is likely to allow for traders with significantly different characteristics.
A study closely related to ours is the one of Kalaitzoglou and Ibrahim (2013). The authors
use high frequency data in order to analyse the microstructure of the carbon futures market
in Phases I and II. Based on the volumes traded and the duration between consecutive trades,
they identify three categories of distinct traders, which they name as: informed, fundamental,
and uninformed. The authors provide, however, no evidence that the trader types actually
possess the characteristics of their category title, i.e. if they actually have access to different
information or not. First, they find that the informed players trade high volumes at low
duration. Second, the fundamental traders time their trades, and prolong the revelation of the
information that the order flow of informed trades started. Third, the uninformed players have
both lower volumes and longer duration. The authors show that, during the first two phases
of the EU ETS, most players acted similarly to the uninformed type, trading for compliance
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reasons; however, some periods of intense trading with fast information arrival can be identified,
where the informed type had a dominating strategic behavior.
In this paper, we are also interested in identifying different categories of market participants.
Unlike the work of Kalaitzoglou and Ibrahim (2013), we define trader types according to char-
acteristics that go beyond the observed trading behavior; instead, we focus on the special design
of the EU ETS as a compliance market. For trader type classification we rely on three criteria:
(i) compliance regulation, (ii) initial endowment of permits relative to actual emissions, and
(iii) players’ exposure to other markets.
Our study uses the European Union Transactions Log (EUTL) to track daily permit transfers
across the individual accounts of the liable and non-liable players in Phase I of the EU ETS (2005
- 2007). Relying on the procedure suggested by Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) and Daigler
and Wiley (1999) for financial markets, we estimate the trading activity - volatility relation
during the first phase of the EU ETS. Our procedure consists in simultaneously estimating
returns and volatility, via a series of iterations between two equations describing conditional
daily price changes and volatility.
Three main findings result from our analysis. First, we show that, common to most financial
markets, volatility is persistent and clusters. Evidence of seasonality is also documented, with
volatility being especially high in April when, under the EU ETS design, liable firms need to
surrender allowances covering their cumulated emissions, and the amount of verified emissions
for the preceding year is publicly disclosed. Second, the trading activities of stronger inten-
sity (larger volumes and higher number of transfers) are generally positively and significantly
associated with higher volatility levels for the analysed period. Third, the trading activity -
volatility relation can be better captured when specifying the sector initiating the trade, the
specific counterparty, and whether or not the player acted as a buyer or a seller. The positive
association can be attributed in particular to the energy sector, which appears to have traded
more during times of higher volatility levels. In contrast, the industrial sector tended to trade
more often when volatility was lower. The non-liable players, mostly represented by financial
intermediaries, seem to have acted as a flexible counterparty, answering to the differentiated
needs of the liable sectors, by trading more with the energy sector when volatility levels were
higher, and more with the industrial companies when volatility levels were lower.
Characterising the trading activity - volatility link is relevant for several reasons. First, es-
timating price differences and volatility on autoregressive terms reveals the degree of market
predictability and maturity. Second, estimating permit price volatility brings insights into how
the design of the EU ETS can help the European Union reach its target of reducing emissions.4
The aim of the EU ETS is to generate a price signal that can encourage firms to reduce their
emissions (Paolella and Taschini, 2008; Bredin et al., 2014) through investments in cleaner tech-
nologies. In an efficient market, permit prices should come close to the marginal abatement
cost. From a theoretical point of view, price volatility and trading activity should be positively
correlated, allowing new information to be incorporated into prices and market participants to
adjust their permit holdings accordingly. However, we find that a large share of market par-
ticipants remained often inactive during Phase I, and tended to trade, on average, more when
price volatility was lower. This indicates lower liquidity contributions by some sectors at times
of intense information revelation, and could suggest that price adjustment was slower than in
well-established, more efficient markets.
4The commitment taken by the European Union was to reduce emissions by 8% by 2012, primarily through its cap-
and-trade scheme. Starting in 2013, the cap is reduced by 1.74% every year, such that by 2020 the GHGs of the liable
sectors are expected to be 21% lower than in 2005.
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The policy implications of our analysis are direct; a cap-and-trade market is unlikely to achieve
efficiency if many players are inactive and reluctant to trade during periods of intense informa-
tion arrival. A directed engagement of less active players could possibly counteract this trend
and lead to improved market efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we discuss the existing theories
formalizing the trading activity - volatility relation. The methodology employed for estimation
is described in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 describes the dataset used and the main characteristics
of the EU ETS. Section 4.5 presents the results. Section 4.6 discusses possible explanations for
our findings. Section 4.7 concludes and reviews interesting avenues for further research.
4.2 Trading activity - volatility relation
Our study is related to the branch of literature that associates changes in prices with trading
activities, such as transacted volumes or number of daily transactions. Two complementary the-
ories have been developed to explain this empirically observed link. On one hand, the ‘mixture
of distributions’ theory considers volume and volatility to be contemporaneously determined
by the arrival of new information and predict a positive volume - volatility association (Clark,
1973; Tauchen and Pitts, 1983; Harris, 1986). On the other hand, the ‘dispersion of beliefs’
theory, developed among others by Harris and Raviv (1993) and Shalen (1993), considers that
traders differ in the way they interpret new information and trade according to their distinctive
beliefs. The dispersion of expectations creates a positive correlation between traded volumes
and price variability.
The positive volume - volatility relation on established financial markets has been empirically
documented since a long time (an early review is given in Karpoff (1988)). Further studies have
shown that partitioning volume into expected and unexpected components increases the fit of
the models, with unexpected volumes playing a dominating role (Bessembinder and Seguin,
1992, 1993). A complementary branch of literature (Jones et al., 1994) points to the fact that
the number of daily transactions is strongly related to price change variability. They conclude
that the trading activity relevant for price movements is the number of daily trades, and not
the volume levels per se.
Assuming heterogeneous agents, with different characteristics or diverging interests, one could
expect that the sign and strength of the trading activity - volatility relation depend on the
type of agent that participates in the trade. Indeed, this prediction is confirmed by empirical
evidence. Daigler and Wiley (1999) analyse several commodity futures markets and find that,
depending on the type of trader (classified in their work according to the distance to the trading
floor), the association between volumes and volatility can be either positive or negative.
In this paper, we study the trading activity - volatility relation on the EU ETS market during
Phase I. In this trial period, the carbon market exhibited many features of an emerging market,
with low initial liquidity and large variations in prices. Fig. 4.1 shows the evolution of carbon
spot prices and traded volumes. Permit prices experienced large jumps caused by the arrival
of compliance information5 (Alberola et al., 2008a). Fig. 4.1 gives a first impression on the
relation between volumes and price changes. It appears that larger movements in prices can be
matched with contemporaneous spikes in volumes.
5Such events include the April 2006 publication of realized emissions for 2005, and the October 2006 announcement
of reduced allocation for the EU ETS second phase.
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The special setting of this market allows for players that are different from multiple perspectives.
We identify three points of possible divergence in agents’ characteristics, namely: (i) compliance
regulation, (ii) initial endowment of permits relative to actual emissions, and (iii) exposure to
other markets.
First, while most traders are subject to pollution compliance rules and need to acquire suffi-
cient permits to cover their cumulated emissions, the EU ETS is open also to non-liable entities,
such as non-emitting companies or individual and institutional investors. Their participation
is expected to increase liquidity on the carbon markets, while trading for speculation or hedg-
ing purposes (Daskalakis and Markellos, 2008). Our analysis might be relevant for indicating
possible benefits or disadvantages of opening the permit market to non-liable players.
Second, in the first phase of the EU ETS, the liable players started off with freely allocated
permits. The extent of the initial permit allocation depended on several factors, including
emission forecasts, self-declared historical emissions, the sector of activity, and the bargaining
power of the emitter (Betz et al., 2004; Alberola et al., 2008b). As such, some players ended
up being generally over-allocated with permits relative to their actual emissions, while others
under-allocated. In a cap and trade system without banking or borrowing, where the supply of
permits is fixed by initial allocation of permits and excess permits are worthless at the end of the
compliance period, it is likely that players adopt different trading strategies depending on their
expected over- or under-allocation status. Estimating the trading activity - volatility relation
according to this dimension can bring insights into the different permit trading strategies of
players depending on their excess or deficit of allowances.
Third, both liable and non-liable players operate primarily in other markets than the EU ETS
and are, thus, exposed to different external risks and opportunities. Alberola et al. (2008b) show
that, during Phase I, the annual growth rate of output production greatly depended on the sec-
tor of activity. Moreover, the authors find carbon price changes to be significantly related to the
size of output production in three sectors: combustion, paper, and iron. Liable agents are likely
to build their permit trading strategies and their output production decisions simultaneously;
resulting permit trades may reflect the conditions on both markets. For example, Daskalakis
and Markellos (2009) conjecture a positive relation between emission allowance spot returns
and electricity risk-premia, possibly due to the coordination of the decisions regarding when
and how much power to produce and when to abate emissions. In contrast, non-liable players,
such as banks and insurance companies, are likely to regard the trading of carbon permits in
a financial framework, for hedging or speculation (Engels, 2009). By grouping accounts along
the sectoral breakdown, we intend to shed light on the trading strategies of players exposed to
different primary business activities.
We have, thus, several reasons to believe that, in this designed market for pollution compliance,
the involved market players differ in key aspects and that their permit trades reflect these
differences. As such, our work makes similar assumptions to those in Shalen (1993) and Daigler
and Wiley (1999), where agents are heterogeneous and their trades are expected to associate
differently with price volatility. We dedicate the remaining of the paper to the investigation of
the sign and the strength of the trading activity - volatility association, and to the analysis of
whether or not this relation varies according to the type of agent involved in the trade.
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Fig. 4.1: EUA spot price and transferred volumes (Sept. 2005 - May 2007).
4.3 Methodology
In order to analyse the trading activity - volatility relation on the carbon market, we rely on
the methodology proposed by Davidian and Carroll (1987), and applied to financial markets
by Schwert (1990) and Bessembinder and Seguin (1992, 1993), among others. The procedure
achieves the computation of unbiased estimates of the conditional daily return standard devia-
tion, and simultaneously accounts for the persistence of volatility. Our paper is closely related
to the study of Daigler and Wiley (1999), who estimate the association between the price
volatility and the trading activity of different types of players on commodity futures markets.
Following the standard procedure in the literature, our methodology consists of iterating be-
tween a conditional mean and a conditional volatility equation of the type:
Dt = α +
n∑
j=1
νjDt−j +
n∑
j=1
µjσˆt−j + Ut (4.1)
σˆt = δ +
n∑
j=1
γjσˆt−j +
n∑
j=1
βjUˆt−j +
m∑
k=1
ηkTAk,t + et. (4.2)
Above, Dt stands for the observed change in price (Pt) from one day to the next, i.e. Dt = Pt -
Pt−1, and the residuals Ut are the unexpected price changes, with Uˆt = Dt− Dˆt.6 σˆt = |Uˆt|
√
pi
2
is the estimated conditional standard deviation. The fitted values from Eq. (4.1) represent price
changes conditional on autoregressive terms and lagged volatilities.
6In the original models, Dt stands for the observed percentage change in price on day t. We opted for the change in
price in order to avoid the inflation of volatility to very large levels in the second part of 2007, when the permit price
basically converged to zero, and daily movements of one tick would result in returns of 100%.
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Eq. (4.2) estimates conditional standard deviations based on lagged volatilities (to account for
persistence), lagged price changes (to allow for effects of recent realized returns on volatility),
and the trading activity (TAt). Based on the findings of Daigler and Wiley (1999) and Jones
et al. (1994), we proxy trading activity with the help of two indicators: (i) daily transferred EUA
volumes and (ii) number of daily permit transfers. Several studies have documented that traded
volumes are highly serially correlated and, thus, easily forecastable (Bessembinder and Seguin,
1993). We fit the transferred volumes with the help of an ARIMA(p,d,q) procedure, in order
to distinguish between expected and unexpected trading activities. Following Bessembinder
and Seguin (1992, 1993), we define expected volumes as the fitted values obtained from the
ARIMA(p,d,q) procedure, while the residuals represent unexpected volumes. Distinguishing
between the expected and unexpected components allows us to determine whether surprises or
trend activity are more strongly associated with volatility. The number of daily permit transfers
and the unexpected volumes represent contemporaneous variables with price change volatility;
thus, our analysis will identify how the trading activity and volatility variables tend to covary
in response to external factors, such as new information arrivals.
The iterative procedure between Eq. (4.1) and (4.2) consists of several steps, as detailed in
Appendix 4.A. After having selected the number of autoregressive lags in price changes with
the help of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), we first estimate Eq. (4.1) without the
lagged volatility terms. The residuals from this estimation are then used for the volatility
transformation, and the model in Eq. (4.2) is fitted. We then re-estimate the price changes via
Eq. (4.1), using the fitted volatilities from the previous step. We recompute the unexpected price
change (Uˆt) and the volatility transformation (σˆt), and re-estimate the conditional volatility
with the help of Eq. (4.2).
4.4 Data
Our analysis uses the European Union Transactions Log (EUTL)7 to track all daily permit
transfers in Phase I of the EU ETS. The EUTL data is published with a five-year delay, currently
offering information up to the end of 2009.8 Due to the lack of availability until recently, this
dataset has been analyzed in only a limited number of studies (Zaklan, 2013; Jaraite and
Kazukauskas, 2013; Betz and Schmidt, 2015) that attempt to identify different patterns in
the trading strategies of liable companies. The dataset offers information regarding the daily
transfers of allowances, and specifies the parties and volumes involved in each transaction.
However, no information is available regarding the price at which the permit transfers have
been concluded.
In Phase I, the allocation of permits to the liable companies was done almost entirely for
free (in percentage of 99%). To exchange permits, all interested entities could open trading
accounts. Three types of accounts could be opened for permit management: (i) mandatory Op-
erator Holding Accounts (OHAs) opened by the liable companies; (ii) Person Holding Accounts
(PHAs) that could be opened by any interested entity, liable or not; and (iii) mandatory coun-
try accounts opened by the member countries of the EU ETS for administrative purposes. As
revealed by Betz and Schmidt (2015), the vast majority of accounts remained mostly inactive
during the Phase I.
7The EUTL is a central transaction log, run by the European Commission, which checks and records all transactions
taking place within the trading system.
8In contrast, US trading schemes have registry data available in real time (Betz and Schmidt, 2015).
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4.4.1 Trading activity of heterogeneous agents
In our study, we use the transfer data provided by the EUTL to proxy the daily volume traded
on the carbon markets. This dataset gives us the unique possibility to distinguish the volumes
traded by each account holder,9 and to group daily transfers according to different criteria.
As mentioned in Section 4.2, EU ETS market players are likely to differ in three dimensions:
(i) compliance regulation, (ii) initial endowment of permits relative to actual emissions, and
(iii) exposure to other markets. First, we distinguish between liable and non-liable players
depending on whether or not the account was subject to compliance regulation. Second, not
all players operating in the EU ETS have started Phase I under the same permit allocation
conditions. Depending on the initial endowment of permits relative to actual emissions, we
group traders into over-allocated, under-allocated, and non-liable.10 The partition criterion
consists of comparing the number of initially allocated allowances with the number of allowances
surrendered at the end of the compliance period. Third, the EU ETS players operate primarily
on other financial or output markets, and belong thus to different sectors of activity. Based on
each account’s corresponding sector code, we distinguish three categories of players, which for
simplicity we denote as: the energy sector, the industrial firms, and the financial institutions.11
The players entering the financial institutions category are non-liable entities, and during the
analysis of results we will refer to them as non-liable, to maintain consistency with the other
criteria for differentiating players.
Table 4.1 presents information regarding the trading activity of market players grouped accord-
ing to the three criteria. While the liable group consists of a large number of players, only few
accounts enter the non-liable category. Nonetheless, the number of transfers and the volumes
have been fairly balanced between the two groups. This implies that the non-liable players,
consisting mostly in financial intermediaries, have been much more active, on average, than a
common liable player. Among the liable accounts, the energy providers appear to have been the
most active market participants. According to the initial permit endowment information, most
liable players have received more permits than finally surrendered, both among the energy and
the industrial firms. Being over-allocated appears to have been associated, on average, with a
more intense trading activity, both in terms of the number of transfers and volumes.
Table 4.2 lists the correlation coefficients characterising the trading activity of players grouped
according to the three sectors of primary business activity. Two indicators of trading activity
are considered: (i) transferred volume levels and (ii) number of transfers. The coefficients
are positive and one can notice the higher connectedness between the trading activities of the
energy and the industry sector, as well as the energy and the non-liable one. Higher coefficient
values are observed for the number of transfers. It appears that the number of permits each
9The account holder name is relevant for all transactions registered under one name and it aggregates, if needed,
several different account IDs belonging to the same holder. For more information regarding the aggregation, please refer
to Cludius (2015).
10The under-/over-allocation analysis needs to be interpreted with care. When analysing the data, some inconsistencies
have been found in the information regarding the initial allocation of permits. Namely, some liable accounts appear with
zero initial permit allocation. This is inconsistent with reality, where all liable accounts benefited from grandfathering.
We believe the problem arises due to the late opening of some registries, therefore missing some of the initial permit
activity. However, the number of concerned accounts is limited and we expect this problem not to significantly influence
the results.
11In our classification, the accounts of the energy sector belong to: electricity and heat, energy service providers,
mining, and refineries. The accounts of the industrials sector include: airport and trade fairs; automotive and transport;
bricks and ceramics; cement and chalk; chemicals and pharmaceuticals; food, beverages, and tobacco; glass, machinery,
and electronics; non-ferrous metals; paper and wood; steel; textiles and printing; university, research, and health; waste,
water and property management. The players entering the financials sector are only PHAs and refer to: banks, brokers,
consultancy, exchanges, fund managers, governmental, NGOs, and own-account traders.
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type of trader exchanged depends on their characteristic size and compliance needs; instead,
how often each trader category traded seems to depend on commonly observed information and
to be more strongly correlated.
The summary statistics presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indeed support the hypothesis that
the permit trading strategy of EU ETS market players differs significantly along the three
classification criteria. Further details on the trading activity of different types of agents are
presented in Appendix 4.C.
Table 4.1: Statistics on the trading activity of market participants grouped according to three criteria.
Note: The table lists summary statistics related to the trading activity of different participants in the EU ETS. The
number of accounts represents the number of different account IDs that have traded at least once. The under- or
over-allocation status of each account can vary from year to year. Volumes are presented in 100,000 units, where total
number of transferred permits is 1,841,282,785. Numbers in brackets refer to percentages in total. The analyzed period
is 15.09.2005 - 31.05.2007.
Compliance regulation Exposure to other markets Initial permit endowment
A. Non-liable A.1. Financial institutions Zero allocation
Nr. accounts 192 ( 5.1%)
Nr. transfers 13,761 (42.8%)
Volume 568 (30.9%)
B. liable B.1. Energy B.1.1. Over-allocated
Nr. accounts 3,596 (94.9%) Nr. accounts 2,448 (64.6%) Nr. accounts 1,844 (48.7%)
Nr. transfers 18,420 (57.2%) Nr. transfers 14,996 (46.6%) Nr. transfers 12,702 (39.5%)
Volume 1,273 (69.1%) Volume 1,095 (59.5%) Volume 809 (44.0%)
B.1.2. Under-allocated
Nr. accounts 875 (23.1%)
Nr. transfers 2,294 ( 7.1%)
Volume 286 (15.5%)
B.2. Industrials B.2.1. Over-allocated
Nr. accounts 1,148 (30.3%) Nr. accounts 845 (22.3%)
Nr. transfers 3,426 (10.7%) Nr. transfers 2,682 ( 8.3%)
Volume 178 ( 9.7%) Volume 144 ( 7.8%)
B.2.2. Under-allocated
Nr. accounts 394 (10.4%)
Nr. transfers 741 ( 2.3%)
Volume 34 ( 1.8%)
Table 4.2: Correlation coefficients for the trading activities of different sectors.
Note: The table lists the correlation coefficients characterising the trading activity of EU ETS market participants
grouped into three sectors. The analyzed period is 15.09.2005 - 31.05.2007.
Indicator Position Correlation coefficient
Energy - Industrials Energy - Financials Industrials - Financials
Volume Buy+Sell 0.1965 0.2392 0.0834
Buy 0.0946 0.1742 0.0169
Sell 0.2507 0.2102 0.1409
Nr. transfers Buy+Sell 0.5888 0.6384 0.5477
Buy 0.3591 0.6191 0.3516
Sell 0.6540 0.5839 0.5699
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4.4.2 European carbon markets and EUA daily price changes
Several organized exchanges have operated during Phase I, covering about 30% of all permit
transactions. This percentage was split between the ECX (London), the NordPool (Oslo), the
EEX (Leipzig), the Eurex (Stuttgart), the BlueNext (Paris), the EXAA (Vienna), and the
Climex (Utrecht). The remaining dominating share of about 70% of transactions took place
over-the-counter (Rittler, 2012). The EUTL database gives information on all transfers of
permit ownership, both exchange and OTC.12
The spot price on the different exchanges followed a very similar trend, with no significant
discrepancies. Our analysis relies on spot prices, publicly available from the European Environ-
mental Agency (EEA). To avoid periods of very low liquidity and less meaningful price levels,13
we restrict the analysis horizon to September 2005 - May 2007, similar to Hintermann (2010).14
With low market liquidity and permit over-allocateion, the EUA price varied widely during
Phase I, from an initial level around 30 EUR/tCO2e, down to 0.1 EUR/tCO2e at the end of
the compliance period in 2007.
Table 4.3 captures the main descriptive statistics regarding the EUA daily spot price, daily
percent change (return), and daily differences in the EUA price; see Appendix 4.B for the
graphical illustration. The normality assumption is rejected for all three series. The return
distribution exhibited fat tails and was slightly positively skewed. When prices declined to
almost zero at the end of the analyzed period, daily changes consisted in only few ticks,15 but
large absolute percentage changes. Similarly to Hintermann (2010), our analysis relies on daily
price differences; these capture the level of price variation and can be related to actual driving
factors, unlike returns which appear inflated at the end on Phase I. The daily price change
series had a mean close to zero, exhibited low standard deviation, negative skewness, and fat
tails. While the spot and log returns series are non-stationary, the daily price difference series
is stationary, as revealed by the KPSS test.
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for the EUA spot price level, return, and difference series.
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics of the daily EUA spot prices (Pt), returns (Rt), and price differences (Dt)
during 15.09.2005 - 31.05.2007. Returns are computed as the natural logarithm of the price ratio in consecutive days,
i.e. Rt = log (Pt/Pt−1), and are unitless. Daily price differences are computed as Dt = Pt − Pt−1 (EUR/tCO2e). Nr.
observations = 433.
Statistic Spot (Pt) Log Returns (Rt) Price Changes (Dt)
Mean 14.30 -0.01 -0.05
Median 15.60 -0.001 -0.02
Maximum 29.75 0.58 7.10
Minimum 0.26 -0.37 -7.50
St. Deviation 8.99 0.07 0.72
Skewness -0.20 0.09 -0.99
Excess Kurtosis -1.23 18.49 51.10
Lilliefors (p-value) 0.10 (0.00) 0.20 (0.00) 0.19 (0.00)
KPSS (p-value) 7.73 (<0.1) 0.95 (<0.1) 0.01 (>0.1)
12Our analysis excludes administrative transfers, i.e. allowance issuance, retirement, and cancellation.
13In the second half of 2007 prices converged and stayed close to zero; see Fig. 4.1.
14The EUA data provided by the European Environmental Agency starts on 15.09.2005.
15One tick is of Eur 0.01.
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4.5 Results
This section presents the empirical results from the estimation of the trading activity - volatility
association on the EU ETS market. We first present the results related to the fitting of the daily
spot price differences. Then, we focus on the regressions of volatility on the trading activity of
different market players.
4.5.1 Daily spot price differences
We start the analysis by first fitting an autoregressive model to the price difference series. The
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) indicates that the first twenty five lags (approximately
one month) have explanatory power for price differences. Selecting a number of autoregressive
terms below this threshold results in autocorrelated errors.
After performing a first iteration on the fitting of price differences and volatility, we re-estimate
Eq. (4.1) using the fitted volatilities from the previous step, together with the autoregressive
terms. The results are presented in Table 4.4. We first show the results of a model where in
the previous step of the iteration process, volatility is regressed only on autoregressive terms
and lagged unexpected price differences (M1). Then, in models M2 and M3, total transferred
volumes and total number of transfers by all market participants are included in the first
estimation of volatility, respectively.
The coefficients of the lagged price differences are significant and negative, showing that larger
past price differences tended to reduce current price changes. In contrast, lagged volatility terms
appear to have positive coefficient signs and are jointly significant, consistent with previous
empirical studies (Bessembinder and Seguin, 1993) and with the literature predicting a positive
relation between required rates of return and expected levels of volatility (French et al., 1987).
The adjusted R2 is around 23%, considerably higher than the 3% that is commonly documented
for commodities futures markets (Bessembinder and Seguin, 1993). This result signals that the
market efficiency of the EU ETS during Phase I was much weaker than that of established
financial markets, where predictability is lower. The result concurs with the findings of Mon-
tagnoli and de Vries (2010) and Palao and Pardo (2012), who point to the inefficiency of the
carbon market during Phase I.
4.5.2 Price volatility and permit trading
Implementing the methodology described in Section 4.3, we analyse the trading activity -
volatility relation by estimating Eq. (4.2). The dependent variable is the volatility of daily spot
price differences. The conditional daily volatility is estimated as a function of autoregressive
terms, past unexpected price differences, and trading activity variables. We test the association
between trading activity and permit price volatility by examining first the relation with daily
volume levels and then with number of transfers.
Kalaitzoglou and Ibrahim (2013) analyse the carbon futures market during the first two phases
of the EU ETS and find it to be buyer-dominated, where the duration (the time passed between
consecutive trades of the same day) of buyer-initiated transactions was always longer than that
of the seller-initiated transactions. To account for potential differences between acquisitions
and sales of permits, we estimate the trading activity - volatility relation by looking at: (i)
overall trading activity (buy and sell); (ii) only acquisitions (buy); and (iii) only sales (sell).
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Table 4.4: Autoregressive models for daily EUA price differences.
Note: The table presents results from the second iteration of the estimation of Eq. (4.1) based on the results from the first
estimation of Eq. (4.2). The dependent variable is the daily spot price difference series. ‘No trading activity’, ‘Volumes’,
and ‘Nr. transfers’ refer to the trading activity included in the first estimation of Eq. (4.2). The analysed period is
15.09.2005 - 31.05.2007. For all estimated coefficients, standard errors are presented in brackets. F-test statistics are
listed for
∑n=25
j=1 νˆj and
∑n=25
j=1 µˆj . The Box-Pierce statistic is computed with k = 2
√
N , N = 359.
No trading activity Volumes Nr. transfers
(M1) (M2) (M3)
Intercept -0.09 (0.07) -0.08 (0.07) -0.07 (0.07)∑n=25
j=1 νˆj 0.00 (3.70)
∗∗∗ -0.02 (3.69)∗∗∗ -0.03 (3.71)∗∗∗∑n=25
j=1 µˆj 0.06 (2.61)
∗∗∗ 0.04 (2.58)∗∗∗ 0.01 (2.63)∗∗∗
R2 0.34 0.34 0.34
Adj. R2 0.23 0.23 0.23
AIC 778.90 779.71 778.39
Box-Pierce test (p-val) 11.43 (0.49) 10.96 (0.53) 11.95 (0.45)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 , ◦p < 0.1
4.5.2.1 Transferred volume levels
The first indicator of trading activity used is the level of daily transferred volumes. Depending
on the selected definition of traded volume, several models are fitted; the results are displayed
in Table 4.5.
We first regress daily volatility on autoregressive terms and past unexpected price differences,
without considering the trading activity among the explanatory variables (Model M4). Further,
we estimate a model including the total daily volume traded by all market participants (M5). In
both cases, we find the autoregressive terms to be highly significant and positive, showing that
past volatility levels have a large predictive power for realized volatility. This is consistent with
the previously documented persistence of volatility (Schwert, 1990; Bessembinder and Seguin,
1993). The positive sign indicates the tendency of volatility to cluster. Moreover, the lagged
unexpected returns have some explanatory power for the realized movements in volatility.
Including the total transferred volumes in the regressions slightly increases the explanatory
power of the model; the coefficient of the total volume is positive, supporting the positive
volume - volatility hypothesis, but not significant. We can infer that the association between
total volumes and volatility was not particularly strong over the entire analysed horizon. This
might be due to the different interests of the EU ETS market participants, which, if diverging,
could have neutralized on the aggregate. Our prediction is that some types of players traded
volumes that are correlated positively with volatility, while others negatively.
Motivated by this hypothesis, we continue the analysis of the volume-volatility relation by
distinguishing between the type of traders involved in the permit transfer. Following our argu-
mentation in Sections 4.2 and 4.4, we use three criteria of classification.
Liable and non-liable traders
In a first classification, we separate volumes according to the liable - non-liable partition. The
estimation results are relegated to Appendix 4.D (Table 4.D.1). We find that only the volumes
traded by the liable sectors have correlated significantly and positively with volatility. Distin-
guishing between expected and unexpected volumes reveals that the positive volume - volatility
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association can be mainly attributed to the unexpected volumes traded by the liable sector.
The explanatory power of the models is higher than that of the general models that do not
distinguish among different types of players.
Under-allocated, over-allocated, and non-liable traders
The results of the volatility estimation when volumes are partitioned according to the permit
allocation criterion are displayed in Appendix 4.D (Table 4.D.2). According to this partition,
the relation between volume and volatility does not appear to have been significant, except for
the models that distinguish between expected and unexpected volumes. Here, we find volatility
to be positively associated with the unexpected volumes bought by the over-allocated accounts,
but negatively with the expected volumes bought by the under-allocated ones. With this trader
type classification, the explanatory power of the model increases to about 40%.
Energy providers, industrial firms, and financial institutions
Third, we classify traders according to their primary business activity and their implicit expo-
sure to other output and financial markets. The results of the volatility estimation are displayed
in Table 4.5 (Models M6 - M8). We find that the volumes traded by the energy sector have
correlated significantly and positively with volatility. More precisely, the positive relation is
driven by the unexpected trades of the energy sector.
Based on these findings, we are further interested in understanding whether we can capture
a link between the two types of players whose trading activity has associated positively with
volatility: the energy companies and the over-allocated players. Our intention is to test the
connection between the exposure to the market of the primary business activity and the permit
allocation status. For this, we regress daily volatility on traded volumes partitioned accord-
ing to both business activity and allocation status; see Table 4.D.4 in Appendix 4.D. We find
that the acquired unexpected volumes of the over-allocated accounts that have correlated pos-
itively with volatility belong to the industrial firms. The anticipated volumes bought by the
under-allocated players that have correlated negatively with volatility belong to the energy
companies.
Summing up, our analysis shows that the volume - volatility relation can indeed be better
explained when distinguishing between different trader types. We find that higher unexpected
volumes traded by either the liable, the over-allocated, or the energy participants, are correlated
positively and significantly with price volatility.
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4.5.2.2 The number of transfers
So far, the focus of our analysis has been on the volume - volatility relation in the EU ETS.
A complementary stream of literature points to the strong association between the number
of trades and price volatility on financial markets. Jones et al. (1994) show that the positive
volume - volatility relation should be understood as the number of trades - volatility relation.
They find that it is the number of transactions per se that is associated with volatility, and not
necessarily their size. However, their findings are not confirmed for all markets by follow-up
literature; Daigler and Wiley (1999) include the number of transactions in their regressions,
but do not find evidence of significance when controlling also for volume size.
Motivated by this debate, we investigate the relation between the daily price volatility and
the number of permit transfers. The results are in line with the findings of the volume -
volatility relation from Section 4.5.2.1; see Table 4.6. On average over the analyzed period, the
total number of transfers associated positively and significantly with volatility (M9). We again
partition trades according to the three criteria for trader classification. First, distinguishing
between liable and non-liable accounts indicates that a higher number of transfers performed
by the liable players correlated positively and significantly with volatility. Second, grouping
players according to the over- and under-allocation status does not seem to result in a significant
number of transfers - volatility relation for either player type. Third, the sectoral breakdown
reveals that the positive trading activity - volatility relation can be attributed to the number
of buying and selling transfers performed by the energy companies (M10-M12).
Table 4.6 shows that accounting for the number of daily permit transfers results in an increased
explanatory power (compared to models M4-M8). Including both volume levels and number of
transfers in the regressions does not improve the fitness of the models and reveals that only
the number of transfers associated significantly with volatility, while the volume - volatility
relation is rendered not significant; see Table 4.E.1 in Appendix 4.E. In line with the study
of Jones et al. (1994) for futures markets, we find that traded volumes in the EU ETS have
no marginal explanatory power when volatility is conditioned on the number of trades. It
might seem surprising that the size of trades had on average no information content beyond
that contained in the number of transfers. However, keeping in mind that the carbon market
was generally over-allocated during Phase I, it seems reasonable that the frequency with which
players trade is a better proxy for the trading activity than the volume size itself. As well, our
results are in line with the findings of Chevallier and Se´vi (2014), who show that the allowance
price process can be represented by a centered jump process, with no continuous component.
With a limited number of traders and infrequent orders, it seems reasonable that the frequency
of trade be significantly associated with the unexpected changes in prices.
Regressing volatility on the number of transfers partitioned according to the primary business
activity appears to provide the best fit. The analysis that follows uses the number of transfers
to proxy the permit trading activity, and the business activity partition to distinguish between
players.
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Table 4.6: Regressions of volatility on the number of daily permit transfers by different trading
sectors.
Note: The table presents results from the second iteration of the estimation of Eq. (4.2) based on the results from the first
estimation of Eq. (4.1). The dependent variable is the volatility of daily spot EUA price differences. The analysed period is
15.09.2005 - 31.05.2007. For all estimated coefficients, standard errors are presented in brackets. F-test statistics are listed for∑n=25
j=1 βˆj and
∑n=25
j=1 γˆj . The Box-Pierce statistic is computed with k = 2
√
N , N = 334.
Nr. transfers
Total Buy + Sell Buy Sell
(M9) (M10) (M11) (M12)
Intercept -0.05 (0.08) -0.01 (0.08) -0.00 (0.09) -0.03 (0.08)∑n=25
j=1 γˆj 0.81 (8.07)
∗∗∗ 0.77 (8.67)∗∗∗ 0.76 (8.62)∗∗∗ 0.79 (8.52)∗∗∗∑n=25
j=1 βˆj 0.61 (1.49)
◦ 0.44 (1.59)∗ 0.43 (1.57)∗ 0.50 (1.56)∗
Nr. transfers
Total 0.13 (0.05)∗∗
Energy 0.30 (0.13)∗ 0.30 (0.12)∗ 0.25 (0.12)∗
Industrials -0.18 (0.44) -0.17 (0.41) -0.06 (0.37)
Non-liable -0.02 (0.14) -0.02 (0.12) 0.01 (0.14)
R2 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.48
Adj. R2 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.38
AIC 530.20 522.92 523.37 526.36
Box-Pierce test (p-val) 16.57 (0.12) 17.19 (0.10) 18.51 (0.07) 16.30 (0.13)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 , ◦p < 0.1
4.5.2.3 The April effect
Sections 4.5.2.1 and 4.5.2.2 showed that, on average, the positive trading activity - volatility
relation has been related over the entire analyzed period with the traded volumes and the
number of transfers of the energy sector. However, analysing the evolution of volatility and
the trading activity over time, one can easily notice the large variations in the levels of both
variables, with peaks in two particular months of each year, namely April and December; see
again Fig. 4.1. These months correspond to important dates in the design of the EU ETS.
Each phase of the EU ETS spans over several years, with December being the last month
of each compliance year. December is, therefore, also the prevalent maturity date for most
derivative contracts on allowances (futures, forwards, and options). However, liable companies
are granted time until March 31st to submit to the European Commission the report regarding
the verified emissions of the previous year. By the end of April, each liable entity needs to
surrender the necessary allowances covering its total emissions for the precedent year. As well,
in April until mid-May, the European Commission publicly reveals the cumulated emissions of
the liable companies.16 This brings information on the ratio between total realized emissions
and overall market cap.
Motivated by the particular design of the EU ETS and the empirical observation of volatility
levels and trading activity shooting high in some periods of the year, we run the regressions of
volatility controlling also for month. Indeed, Table 4.7 confirms that price volatility has been
significantly higher in April. In contrast, we find volatility levels to be lower in December, but
the relation does not appear significant (Models M13 - M15). The permit trading activity of
the energy sector remains significant even when controlling for seasonality. When including the
month fixed effects, the explanatory power of the models increases significantly.
Lucia et al. (2014) suggest that the permit trading strategies of players could vary across the
compliance year, being influenced by the specific timeline imposed by the EU ETS. Both the
16The specific timeline of the EU ETS is captured in Fig. 4.F.1 in Appendix 4.F.
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number of transfers and the volumes have been significantly above the average in April for
both energy and industrial companies; see Figs. 4.F.2 and 4.F.3 in Appendix 4.F. In order to
understand if the trading behavior of the market players is associated differently with volatility
in April, we introduce interaction terms between the number of transfers and the April dummy
(Models M16 -M18). We find that the number of transfers led by the energy sector continues to
be positively and significantly associated with volatility, and the association is indeed stronger
in April. In contrast, the higher the number of permit transfers involving the industrial sector,
the lower was the associated volatility. The negative relation appears to have been particularly
strong for the number of acquisitions.
Let us analyse the results in light of the ’mixture of distributions’ theory. When new relevant
information is disclosed, the relation between price changes and trading activity will depend on
how traders interpret the new information. If the news is uncertain, traders might interpret it
in different ways and take opposing trading positions. In such a case, large price changes are
expected to be accompanied by an intense trading activity (volumes and number of trades).
However, if the new information is interpreted in the same way by all traders, a large price
change would be associated with relatively low traded volumes (Clark, 1973; Tauchen and
Pitts, 1983). In April, when the information on the cumulated emissions of liable players is
publicly revealed, market participants can estimate the difference between the total amount of
permits needed to be surrendered for compliance and the amount of permits allocated for free.
In case this difference is negative, the market is in excess of permits, with prices being updated
downwards. Since all players are exposed to the same information, they update their expecta-
tions in the same direction. This occurred in April 2006, when the permit price experienced a
large negative jump. While the price process experienced a large change due to the arrival of
information containing unequivocal implications, the associated trading activity has been much
weaker after the announcement than before.17, 18
17Prior to April 26th, when the announcement of global market emissions has been made, transferred volumes have
been very large, possibly due to the fact that the surrendering of permits for 2005 was due by the end of April. After April
26th, i.e. once the permit price experienced the large drop, volumes have been very low; see Fig. 4.F.8 in Appendix 4.F.
18Interestingly, Lucia et al. (2014) find that the speculative behavior became much smaller after April 2006, when the
reports regarding the cumulated emissions were publicly released.
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4.5.2.4 Counterparties in permit transfers
Our analysis so far has focused mostly on the association between permit price volatility and
the trading activity of different players. However, a trade is never the action of one player alone,
and each transaction can be characterized by a buyer and a seller. It might be that the trading
activity of one player is correlated positively with volatility when trading with one sector, but
negatively when trading with other sectors.
Table 4.8 provides information regarding the frequency at which each sector traded permits
with the other sectors during the analyzed period. Both in terms of acquisitions and sales, the
energy sector preferred to trade with other companies from the same sector, and secondly with
the non-liable institutions. The industry sector bought mainly within the sector, but preferred
to sell to non-liable players. Finally, the non-liable sector diversified its acquisitions and sales
among energy and other non-liable players.
Table 4.8: Transfer counterparties for players grouped according to primary business activity.
Note: The table presents the share of trades concluded by each sector with the other players, and distinguishes between
acquisitions and sales.
Counterparty
Transfer position Sector Energy Industry Financials
Energy 60.37% 5.96% 33.67%
Buyer Industry 26.11% 46.22% 27.67%
Non-liable 40.68% 14.31% 45.01%
Energy 56.06% 4.40% 39.55%
Seller Industry 20.33% 28.59% 51.09%
Non-liable 39.24% 5.85% 54.91%
As shown in the previous sections, the trades of the energy sector have been positively associated
with permit price volatility. By specifying the sector of the buyer and the seller, we intend
now to understand whether it was the trades of the energy sector in general that coincided
with increased levels of volatility, or only the trades between the energy sector and a specific
counterparty.
We partition the number of trades executed between the different sectors, such that both the
buyer and the seller are identified (Models M19 -M20 in Table 4.9). The estimation of volatility
is performed both with and without the monthly fixed effects; results appear consistent across
the two models. Our findings show that all three sectors tended to trade more frequently within
their own sector when volatility levels were lower. In times of high volatility levels, the energy
sector tended to trade more frequently outside their sector, and find counterparties among the
industrial (as seller) and non-liable sectors. In contrast, it appears that the industrial companies
traded more frequently when volatility levels were lower. Finally, the non-liable players behaved
indeed like financial intermediaries and acted as counterparties to trades whenever the liable
sectors needed it: they traded more with the energy sector whenever volatility was higher, and
more often with the industrial sector when volatility was lower.
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Table 4.9: Regressions of volatility on the number of daily permit transfers by different trading sectors
after distinguishing between buyer and seller.
Note: The table presents results from the second iteration of the estimation of Eq. (4.2) based on the results from the first
estimation of Eq. (4.1). The dependent variable is the volatility of daily spot EUA price differences. The analysed period is
15.09.2005 - 31.05.2007. For all estimated coefficients, standard errors are presented in brackets. F-test statistics are listed for∑n=25
j=1 βˆj and
∑n=25
j=1 γˆj . The Box-Pierce statistic is computed with k = 2
√
N , N = 334.
No Month Dummy With Month Dummy
(M19) (M20)
Intercept 0.00 (0.09) -0.01 (0.14)∑n=25
j=1 γˆj 0.68 (10.67)
∗∗∗ 0.56 (12.04)∗∗∗∑n=25
j=1 βˆj 0.35 (1.58)
∗ 0.01 (2.66)∗∗∗
Nr. transfers (Buyer - Seller)
Energy - Industrials 3.46 (1.23)∗∗ 2.99 (1.12)∗∗
Energy - Non-liable 0.77 (0.39)∗ 1.00 (0.37)∗∗
Industrials - Non-liable -0.04 (1.08) -0.20 (1.12)
Energy - Energy -0.09 (0.17) -0.07 (0.16)
Industrials - Industrials -0.02 (0.55) -0.14 (0.53)
Non-liable - Non-liable -0.41 (0.24)◦ -0.43 (0.24)
Industrials - Energy -0.17 (1.11) -0.30 (1.05)
Non-liable - Energy 0.66 (0.38)◦ 0.71 (0.36)∗
Non-liable - Industrials -1.11 (0.61)◦ -1.22 (0.59)∗
Month Dummy
February -0.04 (0.13)
March -0.10 (0.12)
April 0.43 (0.17)∗
May -0.04 (0.14)
June 0.13 (0.18)
July 0.10 (0.15)
August -0.03 (0.15)
September 0.12 (0.15)
October 0.12 (0.15)
November -0.01 (0.15)
December -0.17 (0.16)
R2 0.55 0.61
Adj. R2 0.45 0.51
AIC 513.77 466.89
Box-Pierce test (p-val) 14.94 (0.19) 23.20 (0.02)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 , ◦p < 0.1
4.6 Discussion
Our analysis reaches the following conclusions:
1. In Phase I of the EU ETS, the carbon market lacked in efficiency, with an observed larger
predictability of price differences than on common financial markets.
2. The volatility of the allowance price is explained to a large extent by autoregressive terms,
suggesting that the volatility process was persistent and that it clustered, common to estab-
lished financial markets.
3. Including the trading activity of market players into the volatility estimation increases the
explanatory power of the models. Two indicators of trading activity have been considered:
volume and number of transfers. Between the two, the number of transfers seems to better
explain movements in volatility. As a robustness check, we use the number of active traders
each day as a proxy for daily trading activity; see Appendix 4.I. The results are similar to the
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number of transfers - volatility analysis and reveal a strong and positive relation. It results
that, in a market with excess allowances, the number of permits traded contains arguably
less information that the number of transfers or the number of active traders. These last
two variables seem to indeed constitute better indicators of changes in market information
and of daily liquidity.
4. The volatility of the allowance price is found to contain seasonal patterns, seemingly strongly
related to the specific EU ETS design. In particular, price changes have higher magnitudes
each year in April, when liable players need to surrender enough allowances to cover their
realized emissions for the previous calendar year and when the information regarding the
aggregated market emissions are made public. Moreover, the trading activity of market
players is more strongly related to volatility in April.
5. The trading activity - volatility relation can be better explained when accounting for the
type of trader. The special setting of the EU ETS market is likely to include traders with
significantly different characteristics. We distinguished between trader types based on three
criteria: (i) compliance regulation, (ii) initial endowment of permits relative to actual emis-
sions, and (iii) players’ exposure to other markets. First, we find a positive and significant
relation between the trading activity of the liable participants and volatility. Second, the
sign of the relation depends on the over- or under-allocation status. Third, the relation
is best explained when accounting for traders with different exposures to other markets.
Namely, the energy sector appears to be the one whose trading activity was positively and
most strongly correlated with volatility. In contrast, the industrial sector appears to have
traded more when volatility levels were lower. The trading activity of the non-liable sector
appears to be associated positively, although not significantly, with volatility.
6. We find that the trading activity - volatility relation depends also on the specific counter-
parties concluding the trade and on who held the buyer or the seller position. As a buyer,
the activity of the energy sector was correlated positively with volatility, regardless of the
counterparty. The non-liable sector, mainly represented by financial intermediaries, tended
to trade more with the energy sector when volatility levels were higher, and more with the
industrials sector when volatility levels were lower.
Our results are confirmed by several robustness tests, as presented in Appendix 4.H. Several
dimensions have been tested for: (i) subsample analysis, as delimited by the April 2006 crash;
(ii) lagged trading activity terms; (iii) including one type of trader at a time; and (iv) daily
changes in trading activity.
The main finding of our analysis is that the relation between the trading activity and the
volatility of the permit price depended indeed on the specific counterparty in the trade and
whether or not the player acted as a buyer or a seller. The question arises as to why did the
energy sector tend to trade more frequently when volatility was higher, while the industrials
when volatility was lower, and the non-liable sector had a trading intensity that related with
volatility positively or negatively depending on the counterparty. In this section, we discuss
how these results could be justified.
Trading experience
One likely hypothesis is that each sector had a different previous experience with trading activ-
ities. With the creation of the EU ETS and its regulation, companies were suddenly exposed
to a new market and needed to develop strategies for reaching compliance. This included
the designation of an organizational department to deal with permit trading activities and to
incorporate this trading activity into the accounting system of the company (Engels, 2009).
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The energy sector consists of generally larger players with a stronger experience in trading, and
therefore more likely to seek profit opportunities from trading permits when price volatility
is higher. In contrast, the industrial sector consists of smaller-sized companies, less exposed
to trading in their primary business activity, and therefore more relentless to trade in times
of higher market turbulences. Finally, the non-liable sector, mostly represented by financial
intermediaries, can be expected to have had enough trading experience to be able to match
their permit trading strategies with the specific trading patterns of the counterparties.
Coordinated output and permit trading decisions
A second proposition is that each sector took both primary business and permit trading de-
cisions in a coordinated manner. For instance, Daskalakis and Markellos (2009) document a
positive relation between EUA spot returns and electricity risk premia.19 The authors propose
that electricity producers have more information regarding the demand and supply of electricity
than other electricity market participants, such as speculators, hedgers, and arbitrageurs; as
well, they own a stock of freely allocated allowances. They are, thus, likely to design power
production and permit trading strategies that account for this extra information. Moreover,
energy producers face a stochastic demand that needs to be fully satisfied (Hintermann, 2012).
Daskalakis and Markellos (2009) argument that the demand can be satisfied by either pro-
ducing electricity or by purchasing it on futures/forward markets. The decision on how to
satisfy demand will be influenced by EUA price movements. For example, in case of increasing
EUA prices, instead of producing it, power could be bought on the futures/forward market
and fewer EUAs would be needed for compliance. This would put pressure on the demand
for electricity and increase prices for future delivery of electricity, increasing the electricity risk
premium. In contrast, in case of decreasing EUA prices, electricity producers would prefer to
produce electricity and sell it on the futures/forward market, putting pressure on the supply
for electricity and decreasing electricity prices in the forward markets. This would result in
lower electricity risk premia, and larger acquisitions of EUAs. The positive link between the
allowance returns and electricity risk premia finds further support in the analysis of Keppler
and Mansanet-Bataller (2010), who show that the allowance price Granger caused electricity
prices during Phase I.
On one hand, we find that higher unexpected changes in EUA price differences are positively
associated with the trading activity of the energy sector. We think these findings are in line with
the argumentation of Daskalakis and Markellos (2009) and with the ‘mixture of distribution’
theory. Namely, the higher the volatility of permit prices, the more often will the energy sector
need to adjust their permit positions, resulting in a larger number of transfers and larger traded
volumes.
On the other hand, the industrial sector faces generally a stochastic demand on output markets
that does not necessarily have to be fully satisfied. Moreover, their output has usually a longer
storability period, such that producers can adjust permit and output positions when market
conditions are more favorable for them, i.e. when EUA volatility is lower. This argument is
in line with our findings that the industrial sector tended to trade less when permit volatility
levels were higher.
Market concentration and exposure to international competition
Tightly connected to the argument above, a third hypothesis states that, depending on the de-
gree of competition on output markets, the liable companies adopted different permit trading
strategies. Some authors argue that, during the first phase of the EU ETS, the energy sector,
19The electricity risk premium is defined as the difference between expected (futures/forwards) and current (spot)
electricity prices.
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not exposed to non-EU competition, could have passed on a significant share of the permit
compliance costs to their customers, cashing in windfall profits. In the light of this argument,
it might be that when the permit price volatility was higher and the permit price was steadily
decreasing, some energy companies attempted to trade more (especially acquire more) in order
to bring the permit price back to higher levels and be able to continue collecting windfall prof-
its. This hypothesis is in line with our findings that the energy sector realized on average large
losses from the trading of permits due to their acquisitions when permit prices were high; see
Appendix 4.J. Moreover, Hintermann (2014) shows that a number of electricity firms accumu-
lated a large allowance surplus by the end of Phase I, which could indicate their intention to
keep permit prices high. Provided that a player receives enough free permit allocation and has
a dominant position on both output and permit markets, it might find it profitable to increase
the price even in a position of net buyer, as argued by Hintermann (2011). Since the passing
on of compliance costs did not function for the other sectors, which were exposed to non-EU
competition, they did not seem to share the same permit trading strategy.
The permit price manipulation hypothesis is not endorsed by our anaylsis. We study the degree
of market concentration in the EU ETS and find that during Phase I the carbon market was
generally highly competitive, with a sufficient number of active market players; see Appendix 4.I.
This finding is in line with Hintermann (2014). Moreover, we find no statistical significance in
the relation between permit price volatility and the trading activity of the biggest players, and
we cannot, thus, validate the market manipulation theory. Two caveats are in order. First,
our market concentration analysis is done at the aggregate level, over all permit transfers; in
reality, several carbon markets were in place, and it might indeed be that on some of them a
few players held a significant market share. Second, the concentration analysis includes the
entire analysed horizon; in reality, on a market with limited liquidity, such as the EU ETS, it
is likely that some players have held large market shares in some particular periods, although
not over the aggregate.
4.7 Conclusion
Our analysis focused on the relation between the permit price volatility and the trading activity
of market participants during the first phase of the EU ETS. We find evidence of a generally
positive relation between trading activity and volatility. Our analysis indicates that this asso-
ciation is contemporaneous, where both variables vary in relation to common external factors,
in line with the ‘mixture of distributions’ theory.
Our study was directed at estimating not only the sign of the association between the trading
activity and the movements in prices, but also the specific relation with the trades of different
trader types. The sign and strength of the trading activity - volatility relation are found
to depend on the sector initiating the trade, the specific counterparty, and whether or not the
player acted as a buyer or a seller. Several hypotheses are formulated to explain the contrasting
associations between trader types and volatility. Among these, we give strongest support to
the conjecture that, depending on their specific situation, players have designed coordinated
output and permit trading decisions that resulted in a specific association with price volatility.
It is important that further research focuses on the theoretical validation or disapproval of this
hypothesis. Perhaps even more important is the need to fully grasp the link between the trading
activity - volatility relation and the incentives to abate emissions.
Although the trading activity - volatility relation was found to be generally positive, this only
held due to the dominance of the energy sector and against the contribution of the industrial
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one. A cap-and-trade market is unlikely to be efficient if many players remain mostly inactive
and are reluctant to trade during periods of intense information arrival. The policy implications
that follow from our analysis point to the desirability of a directed engagement of less active
players. Possibly, an intensified participation on carbon markets of financial intermediaries
acting as market makers and information gatherers, provided their speculative behavior does
not distort the market, is expected to favor the entry of small liable players, who have been
predominantly absent from the trading platforms during the first phases of the EU ETS. This
could possibly help with the dissemination of information regarding the cumulated emissions -
permit allocation balance, and avoid large market destabilizations in the future due to infrequent
arrivals of important news.
The European carbon market has been shown to achieve higher efficiency levels in the years
following the first compliance period (Montagnoli and de Vries, 2010; Palao and Pardo, 2012),
with allowance prices coming closer to fundamentals (Creti et al., 2012; Koch, 2014). Kalait-
zoglou and Ibrahim (2013) link the increase in market stability and maturity with the increased
availability of data on emissions at the installation level and the higher stability of order flow.
Future research could extend our study by analysing the trading activity - volatility relation
in the subsequent phases of the EU ETS, once EUTL data is made available. This could help
generalize our findings that the sector whose trading activity was mostly associated with higher
volatility were the energy companies and provide further insights into the reasons behind. As
well, accounting for the different rules introduced in the EU ETS in Phases II and III could
better reveal the link between market design, price volatility, and abatement.
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Appendix Chapter 4
4.A Estimation steps for the trading activity - volatility relation
For the estimation of the trading activity - volatility association, we rely on the methodology proposed by Davidian and
Carroll (1987), as detailed in Section 4.3. The estimation steps are summarized below:
1. We select the optimal number of autoregressive lags (p) in EUA price differences.
2. We run the autoregressive model for EUA price differences.
Dt = α+
p∑
i=1
νiDt−i + Ut (4.A.1)
3. We apply the volatility transformation:
σˆt = |Uˆt|
√
pi
2
(4.A.2)
where:
Uˆt = Dt − Dˆt (4.A.3)
Dˆt = αˆ+
p∑
i=1
νˆiDt−i (4.A.4)
4. We estimate volatility as an autoregressive model of lagged volatility, lagged unexpected returns, and the trading
activity variables. We use different proxies for the trading activity (TAk,t): transferred volumes, expected and
unexpected transferred volumes, number of daily permit transfers, and daily number of unique trading agents.
σˆt = α+
p∑
i=1
γiσˆt−i +
p∑
i=1
βiUˆ t−i +
m∑
k=1
ηkTAk,t + t (4.A.5)
5. We re-estimate price differences using the fitted volatility:
Dt = α+
p∑
j=1
γj σˆt−j +
p∑
j=1
βjDt−j + Ut (4.A.6)
where the fitted volatility is given by:
σˆt = αˆ+
p∑
j=1
γˆj σˆt−j +
p∑
j=1
βˆjUˆ t−j +
m∑
k=1
ηˆkTAk,t (4.A.7)
6. We compute the unexpected EUA price differences as:
Uˆt = Dt − Dˆt (4.A.8)
and redo the volatility transformation:
σˆt = |Uˆt|
√
pi
2
(4.A.9)
7. We re-estimate EUA volatility using σˆt and Uˆ t−i estimated in Step 6:
σˆt = α+
p∑
i=1
γiσˆt−i +
p∑
i=1
βiUˆ t−i +
m∑
k=1
ηkTAk,t + t (4.A.10)
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4.B The emission allowance price in the EU ETS Phase I
We define the EUA returns (Rt) and daily price differences (Dt) as:
Rt =
St − St−1
St−1
(4.B.1)
Dt = St − St−1 (4.B.2)
where St represents the EUA spot price at time t. Fig. 4.B.1 captures the evolution of the EUA spot, returns, and daily
price differences over the analysed horizon 19.09.2005 - 31.05.2007.
Fig. 4.B.1: EUA spot, daily returns, and daily price differences during Phase I of the EU ETS.
In Fig. 4.B.2, the histograms of the three price series are presented. While the EUA spot appears comparably uniformly
distributed over the 0 - 30 Eur/tCO2 space, both the returns and the price difference series are centered around zero.
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Fig. 4.B.2: Historical distributions for spot prices, daily returns, and daily price differences during
Phase I of the EU ETS (19.09.2005 - 31.05.2007).
In order to determine the number of autoregressive lags in price differences, we examine in Fig. 4.B.3 the autocorrelation
and partial autocorrelation plots for the entire price difference series. As indicated by the plots, even lags of order higher
than 20 are significant. For the regression analysis, we choose to rely on 25 autoregressive terms. This choice results in
non-autocorrelated errors.
0 5 10 15 20 25
−
0.
2
0.
2
0.
6
1.
0
Lag
AC
F
ACF price difference (full sample)
0 5 10 15 20 25
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
Lag
Pa
rti
al
 A
CF
PACF price difference (full sample)
Fig. 4.B.3: Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation in daily price differences.
4.C The permit trading activity in the EU ETS Phase I
In this section, we present key summary statistics describing the trading activity on the market for emission allowances.
Fig. 4.C.1 captures the evolution over time of total traded volumes and number of daily transfers during 15.09.2005 -
31.05.2007. The two variables appear to be positively correlated and have spikes in particular periods of the year, e.g. in
December and April of each year. These seasonality can be explained by the specific design of the EU ETS, as explained
in Section 4.5.2.3.
In our analysis, we are interested in understanding the trading behavior of different types of players. One criteria for
player differentiation is the sector of primary business activity. Table 4.C.1 presents the main statistics linked to the
trading activity of different activity sectors. As motivated in the main text, we group players into three main groups:
energy, industrials, and non-liable. Table 4.C.1 reveals significant differences among the three players, with the energy
sector taking the largest share in terms of volumes, number of accounts, and number of transfers. The non-liable sector,
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composed mainly of financial intermediaries, is perhaps on average the most active in terms of trading days and average
volumes per trader.
Fig. 4.C.1: Daily transferred volumes and number of transfers in the EU ETS Phase I.
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Another important criterion of trader classification is the number of permits initially allocated for free. Table 4.C.2
presents summary statistics on the number of permits over-allocated to each sector (energy, industrials, and non-liable).
The number of permits over-allocated is computed as the number of permits initially received for free minus the number
of permits surrendered at the end of each compliance year (the number of permits covering total realized emissions).
The information is presented for each compliance year in Phase I. We observe that the energy sector has been generally
under-allocated over Phase I, although it had a large number of excess permits in 2005. The industrials sector has been
generally over-allocated, explaining the higher propensity of the sector to participate in the permit market on the sell
side, rather than on the buy side. The non-liable players have entered the market voluntarily and were by definition non
subject to emission regulation under the EU ETS. As such, their initial permit allocation (and over-allocation) was zero.
Table 4.C.2: Descriptive statistics regarding the over-allocation of permits per sector of activity.
Note: The table presents key descriptive statistics regarding the initial permit allocation status of three sectors of activity
(energy, industrials, and non-liable institutions) for 19.09.2005 - 31.05.2007. The number of permits over-allocated is
computed as the difference between initially allocated allowances (for free) and the final number of surrendered allowances.
Sector of activity
Indicator Energy Industrials Non-liable
Nr. permits over-allocated
2005 261’422’527 159’129’599 0
2006 -261’635’140 -47’905’466 0
2007 -51’059’179 40’760’772 0
2005-2007 -51’271’792 151’984’905 0
Nr. accounts over-allocated
(% in total)
2005 63.82% 68.87% 0
2006 50.32% 46.76% 0
2007 62.67% 55.42% 0
4.D Volatility and transferred volumes: supporting results
This section presents supporting results for the anaylsis undertaken in Section 4.5.2.1. Tables 4.D.1 - 4.D.4 present
the estimation results of the regressions of daily price difference volatility on different proxies of the trading volumes.
According to trader type, four categorizations of volumes are made: (i) regulated and non-regulated volumes; (ii) volumes
traded by under- and over-allocated agents; (iii) volumes separated according to the sector of primary business activity
of the trader (energy, industrials, non-liable), and (iv) volumes separated according to both the under- and over-allocated
status and the sector of activity of the trader. The results of the different models are discussed in Section 4.5.2.1.
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4.E Volatility and number of permit transfers: supporting results
The number of daily permit transfers is another proxy for the trading activity. This section presents regression results
in support for the anaylsis undertaken in Section 4.5.2.2. Table 4.E.1 presents the results of the estimation of volatility
on the number of daily permit transfers when agents are grouped according to their emission regulation liability and the
over-/under-allocation status. The interpretation of results can be found in Section 4.5.2.2. Substituting traded volumes
with the number of daily permit transfers confirms the previous findings and results in models with a higher explanatory
power. Table 4.E.2 includes both volumes and number of transfers in the regressions of volatility. We find that volumes
have no additional explanatory power beyond that contained in the number of daily permit transfers. We believe that,
in this generally over-allocated market, the number of trades has been more sensitive to relevant arriving information
than the size of the trades.
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4.F The April effect: supporting results
This section provides additional supporting results for the analysis undertaken in Section 4.5.2.3. As mentioned before,
the EU ETS is an artificially created market whose rules and their changes have an impact on market variables. In
particular, we observe that both the permit price process and the trading activity of market participants is characterized
by seasonality. More precisely, an intensification in the trading activity as well as an increase in the magnitude of daily
price changes can be observed in specific periods of the year. Two months stand out for their intensified activity, namely
December and April of each year. Fig. 4.F.1 captures the most important annual events taking place in the European
compliance market. This information motivates our decision to check for seasonality patterns in volatility by including
month dummies.
Fig. 4.F.1: The EU ETS compliance timeline. Source: Lucia et al. (2014).
Table 4.F.1 presents the results of the regressions of volatility on month dummies and volumes traded by agents sorted
according to their sector of activity. The results confirm our findings when proxying the trading activity by the number
of daily transfer. In particular, volatility is generally higher in April. Table 4.F.2 presents the results of the analysis
when including an interaction term between traded volumes and the April dummy. We find that the volumes traded by
the non-liable sector in April are significantly and positively correlated with the price change volatility. The results are
further discussed in Section 4.5.2.3.
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Table 4.F.2: Regressions of volatility on the daily volumes of permits and interaction with April
month dummy by different trading sectors.
Note: The table presents results from the second iteration of the estimation of Eq. (4.2) based on the results from the first
estimation of Eq. (4.1). The dependent variable is the volatility of daily spot EUA price differences. The analysed period is
15.09.2005 - 31.05.2007. For all estimated coefficients, standard errors are presented in brackets. F-test statistics are listed for∑n=25
j=1 βˆj and
∑n=25
j=1 γˆj . The Box-Pierce statistic is computed with k = 2
√
N , N = 334.
Volume
Buy + Sell Buy Sell
(M A43) (M A44) (M A45)
Intercept 0.1 (0.06) 0.1 (0.06) 0.11 (0.06)∑n=25
j=1 γˆj 0.65 (7.97)
∗∗∗ 0.67 (7.90)∗∗∗ 0.63 (7.76)∗∗∗∑n=25
j=1 βˆj -0.15 (2.30)
∗∗∗ -0.19 (2.17)∗∗ -0.14 (2.41)∗∗∗
Volumes
Energy 0.02 (0.03) 0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.04)
Industrials 0.05 (0.29) -0.14 (0.32) 0.10 (0.20)
Non-liable -0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
Interaction Volume-April Dummy
Energy*April -0.06 (0.05) -0.05 (0.05) -0.07 (0.05)
Industrials*April -0.11 (0.3) 0.11 (0.33) -0.18 (0.21)
Non-liable*April 2.96 (0.56)∗∗∗ 2.28 (0.52)∗∗∗ 3.61 (0.58)∗∗∗
R2 0.51 0.50 0.52
Adj. R2 0.41 0.40 0.42
AIC 481.84 493.94 469.01
Box-Pierce test (p-val) 19.77 (0.05) 17.77 (0.09) 22.35 (0.02)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 , ◦p < 0.1
To have a better grasp of the April effect, we plot the volumes and number of permit transfers conducted by each sector
during the analysed horizon; see Figs. 4.F.2 - 4.F.7. In each plot, the trading activity is aggregated at the monthly
horizon. We observe that at the monthly level, the trading activity of the three sectors followed different patterns, most
likely due to the initial permit allocation status (over-, under-allocated, or no allocation). Specifically, the energy sector
tended to align its monthly bought and sold volumes, with net traded volumes close to zero. The trading activity of
the industrial sector has been more intense on the sell than the buy side, as could be expected from the fact that the
sector was generally over-allocated. The non-liable sector, with no initial allocation tended to acquire more permits than
sell over the year, with the exception of the month of December, when most probably the permits underlying various
futures/forward contracts reached maturity and permits have been transferred to liable counterparties.
Trying to link the monthly trading activity with the April effect, we observe that it spiked in April of each year for all
sectors, both in terms of volumes and number of trades. This might be the result of excessive trading before the final
surrendering of permits for the previous compliance year. It might also be that volumes have reflected the drop in permit
prices due to the general acknowledgment of market over-allocation after the publication of total realized emissions in
April.
Looking specifically at the daily permit trading activity characterising the days around the April 2006 crash, we observe
that spikes in traded volumes took place immediately before the crash; see Fig. 4.F.8. The main trading players were the
energy and industrial representatives, with the non-liable sector having a fairly uniformly distributed amount of volumes
before and after the crash. Taking a look at the number of transfers reveals that these presented similar magnitudes
before and after the April 2006 crash, revealing that the average volumes transferred per transaction have been higher
than usually before the crash for the energy and industrials sectors.
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Fig. 4.F.2: Volumes bought and sold by the energy sector during Phase I.
Fig. 4.F.3: Volumes bought and sold by the industrial sector during Phase I.
Fig. 4.F.4: Volumes bought and sold by the non-liable sector during Phase I.
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Fig. 4.F.5: Number of monthly transfers performed by the energy sector during Phase I.
Fig. 4.F.6: Number of monthly transfers performed by the industrial sector during Phase I.
Fig. 4.F.7: Number of monthly transfers performed by the financial sector during Phase I.
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4.G Counterparties in permit transfers: supporting results
This section presents additional information in support of the analysis led in Section 4.5.2.4. Our view is that when
analysing the trading activity of different types of players, one should consider not only the total trades undertaken by
each agent, but also the specific counterparty of the trade. So far, our analysis has shown that the trading activity of
the energy sector was the one that, on average, correlated the most with price difference volatility. Accounting for the
counterparty of each permit transfer, we are interested in understanding whether it was the energy sector in general that
associated positively and significantly with volatility, or only their trades with a specific counterparty.
Figs. 4.G.1 and 4.G.2 display the evolution of the number of daily trades within and across sectors. Figs. 4.G.3 - 4.G.8
provide further information regarding the division of trades according to buys and sales. Two key observations come out.
First, as expected, financial intermediaries constituting the non-liable sector used to trade the least within their own
sector. Second, most across sector transfers took place between the non-liable and the energy sector. It is no surprise
then that the trading activity of the energy sector with the non-liable sector as counterparty was the one to correlate
the strongest with volatility.
Fig. 4.G.1: Number of daily transfers to the same sector during EU ETS Phase I.
Fig. 4.G.2: Number of daily transfers across different sectors during EU ETS Phase I.
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Fig. 4.G.3: Number of daily transfers with the energy sector as a buyer during EU ETS Phase I.
Fig. 4.G.4: Number of daily transfers with the industrials sector as a buyer during EU ETS Phase I.
Fig. 4.G.5: Number of daily transfers with the non-liable sector as a buyer during EU ETS Phase I.
Chapter 4. Who is driving the volatility of the CO2 permit price? 122
Fig. 4.G.6: Number of daily transfers with the energy sector as a seller during EU ETS Phase I.
Fig. 4.G.7: Number of daily transfers with the industrials sector as a seller during EU ETS Phase I.
Fig. 4.G.8: Number of daily transfers with the non-liable sector as a seller during EU ETS Phase I.
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4.H Robustness tests
4.H.1 Subsample analysis
In this section, we test the robustness of our results by rerunning the analysis over subsamples of the entire analyzed
period. The main point of change in the spot price series is represented by the crash of April 2006, when the EUA
price has been suddenly adjusted downwards, following the release of public information that too many allowances were
available on the market compared to the total realized emissions. As seen in Table 4.3 in the main text, the April 2006
crash marks a regime shift in the EUA price series, making the price sample non-stationary. On the contrary, the daily
price change series, i.e. the variable of interest for our analysis, is stationary with similar sample characteristics before
and after the crash. The subsample analysis is expected to confirm the robustness of our results regarding the entire
sample.
In order to understand the properties of the price difference series before and after the event of April 2006, we present
in Fig. 4.H.1 the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots for the pre-crash and post-crash periods.
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Fig. 4.H.1: Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation in daily price differences (pre- and post- the
April 2006 crash).
Table 4.H.1 presents summary statistics on EUA daily price differences. Excluding the data points during the April 2006
crash eliminates the extreme values encountered in the full sample, leaving the pre- and post-crash series with closer
minimum and maximum values, as well as reduced standard deviation.
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Table 4.H.1: Summary statistics on EUA daily price differences (full sample, pre-crash, and post-
crash).
Sample N Min Median Mean Max St. dev. ADF KPSS
(p-value) (p-value)
Full sample 433 -7.50 -0.02 -0.05 7.10 0.72 -6.66 0.01
(15.09.05-31.05.07) (< 0.01) (> 0.1)
Pre-crash 155 -2.95 0.05 0.02 1.25 0.45 -4.31 0.08
(15.09.05-25.04.06) (< 0.01) (> 0.1)
Post-crash 266 -1.50 -0.02 -0.06 2.03 0.35 -6.64 0.14
(16.05.06-31.05.07) (< 0.01) (> 0.1)
Tables 4.H.2 and 4.H.3 present the results of the estimations of volatility on autoregressive lags, past unexpected price
differences, and different trading activity indicators.
For the period preceding the April 2006 crash, we find that past volatility terms are significantly and negatively correlated
with current levels of volatility. This observation is in line with the fact that the price difference series before the crash
exhibited significant negative partial autocorrelation terms; see again Fig. 4.H.1. It appears that periods of high volatility
have been followed by periods of low volatility, similar to a mean-reverting process. Moreover, the trading activity seems
not to have had a significant association with price volatility. Although the coefficients are predominantly positive, only
the association between the total daily number of transfers and price volatility is significant. The breakdown of volumes
and of number of transfers according to the sector initiating the permit transfer does not seem to provide further insights
into the trading activity - volatility relation. The explanatory power of the models is much lower than for the entire
analysed sample.
For the period after the April 2006 crash, results are more in line with what is observed for the entire sample, also due
to the larger number of observations in the post-crash period than pre-crash. First, lagged volatility terms are positively
and significantly associated with current volatility levels, suggesting that volatility is persistent and clusters. Second,
the total number of daily permit transfers correlates positively and significantly with volatility. Third, for the period
after the April 2006 crash, it appears that the volumes traded by the non-liable sector (the financial intermediaries) had
a negative impact on volatility levels. In other words, the non-liable sector preferred to trade more when volatility levels
were lower. The explanatory power of the models is higher than in the pre-crash period, but still below that what is
observed for the entire sample.
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4.H.2 Lagged trading activity terms
During our analysis, we have noted that the association between trading activity and volatility is significant and positive,
where both trading activity and volatility are observed at the same time. However, the analysis is not actually fit for
saying anything about the direction of the relation, e.g. if trading activity had an influence on price volatility. To get
a hint on whether the trading activity had any influence on price volatility, we rerun the models with lagged trading
activity terms, i.e. volatility observed at time t is regressed on trading activity at time t − 1. Table 4.H.4 presents the
results of the regressions on volatility of lagged trading activity variables, over the entire analysed horizon.
The explanatory power of the models stays similar to that of the models of contemporaneous trading activity and
volatility. We find that total volume and total number of transfers are no longer significantly associated with price
volatility. It appears that only the past trading activity of the industrial sector is positively and significantly associated
with volatility, giving some basis to the interpretation that volatility tended on average to be higher after the industrial
sector traded more (higher volumes or more frequently).
The results of the regressions on lagged trading activity bring some clarity over the interpretation of results for the
contemporaneous trading activity - volatility relation. We have previously seen that, when studying the contemporaneous
trading activity - volatility relation, the energy sector seems to have the strongest association with volatility. In light of
the new results, it seems that we cannot talk about an increase in volatility due to the trading behavior of the energy
sector, but rather that both have reacted on average in similar ways to the arrival of information on the market. In this
sense, these new results tend to support the hypothesis that an exogenous variable (the arrival of information) has a
simultaneous impact on both price volatility and traded volumes.
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4.H.3 Including one sector at a time
The analysis in the main text of the paper has shown that the strongest association between the trading activity and
volatility can be encountered in the case of the energy sector (both for volumes and number of transfers). To investigate
whether possible correlations between sectoral activities do not hide the significant association with the industrials or
non-liable sectors, we rerun the models by including only the trading activity of a sector at a time.
As Table 4.H.5 reveals, our previous results are robust. In terms of volumes, it is indeed only the trading activity of the
energy sector that correlates positively and significantly with volatility. In terms of the number of daily transfers, we
observe that by including only one sector at a time, the positive association between the number of transfers of the energy
sector and volatility is maintained and appears even stronger (model M A61 compared to model M A60). The number
of transfers of the industrial and non-liable sectors appear also significant and positive when included separately into the
regressions, signaling the potential existence of some correlation effects in the model with all three sectors. Moreover, the
explanatory power of the two models excluding the energy sector is lower than of the models that include with energy,
hinting to the fact that it is indeed the energy sector who bears the strongest association with volatility.
In Table 4.H.6, we continue the robustness analysis by running the regressions of volatility on the number of transfers,
while testing for possible seasonality evidence. The left panel presents the results when the model includes month
dummies, while the right panel allows for interactions between the number of transfers from each sector and the April
dummy. First, the models with month dummies confirm our previous results, i.e. the number of transfers carried out by
the energy sector correlated positively and significantly with volatility and volatility is higher in April. Including only
one sector at a time decreases the explanatory power of the model. Second, according to the models with interaction
terms, including only one sector at a time reveals that the number of transfers from each sector has correlated positively
and significantly with volatility in April, especially for the energy and non-liable sectors. Again, the explanatory power
of the models is considerably lower when the sectors are included separately (in models M A73-75 compared to M A72),
showing that accounting for the activity of all three sectors simultaneously manages to extract most information.
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4.H.4 Daily changes in trading activity
This section discusses the relation between the change in number of transfers and volatility. The results of the estimation
are presented in Table 4.H.7. The significant association seems to hold also for volatility and changes in trading activity.
We find that volatility is positively associated not only with trading activity levels, but also with changes in trading
activity levels.
Table 4.H.7: Regressions of volatility on the change in the number of daily permit transfers by
different trading sectors.
Note: The table presents results from the second iteration of the estimation of Eq. (4.2) based on the results from the first
estimation of Eq. (4.1). The dependent variable is the volatility of daily spot EUA price differences. The analysed period is
15.09.2005 - 31.05.2007. For all estimated coefficients, standard errors are presented in brackets. F-test statistics are listed for∑n=25
j=1 βˆj and
∑n=25
j=1 γˆj . The Box-Pierce statistic is computed with k = 2
√
N , N = 333.
Nr. transfers
Total Buy + Sell Buy Sell
(M A76) (M A77) (M A78) (M A79)
Intercept 0.06 (0.07) 0.06 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 0.06 (0.07)∑n=25
i=1 γˆi 0.86 (7.80)
∗∗∗ 0.87 (8.75)∗∗∗ 0.86 (8.56)∗∗∗ 0.87 (8.32)∗∗∗∑n=25
i=1 βˆi 0.55 (1.46)
◦ 0.54 (1.85)∗∗ 0.51 (1.65)∗ 0.59 (1.86)∗∗
Nr. transfers
Total 0.11 (0.06)◦
Energy 0.43 (0.13)∗∗ 0.37 (0.12)∗∗ 0.32 (0.12)∗∗
Industrials -0.65 (0.35)◦ -0.35 (0.35) -0.53 (0.29)◦
Non-liable -0.11 (0.13) -0.10 (0.12) 0.01 (0.13)
R2 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.49
Adj. R2 0.36 0.40 0.39 0.39
AIC 537.31 521.41 526.64 527.55
Box-Pierce test (p-val) 16.93 (0.11) 15.35 (0.17) 16.83 (0.11) 13.43 (0.27)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 , ◦p < 0.1
4.I Market concentration
This section focuses on the extent of market concentration in the EU ETS Phase I. When analysing the trading activity
- volatility relation, it is interesting to understand whether the trading activity on the emission allowance market can
be mainly attributed to a few players, that is the market is highly concentrated, or is well spread among many different
players.
To evaluate the extent of market concentration and its link with price volatility, we proceed with a three-step analysis.
First, we check how many agents operated on the market and what were the volumes they traded. We group agents
according to their sector of activity. We observe that many agents have entered the market just once or twice, while
others have traded very frequently. Second, we compute two indexes relevant for the extent of market concentration and
equality of distribution in the market of trading activities in the market. Third, we regress daily EUA price difference
volatility on the number of unique agents that have traded each day in the market in order to understand whether price
changes have been sensitive to higher or lower market concentration.
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Fig. 4.I.1: The trading activity and extent of market presence of agents.
Note: The figure captures the number of active agents and their traded volumes in the EU ETS Phase I. We group agents according
to their sector of activity. Active agents are defined as those trading in at least a threshold number of days (displayed on the
X-axis). The threshold takes values between 0 and 400 out of a maximum of 434 days. Only one agent (belonging to the non-liable
sector) has traded on more than 400 out of 434 days.
In the Phase I of the EU ETS, it appears that although many agents have participated with at least one trade in the
market, only very few have actually traded regularly. Fig. 4.I.1 shows that the most active players belong the energy
and the non-liable sectors. Both among the buyers and the sellers, less than 15 agents traded in more than half of the
days in the analysed horizon. The effect is more pronounced for sellers. However, the number of active players is large
enough to describe a competitive market, with possibly no major players dominating the trades, as indicated by the
Herfindahl Index for market concentration displayed in Table 4.I.1. When analysing the Herfindahl Index at the sector
level, it appears that the non-liable sector presents higher market concentration than the energy or industrial ones. This
observation holds only for the number of transfers, not for volumes.
Table 4.I.1: Indicators of market concentration.
Note: The table presents the Herfindahl Index relevant for the extent of market concentration. The index is computed based on
two trading activity variables (volume and nr. transfers) during 15.09.2005 - 31.05.2007. The statistics are presented separately
for buy and sell transactions. The index is computed first for the entire market and then at the sector level (energy, industrials,
and non-liable). The Herfindahl Index (HI) is computed as the sum of squared market shares, i.e. HI =
∑N
i=1 s
2
i where N is the
number of buyers or sellers, si = TAi/TA, TAi the trading activity of agent i and TA the total trading activity.
Market position Sector Herfindahl Index
Nr. transfers Volumes
Buy All 0.0261 0.0108
Energy 0.0149 0.0164
Industrials 0.0113 0.0590
Non-liable 0.1044 0.0442
Sell All 0.0230 0.0095
Energy 0.0068 0.0141
Industrials 0.0064 0.0297
Non-liable 0.1436 0.0482
Furthermore, we check whether we can detect any significant association between volatility and the number of unique
players trading each day. Table 4.I.2 shows that this trading activity proxy leads to similar results as the number of daily
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trades. We find evidence of a significant and positive association between the number of agents operating each day in
the market and volatility. In particular, the more agents traded on behalf of the energy sector, the higher the volatility
level. The explanatory power of these models is higher than for the models with the number of transfers. We find, thus
far, no evidence of a significant link between high market concentration and volatility.
Table 4.I.2: Regressions of volatility on the number of trading agents grouped by sector of activity.
Note: The table presents results from the second iteration of the estimation of Eq. (4.2) based on the results from the first
estimation of Eq. (4.1). The dependent variable is the volatility of daily spot EUA price differences. The analysed period is
15.09.2005 - 31.05.2007. For all estimated coefficients, standard errors are presented in brackets. F-test statistics are listed for∑n=25
j=1 βˆj and
∑n=25
j=1 γˆj . The Box-Pierce statistic is computed with k = 2
√
N , N = 334.
Nr. agents
Total Buy + Sell Buy Sell
(M A80) (M A81) (M A82) (M A83)
Intercept -0.11 (0.09) -0.04 (0.10) 0.04 (0.10) -0.10 (0.09)∑n=25
j=1 γˆj 0.81 (8.47)
∗∗∗ 0.74 (9.10)∗∗∗ 0.65 (9.14)∗∗∗ 0.59 (8.83)∗∗∗∑n=25
j=1 βˆj 0.60 (1.49)
◦ 0.43 (1.64)∗ 0.21 (1.67)∗ 0.15 (1.56)∗
Nr. agents
Total 0.18 (0.06)∗∗
Energy 0.40 (0.18)∗ 0.44 (0.16)∗∗ 0.25 (0.15)◦
Industrials -0.58 (0.51) -0.88 (0.47)◦ -0.10 (0.36)
Non-liable 0.10 (0.28) 0.02 (0.23) 0.16 (0.23)
R2 0.48 0.5 0.5 0.49
Adj. R2 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.40
AIC 525.15 517.84 515.68 523.46
Box-Pierce test (p-val) 15.58 (0.16) 15.11 (0.18) 15.61 (0.16) 14.49 (0.21)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 , ◦p < 0.1
Table 4.I.3 presents the results of the regressions of volatility on the number of daily transfers or volume levels traded by
the most active agents. The most active agents are defined here as those that have traded for more than 300 days out
of the 434 of the analysed horizon. We find no significant associations between the trading activity of the most active
agents and volatility. Taking into account the fact that these 4 most active agents belong exclusively to the non-liable
sector, i.e. they are financial intermediaries, we can infer that their trading strategy was following a pattern, which was
only weakly related to allowance price volatility. Finding no significant association between the trading activity of the
most active players (both in terms of frequency and volumes) leads us to conclude once again that the EU ETS market
has been quite competitive during the analysed period, and find no evidence of market concentration.
Table 4.I.3: Regressions of volatility on the number of transfers and volumes traded by the most
active agents (nr. trading days larger than 300 out of 434).
Note: The table presents results from the second iteration of the estimation of Eq. (4.2) based on the results from the first
estimation of Eq. (4.1). The dependent variable is the volatility of daily spot EUA price differences. The analysed period is
15.09.2005 - 31.05.2007. For all estimated coefficients, standard errors are presented in brackets. F-test statistics are listed for∑n=25
j=1 βˆj and
∑n=25
j=1 γˆj . The Box-Pierce statistic is computed with k = 2
√
N , N = 334.
Nr. transfers Volumes
Buy Sell Buy Sell
(M A84) (M A85) (M A86) (M A87)
Intercept 0.00 (0.08) -0.00 (0.08) 0.05 (0.07) 0.06 (0.06)∑n=25
j=1 γˆj 0.83 (7.16)
∗∗∗ 0.83 (7.08)∗∗∗ 0.85 (8.14)∗∗∗ 0.86 (8.39)∗∗∗∑n=25
j=1 βˆj 0.61 (1.34) 0.63 (1.39) 0.53 (1.38) 0.53 (1.46)
◦
Trading activity 0.36 (0.24) 0.45 (0.26)◦ 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
R2 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.47
Adj. R2 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.37
AIC 543.89 547.48 534.06 526.72
Box-Pierce test (p-val) 13.01 (0.29) 14.37 (0.21) 14.95 (0.18) 15.37 (0.17)
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 , ◦p < 0.1
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4.J Gains and losses in the EU ETS Phase I
This section analyses the monetary results generated by the trading strategies of market players. We look at three sectors
of activity (energy, industrials, and non-liable) and compute the associated profit and loss to their transactions. For the
computation, we use daily EUA market prices; as such, the results presented below constitute just an approximation.
In reality, permit transfers have been possibly conducted at personalised price levels (many transactions have been
over-the-counter) and we lack this information.
Fig. 4.J.1 presents the daily profit and loss (PnL) levels as well as the cumulated profit and loss (cPnL) of the three
sectors of activity. We observe that, most of the days, the daily profit and loss is very close to zero, suggesting that
in general each sector tried to balance the incoming and outgoing level of permits. This might be generated by the
preference to trade within the sector, with buying and selling transactions netting each other out. Several spikes are
striking, mostly in December of each year, as well as around the April 2006 crash.
Observing the cumulated profit and loss, significant discrepancies appear in the trading revenues obtained by the different
sectors. On average, the industrial sector appears as the most successful one, starting slowly but achieving rapidly
positive cumulated profits. This trend is increasing through time, in line with the cumulated number of permits each
sector decided to hold. As shown in Fig. 4.J.2, the cumulated number of net permits held by each sector followed different
trajectories. First, the industrial sector, which was over-allocated initially, chose to be a net seller of permits, supporting
the observation that their cumulated revenues from permit trading have been positive at the cumulated level. Second, the
energy sector had cumulated profits close to zero for a significant amount of time, but these turned negative in 2007 as
the sector became a net buyer of profits, albeit at a low permit price. Third, the strategy chosen by the non-liable players
is perhaps the most intriguing one. The non-liable sector appears on the aggregate to have had the most significant losses
during Phase I, buying heavily at the beginning of the compliance period when permit prices were high, and trying to
exit the market towards the end of the compliance period by selling the permits at much lower prices. Our results are
in line with Cludius (2015), who analyses the winners and losers on the EU ETS market during Phase I and shows that
the gains and losses obtained by market participants through permit trading depended mostly on the number of initially
allocated permits. As such, the author finds that big industrial companies that have been over-allocated, managed to
obtain the largest gains, while the under-allocated energy companies suffered losses. The author also draws the readers’
attention to the fact that the losses made by energy companies on the EU ETS have been significantly smaller than the
gains they made on the energy markets as a results of compliance price pass-through.
Our analysis is to be interpreted with care since three caveats are in order. First, we abstract from discounting of
revenue over time. This might have an influence over the estimated cumulated revenues, since sectors had access on
average to differentiated financing conditions, e.g. the non-liable sector, mostly represented by financial intermediaries, is
expected to have been able to borrow funds at lower interest rates than the other sectors. Second, the transfer of permits
reflects not only spot transactions, but also transfers of permits from derivative products, such as forwards and futures.
These derivative contracts are usually concluded at different points in time and price conditions, but such details are not
accounted for in our analysis. Third, many of the permit transactions have been concluded over-the-counter, sometimes
at personalized price and quantity conditions. Lacking information on the actual transaction price, our analysis uses the
EUA average daily price and achieves only a proxy of the actual profits and losses.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of our profit and loss analysis, it appears that indeed the energy and the non-liable
sectors tended to make less money over all from permit trading than the industrial sector. This observation might
represent a hint as to why did the trading activity of these two sectors tend to correlate significantly and positively
with price volatility. Being on a path of cumulated losses, the two sectors might have been tempted to trade more when
volatility levels were higher since they were more exposed to the permit market.
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Fig. 4.J.1: Daily and cumulated gains and losses from permit trading by sector of activity.
Note: The figure captures the estimated gains and losses during 15.09.2005 - 31.05.2007. Agents are grouped according to their
sector of activity. The upper panel presents the daily profit and loss (PnL); the lower panel captures the evolution of the cumulated
profit and loss (cPnL). PnL(t) = [Vs(t)−Vb(t)] ·P (t) and cPnL(t) =
∑t
i=0 PnL(i), where Vs and Vb are the nr. of permits bought
and sold at time t, and P (t) is the EUA price.
Fig. 4.J.2: Daily and cumulated net permit volumes by sector of activity.
Note: The figure captures daily traded volumes during 15.09.2005 - 31.05.2007. Agents are grouped according to their activity
sector. The upper panel presents daily net transferred volumes (nV ); the lower panel captures cumulated net volumes (cnV ).
nV (t) = Vs(t)− Vb(t) and cnV (t) =
∑t
i=0 nV (i), where Vs and Vb are the number of permits bought and sold at time t.
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1. Introduction
Climate change due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions is viewed as one of the most serious challenges
faced by humankind (Stern, 2006). Strategies for dealing with
climate change enter three main categories: mitigation,
adaptation, and climate geoengineering. International agree-
ments call for reductions in GHG emissions – the mitigation
approach. Despite its direct impact on temperature levels, its
technical feasibility, and its ethical appeal, several factors
limit the implementation of mitigation: (i) the strong inertia in
the carbon cycle creates a gap between present abatement
costs and future climate benefits (Keller et al., 2007); (ii) the
decades-to-millennia-long lifespan of GHG render mitigation
ineffective in case of abrupt climate changes; (iii) the
atmosphere is a common good and unilateral actions are
discouraged by the possibility of free riding (Millard-Ball, 2012).
An alternative for dealing with climate change is adapta-
tion, the development of strategies that effectively reduce
climate change impacts (Tol, 2005). Adaptation covers a large
array of sectors, and can be ‘proactive’ or ‘reactive’ (de Bruin,
2011). While proactive adaptation is directed towards infra-
structure and medium-to-long-term economic transforma-
tions (Agrawala et al., 2011), reactive adaptation can be
deployed almost instantaneously to mitigate unforeseen or
underestimated damages. Several features distinguish adap-
tation from mitigation: (i) adaptation can be implemented
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unilaterally, giving full control of the benefits to the countries
implementing it; (ii) adaptation is expected to exhibit a fast
implementation – fast benefits feature, avoiding deadlocks
from discounting preferences. However, investments in
adaptation have been limited so far due, in particular, to
difficulties in forecasting its effectiveness.
Given the increasing risk of an unmanageable temperature
path, geoengineering has been proposed as an alternative
strategy. It corresponds to a deliberate modification of the
climate system in order to alleviate climate change impacts
(Keith, 2000; Caldeira et al., 2013). One may distinguish between
two main techniques: Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) and Solar
Radiation Management (SRM). In this paper, we focus on an SRM
approach that targets the reduction of incoming solar radiation
by injection of sulfur in the stratosphere, believed to be one of
the most efficient geoengineering strategies to reduce global
temperature (Wigley, 2006; Shepherd et al., 2009). Its premise is
the ability to keep temperature levels artificially low, instead of
reducing GHG emissions. SRM presents several advantages: (i) it
involves low implementation costs (Robock et al., 2009); (ii) in
case of rapid climate changes (when tipping points are reached),
with rare but catastrophic impacts, SRM could act as a quick and
effective temperature ‘backstop’ (Crutzen, 2006); (iii) it can be
implemented either unilaterally or cooperatively (Barrett, 2008).
SRM brings along also important risks, as it may produce
unintended consequences and harmful side-effects (Victor,
2008). A comprehensive summary is given in Barrett et al.
(2014). Injecting sulfur particles into the upper atmosphere is
expected to cause polar ozone depletion (Crutzen, 2006; Tilmes
et al., 2008; Solomon et al., 2009), acid deposition at the poles
(Kravitz et al., 2009), alter ecosystems (Stanhill and Cohen,
2001; Adams et al., 2003; Rasch et al., 2008), and trigger regional
imbalances (e.g., in the patterns of surface temperature,
radiation, and the hydrological cycle; Trenberth and Dai, 2007;
Bala et al., 2008; Brovkin et al., 2009; Kravitz et al., 2013;
Niemeier et al., 2013; Schaller et al., 2013; Huneeus and
Boucher, 2014). Simulations of sulphate injection predict
disruptions in the Asian and African summer monsoons
(Robock et al., 2008). Stratospheric aerosol loading impacts the
ratio of direct to diffuse light, with consequences for terrestrial
and marine photosynthesis and for technologies relying on
direct light (Rasch et al., 2008; Vaughan and Lenton, 2011).
Furthermore, SRM achieves only an artificial reduction in
temperature levels. With a continued increase in GHG
concentrations, the injection of aerosols would need to raise
proportionally, and a disruption would lead to a significant
jump in temperatures at the corresponding concentration
level (Brasseur and Roeckner, 2005; Brovkin et al., 2009; Jones
et al., 2013) with probable dire consequences. Additionally,
SRM will not be able to counteract other negative conse-
quences coming from high GHG concentrations, such as ocean
acidification (Orr et al., 2005; Doney et al., 2009), CO2
fertilisation of land plants, and other biogeochemical mod-
ifications (Ban-Weiss and Caldeira, 2010). Finally, with a lack of
assessment of SRM impacts on human societies and on
ecosystems, there remains the possibility for unexpected
consequences – unknown unknowns (Kravitz et al., 2009). The
uncertainty is reinforced by the fact that expected conse-
quences of SRM (both positive and negative) are estimated by
comparison with natural volcanic eruptions, which are an
imperfect analog to continuous anthropogenic stratospheric
forcing (Robock et al., 2013). Finally, there are important
societal and political dimensions to geoengineering (Mac-
naghten and Szerszynski, 2013; Wright et al., 2014).
Given these important caveats, support for geoengineering
measures has been inconclusive so far. Crutzen (2006), Wigley
(2006), Carlin (2007), and Bickel (2013) advocate additional
research on geoengineering before a robust recommendation
could be formulated. More recent studies focus on modelling
decision-making in the context of multiple sources of risk.
Goes et al. (2011) use an integrated assessment model (IAM)
where the total damage from climate change is a function of a
rate-dependent temperature component, and account for the
failure to sustain aerosol forcing and for the subsequent
unraveling of drastic climate changes. In such a case, SRM is
found to be uneconomical. Bickel and Agrawal (2012) rely on
the model of Goes et al. (2011) and show that under modified
assumptions some totally different conclusions regarding the
use of SRM can be found.
In this paper, we assess the optimal mix of policies to deal
effectively with climate change. Our methodology relies on the
Ada-BaHaMa model (Bahn et al., 2012), which allows for
mitigation and proactive adaptation, and enriches it by
explicitly considering reactive adaptation and SRM. We
account for different effects of SRM. While the desired effects
of SRM on radiative forcing can be estimated with a
considerable degree of confidence (Crutzen, 2006), the magni-
tude of undesired side-effects of sulfur injection on natural and
socio-economic systems remains a significant unknown. We
focus on this second uncertainty source, and unlike previous
IAMs that consider SRM side-effects to be constant over time
(Goes et al., 2011; Bickel and Agrawal, 2012), we model side-
effects as a time-varying and persistent process with a
stochastic component.
Our original contribution consists in assessing within an
integrated assessment framework the optimal policy mix
when mitigation, adaptation, and SRM are available. We show
that the optimal strategy for dealing with climate change
involves the joint use of all three strategies. While mitigation
and adaptation are optimally employed in the vast majority of
analysed scenarios, SRM passes a cost–benefit test only when
its side-effects are low. Moreover, small deviations from
expected side-effects can potentially cause large welfare
losses, further weakening the case for SRM.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details our
dynamic IAM and its calibration. Sections 3 and 4 provide
numerical results and analyse specific uncertainties related to
SRM. Section 5 concludes.
2. Modelling approach
This section briefly reviews the original Ada-BaHaMa model
and details the new modelling features: (i) the introduction of
SRM as an instrument to control temperature increase and (ii)
a separate accounting of proactive and reactive adaptation.
The model distinguishes between two types of economy: a
‘carbon’ economy (our present economy), where production
generates a high level of GHG emissions, and a ‘low-carbon’
economy. More precisely, production (Y) occurs in the two
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economies according to an extended Cobb–Douglas function
in three inputs: capital (K), labor (L), and energy (measured
through GHG emissions E). Capital stock in each economy
evolves according to the choice of investment (I) and a
standard depreciation relation.
2.1. Climate dynamics in the presence of SRM
GHG stocks evolveaccordingto thedynamic equationsoftheDICE
model (Nordhaus, 2008) that distinguishes between three
reservoirs: (i) an atmospheric one (MAT), (ii) a quickly mixing
one in the upper oceans and the biosphere (MUP), and (iii) a slowly
mixing deep-ocean reservoir (MLO) which acts as a long-term sink.
We extend the original Ada-BaHaMa to account for a solar
radiation management (SRM) strategy that increases the
albedo effect through sulfur injection in the lower strato-
sphere. The sulphate aerosols formed increase the strato-
spheric reflection of shortwave radiation back to space
(Stenchikov et al., 1998), reducing the radiative forcing (F)
from an increase in CO2 concentrations:
FðtÞ ¼ hlog2
MATðtÞ
MATð1750Þ
 
þ FEXðtÞ  FGEðtÞ (1)
where t is the time period (t 2 [2005, 2155]), h = 3.7 W m2 is the
radiative forcing for a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concen-
trations, FEX the exogenous radiative forcing term, and FGE is
the radiative forcing created by the sulphates. The radiative
forcing from SRM depends on the amount of sulfur injected,
the size of the particles, and the location of injection (Vaughan
and Lenton, 2011). Sulfur injection simulations show that at
high injection rates (above 40 Tg S) the efficacy on radiative
forcing levels off (English et al., 2012). However, for smaller
injection rates, a linear relation approximates well the impact
of sulfur injected on radiative forcing.1 We follow Crutzen
(2006) and allow for a linear relation:
FGEðtÞ ¼ vGðtÞ (2)
where v is the effectiveness factor of SRM (v = 0.75 W m2 per
Tg S), and G the yearly amount of sulfur injected in the
stratosphere measured in tetragrams of sulfur (Tg S).
The other elements of the climatic model remain un-
changed from Ada-BaHaMa and follow the DICE model to
compute the earth’s mean surface temperature (TAT) and the
average temperature of the deep oceans (TLO).
2.2. Climate change damages and SRM side-effects
Ada-BaHaMa follows the approach used in MERGE (Manne and
Richels, 2005) to link climate change damages and their
economic impacts. Here, we additionally account for negative
externalities from sulfur injection. Yearly damages (D) on
production (Y) come from atmospheric temperature increase
(DTAT ) and side-effects from sulfur injection (DGE):
DðtÞ ¼ DTAT ðtÞ þ DGEðtÞ (3)
2.2.1. Climate change damages and adaptation
The increase in temperature (TAT) from pre-industrial levels
entails damages that can be alleviated through adaptation (AD):
DTAT ðtÞ ¼ ADðtÞ
TATðtÞ  Td
catT  Td
 2
(4)
where Td is the temperature deviation (from pre-industrial
levels) at which damages start to occur, while catT represents
the ‘catastrophic’ temperature level at which the entire pro-
duction would be wiped out. To have a comparable basis with
the current literature on IAM with adaptation, Td and catT are
calibrated to replicate the damage intensity in DICE; see Bahn
et al. (2012).
We distinguish between reactive (flow) and proactive
(stock) adaptation, similar to Bosello et al. (2010) and Agrawala
et al. (2011). We model the effectiveness of the two adaptation
strategies in reducing climate change damages as follows:
ADðtÞ ¼ 1  aAD p ðtÞ
K3ðtÞ
K3maxðtÞ  aADr ðtÞ
S3ðtÞ
S3maxðtÞ (5)
where aADp (respectively, aADr ) is the maximum proactive
(resp. reactive) adaptation effectiveness, K3 (resp. S3) the
amount of proactive adaptation capital (resp. reactive adapta-
tion spending), K3max (resp. S3max)
2 the maximum amount of
adaptation capital (resp. spending) that would ensure the
optimal effectiveness of the proactive (resp. reactive) adapta-
tion measures. Like K3max in our original model, S3max is
modelled as an increasing function of the temperature level:
S3maxðtÞ ¼ bADr
TATðtÞ
Td
 gADr
(6)
where bADr and gADr are calibration parameters. The two options
are assumed to be complementary, in that the implementation
of one enhances the effectiveness of the other. On the one hand,
reactive adaptation requires the existence of some infrastruc-
ture; for instance, the deployment of new crops (better suited to
new climatic condition) possibly requires that tests have been
conducted beforehand (pro-actively) in R&D facilities. On the
other hand, since investments in (proactive) adaptation are
initiated much earlier than their first use, they are based on
expectations and can result in inadequate solutions when
damages start to occur. Reactive adaptation can marginally
modify the solution to ensure maximum effectiveness. Adap-
tation effectiveness is modelled as follows:
aAD p ðtÞ ¼ ðaADp  aADp Þ g1
K3ðtÞ
K3maxðtÞ þ g2
S3ðtÞ
S3maxðtÞ
 
þaADp (7)
aADr ðtÞ ¼ ðaADr  aADr Þ g1
S3ðtÞ
S3maxðtÞ þ g2
K3ðtÞ
K3maxðtÞ
 
þaADr (8)
where aADp and aAD p (resp., aADr and aADr ) are the minimum
and maximum effectiveness values for proactive (resp.,
reactive) adaptation, and g1, g2 calibration parameters
1 In our simulations, the optimal amount of sulfur injected never
exceeds 15 Tg S per annum.
2 We impose K3(t)  K3max(t) and S3(t)  S3max(t) at all time peri-
ods.
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(g1 > g2, g1 + g2 = 1). We model adaptation effectiveness such
that: (i) the absence of one adaptation strategy does not
make the other ineffective, but reduces its potential; and (ii)
only maximum capital level (K3(t) = K3max(t)) and spending
(S3(t) = S3max(t)) ensure maximum effectiveness. The online
Supplemental material provides information on the calibra-
tion of all parameters concerning adaptation.
2.2.2. SRM measures and side-effects
SRM implementation is expected to be inexpensive and fast
(Barrett, 2008). Following Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2013), we
allow for linear SRM implementation costs (S4) in the yearly
amount of sulfur injected in the atmosphere (G):
S4ðtÞ ¼ pGEðtÞGðtÞ (9)
where pGE is the cost of sulfur injection. Following Crutzen
(2006), pGE equals $25 billion per Tg S annually.
Despite low implementation costs, SRM is believed to bring
along important risks. We have presented in the introduction
a comprehensive, but not exhaustive, list of expected side-
effects, whose true magnitude and economic effects remain to
be quantified (Robock et al., 2013). We model the magnitude of
SRM side-effects (DGE) following the approach of Goes et al.
(2011), where sulfur injection damages depend on an intensity
factor (aGE 2 [0, 1]) and the radiative forcing created by SRM (FGE),
normalised by the radiative forcing for a doubling of atmo-
spheric CO2 concentrations (h). However, unlike previous IAMs
that consider SRM side-effects (parameter aGE) to be constant
over time (Goes et al., 2011; Bickel and Agrawal, 2012), we model
side-effects as a time-varying and persistent process. Modifying
the radiative forcing through sulphate injection is expected to
impact different Earth system processes, whose consequences
will be felt for periods beyond the lifetime of sulphates in the
stratosphere (Brovkin et al., 2009; Vaughan and Lenton, 2011).
Therefore, we account for persistency in damages and allow the
intensity factor (aGE) to vary over time:
DGEðt þ DtÞ ¼ lDGEðtÞ þ aGEðt þ DtÞ FGEðt þ DtÞ
h
ADGEðtÞ (10)
where l (<1) is a constant depreciation rate,3 aGE a random
process, FGE the radiative forcing created through SRM, h the
radiative forcing for a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concen-
trations, and ADGE 2 [0, 1] a parameter describing the effec-
tiveness of adaptation to damages from sulfur injection. It
could also be possible to reduce SRM side-effects through
adaptation measures, in a similar manner to damages from
temperature increase (see Eq. (4)). However, we are not aware of
any literature investigating this issue, and the costs of reducing
the highly uncertain SRM damages are still to be estimated.
Given this, we do not allow for adaption to side-effects and set
ADGE(t) = 1, 8 t. Thus, we disregard both benefits and costs of
such adaptation. Instead, we focus on many possible values in
the magnitude of SRM side-effects (aGE); see below.
SRM is likely to impact a multitude of systems and generate
complex feedback loops. Hence, we assume its short- and
long-term disturbances to be unpredictable and to evolve in a
possibly non-monotonic manner.4 While some of the
responses to stratospheric sulfur injection are believed to
be fast (e.g., precipitation), others would come with longer
time scales (e.g., oceanic responses) (MacMynowski et al.,
2011a,b; Robock et al., 2013). We rely on a binomial tree
representation in order to model the evolution of (monetary)
side-effects over time (aGE(t)) and capture the uncertainty and
variability in their size. The binomial representation assumes
that at each moment of time, side-effects can either increase
or decrease compared to the previous state, such that:
with u and d respectively the percentage increase and de-
crease.
The parameter aGE refers to percentage losses in total
production (Y) due to side-effects from SRM, when the
radiative forcing created through sulfur injections equals
the radiative forcing for a doubling of atmospheric CO2
concentrations (FGE = h). To capture all possible (from highly
optimistic to very pessimistic) side-effect scenarios, we allow
parameter aGE to take values between 0 and 100% of total
production. We define three levels of side-effects: an initial
level aGE(2005), and two boundary values for the final time
period (year 2155) defining a minimum (aGE ¼ 0) and a
maximum level ( ¯aGE ¼ 1). Similarly to Goes et al. (2011), we
run different scenarios in which the initial size of side-effects
(aGE(2005)) takes values in the range [0, 0.1].
5
Parameter u is calibrated to link aGE(2005) to ¯aGE in a
monotonically increasing path over 15 decades (until 2155):
¯aGE ¼ ð1 þ uÞ15 aGEð2005Þ. Similarly, a monotonically decreas-
ing path is obtained for aGE ¼ ð1  dÞ15 aGEð2005Þ. Based on the
binomial representation, for each initial aGE(2005) we obtain
32,768 (= 215) different scenarios. Perfect foresight is assumed
regarding each of the distinctive aGE scenarios.
3. Optimal policy mix
3.1. Selected scenarios for SRM side-effects
This section analyses the optimal decisions regarding invest-
ments and spendings for production and climate measures,
and the impact on temperature levels and atmospheric GHG
stocks, when three different climate policy portfolios are
available: (i) mitigation only; (ii) mitigation and adaptation; (iii)
mitigation, adaptation, and SRM.
3 Given the lack of evidence on the strength of the persistency of
SRM side-effects, we run a sensitivity analysis for l, with l 2 {0,
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}.
4 This time-varying representation of SRM side-effects is moti-
vated by the view that ecosystems present dynamic and non-
linear resilience to shocks and perturbations (Holling, 1973; Gun-
derson, 2003). Complex socio-ecological systems can have a highly
optimised tolerance to a certain set of disturbances (Carlson and
Doyle, 2002; Janssen et al., 2007), but they would suffer if the
disturbances evolve or change outside of their optimised toler-
ance zone, causing them to move to new equilibria.
5 Goes et al. (2011) consider constant aGE 2 {0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03,
0.05}.
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We consider three illustrative scenarios for SRM side-
effects. Following Goes et al. (2011), we first choose a constant
path for SRM side-effects (aGE(t) = 0.015, 8t), entitled the mild
scenario.6 Additionally, we consider two cases where the
side-effect paths are time-varying. In a strong damage scenario,
aGE increases monotonically from aGE(2005) = 0.015 to
aGEð2155Þ ¼ ¯aGE. It corresponds to the upper edge of the
distribution (of all possible paths for side-effects starting at
0.015) when all forecasted impacts would be triggered and the
total magnitude would be amplified by cross-interactions. In a
weak damages scenario, aGE decreases monotonically from
aGE(2005) = 0.015 to aGEð2155Þ ¼aGE . It corresponds to the lower
edge of the distribution when SRM has only modest side-effects.
Addressing climate change requires mitigation, which
corresponds in our model to a transition from the carbon
economy to the low-carbon one. Fig. 1 illustrates the optimal
capital accumulation in the two economies. In the ‘mitigation
only’ portfolio, there is a clear transition between the two
economies: the carbon-intensive capital is rapidly phased out
after 2055 and completely replaced by the low-carbon capital
before the end of the century. When adaptation is also
available as a policy tool (‘mitigation and adaptation’ portfo-
lio), this transition does take place, but starts one decade later.
The SRM option has contrasted implications: under mild and
strong side-effects, the transition takes place similarly to the
‘mitigation and adaptation’ portfolio, whereas the transition
never occurs under weak side-effects. In line with Barrett
(2008), our results indicate that there is no incentive to curb
GHG emissions if SRM is available and its side-effects are
benign.
Fig. 2 captures adaptation and SRM decisions. When its
side-effects are weak, SRM is the main instrument to address
climate change. It is used after 2045 (substituting for
mitigation efforts), together with low proactive adaptation
efforts (after 2095). When its side-effects are mild, SRM is only
used (for two decades 2065–2085) as a complement to
adaptation and mitigation strategies. SRM is not used when
its side-effects are strong. Concerning adaptation, we note
that: (i) the accumulation of proactive adaptation capital starts
before spending on reactive adaptation; and (ii) the decreasing
trend in adaptation towards the end of the horizon reflects the
stabilisation of temperature (see Fig. 3) reached through SRM
and/or mitigation. An interesting aspect is the relative
dynamics of reactive adaptation and SRM, as they share the
advantages of rapid implementation and immediate reduction
of damages. The weight given to each strategy depends on the
magnitude of SRM side-effects: (i) for strong side-effects, only
adaptation is used; (ii) for mild and weak side-effects, both
strategies enter the policy portfolio, with more weight given to
SRM when its side-effects are lower. This results from the
limited effectiveness of reactive adaptation.
Fig. 3 reveals that temperature is kept below the 2 8C
threshold proposed by the Copenhagen Accord only when SRM
side-effects are weak. This is achieved at the expense of: (i) a
large deployment of SRM; and (ii) high GHG concentrations, due
to the absence of mitigation. In the other scenarios, concentra-
tions and then temperature decrease slowly with the transition
to the low-carbon economy. When SRM side-effects are mild,
the use of SRM for two decades (2065–2085) reduces the
temperature deviation for this period below the ‘mitigation
only’ portfolio; as SRM is stopped in 2085, the temperature level
begins to increase and converges to the weak side-effects path,
reflecting the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere. The use
of adaptation (in the ‘mitigation and adaptation’, and ‘mitiga-
tion, adaptation, and SRM with strong side-effects’ portfolios)
reduces the damages from climate change, postponing the
transition to the clean economy and resulting in higher
temperature increases than the ‘mitigation only’ portfolio.
Imposing the 2 8C limit yields an earlier implementation of
mitigation and/or SRM. With strong side-effects, investments
in mitigation are advanced by two decades (2035); with weak
side-effects, SRM remains predominant and is implemented
from 2035 on. To reduce climate change damages, adaptation
is still used with a similar timing (compared to the uncon-
strained temperature cases) but requires less funding.
Fig. 1 – Capital accumulation in the two economies.
6 This level has been chosen such that SRM is optimally
employed in at least one decade over the horizon 2005–2155.
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3.2. Distributional analysis for SRM side-effects
In this section, we consider the ‘mitigation, adaptation, and
SRM’ portfolio and extend the previous analysis in two
directions. One the one hand, we consider different initial
SRM side-effect levels (aGE(2005)). On the other hand, for each
of these initial levels, we analyse 32,768 paths describing the
evolution of side-effects over time based on the binomial
representation; see Section 2.2.2.
We analyse first the frequency with which the different
climate policies are used. The frequency indicator is computed
as the number of scenarios in which the policy is employed in
at least one decade over the 2005–2155 horizon, divided by the
total number of scenarios corresponding to each aGE(2005).
However, this indicator is not evaluating the probability
associated with the different aGE paths.
Fig. 4 illustrates first that the optimal policy mix depends
on the initial value of SRM damages. The use of SRM is strongly
dependent on its initial side-effects, such that this strategy is
implemented in at least one decade in almost 100% of the
scenarios when aGE(2005) is 0.1%, declining abruptly for larger
values, to the point that SRM is employed in about 11% of the
scenarios when aGE(2005) is 10%. Despite the availability of the
inexpensive SRM option, mitigation and adaptation strategies
are an important part of the optimal climate policy portfolio.
Proactive and reactive adaptation strategies are employed in
all scenarios, independent of the SRM side-effects. The use of
mitigation increases from about 80% when initial side-effects
are low, to 93% of the scenarios when aGE(2005) = 0.1.
Another parameter that strongly influences the use of SRM
is the persistency of its side-effects over time (parameter l).
Fig. 4 illustrates also that for moderate initial SRM damages
(aGE(2005) = 0.03), this strategy is used mostly as a complement
to mitigation and adaptation even when its side-effects are
active only during the implementation period (l = 0). The
frequency of SRM use decreases sharply for higher persistency
Fig. 2 – Capital accumulation in proactive adaptation, and decade spending with reactive adaptation and SRM.
Fig. 3 – Atmospheric temperature and GHG concentrations.
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levels. Moreover, in these cases, SRM is only implemented at
the end of the decision horizon; see the online Supplemental
material.
Due to the uncertainty in the size of initial side-effects and
in their persistency over time, the variability in SRM use is very
large. Thus, SRM does not seem to be a robust climate policy.
Even with low initial side-effects, SRM mostly plays the role
of a complement to adaptation and mitigation, and rarely a
substitute.
4. Unexpected SRM side-effects
The previous section indicates that SRM should be used when
its side-effects are low and their persistency is limited. Here,
we discuss possible economic impacts of making wrong
assumptions about SRM side-effects and analyse the resulting
adjustments in the optimal policy mix. Other important
concerns raised in previous literature (Orr et al., 2005; Robock
et al., 2009; Goes et al., 2011), such as (i) the failure to continue
with SRM and (ii) high GHG concentrations, are discussed in
the online Supplemental material.
Up to now, the optimal policy mix was evaluated under
perfect foresight, assuming that the side-effects were known
along each scenario. Here, we study the consequences of
incurring a different (random) side-effect path than the one
presumed. First, we compute following Eq. (10) the presumed
SRM damages (DGE(t, s)) that translate into output losses,
where s is given by each SRM side-effects path from the
binomial representation. Next, we compute unexpected output
losses (DGE(t, s0)) that would arise if a different side-effect path
s0 occurs. More precisely, we replace in Eq. (10) aGE(t) by a factor
chosen randomly from the possible side-effect paths, while
keeping the same levels for sulfur injection. Holding wrong
assumptions regarding the side-effects should only last for
short periods. Indeed, although the earth system presents
some inertia, the magnitude of side-effects is ex-post
observable via decreases in production. However, it might
take several decades until true realisations are identified.
As an illustration, we consider an error horizon of one to
three decades and compare output losses7 under known
(presumed) and random (unexpected) side-effect paths. Fig. 5
reveals that output losses double on average when the side-
effect path is different than the one expected, even for a
Fig. 4 – Policy frequency for different aGE(2005) (at l = 0.5) and l (at aGE(2005) = 0.03).
Fig. 5 – Distribution of output losses under known and random SRM damages for different error horizons
(SDGE ¼
PtGEþhDt
tGE
DGEðtÞ, aGE(2005) = 0.03, l = 0.5).
7 For each scenario s 2 [1, 32, 768], we compute the sum of
presumed damages as: SDGE ¼
PtGEþhDt
t¼tGE DGEðt; sÞ, where tGE is the
first period of SRM implementation in scenario s, and h 2 {1, b, 3}
are decades of SRM implementation. Unexpected damages are
computed as: 15000
P5000
i¼1
PtGEþhDt
t¼tGE DGEðt; s0iÞ, where aSE(t, s0 i) is ran-
domly selected from the initial side-effect distribution over 5000
simulations.
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ten-year horizon. With a twenty to thirty-year horizon, the
variance and right skewness of output losses increases further
on average, indicating that extreme losses have a high chance
of occurrence. The output loss is higher in the case of larger
initial SRM side-effects, showing that when SRM implemen-
tation is optimal in only few of the possible aGE paths,
misestimating the damages can be very punitive; see also the
online Supplemental material.
Next, we study the adjustments to the optimal policy mix
after observing the true damages. As an example, we examine
the (extreme) case where side-effects were assumed to be
weak, but turn out to be strong. With (presumed) weak side-
effects, SRM is first implemented in 2065 at the expense of any
mitigation efforts. But suppose that after three decades the
policy maker realises that side-effects are actually strong. We
simulate this situation by running the model from 2065 on
with the true aGE values, keeping all investment and spending
decisions blocked for the error horizon (2065–2085). The policy
maker reacts by stopping all SRM activities from 2095 on. A
quick transition to the low-carbon economy takes place, but
cannot prevent a temperature increase to almost 3 8C. To
alleviate some of the climate damages, adaptation (especially
reactive) is extensively used; see also the online Supplemental
material. Overall, deviating during the error horizon from the
optimal policy in case of strong side-effects results in lower
consumption levels for the remaining horizon.
5. Conclusions
This paper extends the Ada-BaHaMa model with an explicit
representation of reactive adaptation and geoengineering
(SRM). Reactive adaptation is modelled as a flow, and allows
for its benefits to be internalized once with its costs,
representing a climate policy that may avoid problems with
discounting preferences. SRM is a potential alternative to
traditional climate strategies, and we distinguish between its
(desired) effects on temperature levels and its (undesired and
uncertain) side-effects on the environment. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper to assess, within an
integrated assessment framework, the optimal policy mix
when mitigation, proactive and reactive adaptation, and SRM
strategies are available. We focus on the possible interactions
and substitutions between these different policies, while
accounting for the possible variability and persistency in the
side-effects of SRM.
Our analysis reveals that the climate portfolio should give
primary weight to mitigation and adaptation. With large
predominance, SRM is a complement to mitigation and
adaptation, and rarely a substitute, revealing that SRM will
not provide an easy way out of the climate problem. The use of
SRM is strongly dependent on the magnitude of its side-effects
and their persistency through time. Due to uncertainty in
these two features, the variability in SRM use is very large,
leading us to conclude that the SRM option lacks robustness.
An extensive use of SRM brings additional concerns. We
investigate possible welfare losses due to incorrect assump-
tions about SRM side-effects. Our analysis shows that output
losses rise considerably when side-effects are different than
presumed, even for short error horizons. Besides, longer
horizons are more costly, with extreme losses having a higher
chance of occurrence. Accounting for such concerns reduces
the use of SRM.
In our cost–benefit approach, despite the predominant role
of mitigation, we note that investments in the low-carbon
economy start after 2055 at the earliest. However, when
following a cost-effectiveness approach to limit temperature
increase to 2 8C, climate policies are implemented 20 years
earlier. Meeting the agreed 2 8C temperature target would thus
require earlier actions.
Our analysis could be improved along the following lines.
First, being derived in a cost-benefit framework, our results
(and in particular the timing of mitigation) critically depend on
the magnitude of the estimated climate change damages,
calibrated in our model on DICE and AD-DICE. Recent papers
(Stern, 2013; Pindyck, 2013) signal possible underestimations
of such damages in the DICE-like integrated assessment
models; further research could help address these issues.
Besides, one could perform additional sensitivity analysis on
climate parameters, especially the climate sensitivity. Second,
the deployment of SRM depends on various unknowns, such
as the type and magnitude of side-effects, and the process
governing their variability through time. The calibration of all
involved parameters in our model will benefit from revisions
reflecting scientific advances. Third, our model assumes
exogenous technological progress. With an endogenous
formulation, one might expect that (R&D) investments in
low-carbon technologies start earlier to get on-time the
needed technologies for mitigation. Finally, our model
assumes the existence of a well-functioning international
cooperation for undertaking mitigation and SRM at a global
level. Future research could improve our understanding of the
two policies by accounting for differentiated geographical
impacts and investigating strategic country behaviour.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
envsci.2014.12.014.
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Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) projects are
being designed and implemented across tropical countries, intending to curb the
contribution of deforestation to greenhouse gas emissions. An important aspect of
REDD implementation is the baseline against which reductions are measured. The
baseline estimates the business-as-usual emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation. We solve a dynamic model of land conversion from forest to agriculture
in the presence of REDD, and assess the performance of four baselines. We show that
none of the analysed baselines dominates in all performance aspects, and that the final
baseline choice needs to maximise the trade-off between the effectiveness to reduce
deforestation, cost-efficiency, and changes in income. The frequently used historical
average baseline could be improved by using a forward-looking one, which is shown
to better account for the opportunity costs faced by landowners. This result hinges on
the ability of the baseline to predict deforestation rates without significant
underestimations. We advocate the switch from a single-threshold baseline to a
corridor methodology, which would provide continued incentives to reduce
deforestation, even during periods of high opportunity costs. We finally show how the
selection of certain baseline attributes, such as corridor bandwidth and symmetry, can
enhance performance.
Keywords: deforestation; REDD; baselines; effectiveness and efficiency
1. Introduction
Emissions from deforestation and forest degradation rank as the second largest source of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere after fossil fuel combustion, contributing about 12% of
global anthropogenic emissions (van der Werf et al. 2009). Programmes targeting the
Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD and REDD+)1
have emerged as potential instruments for stabilising atmospheric CO2 concentrations and
mitigating climate change.
REDD programmes target forest preservation in tropical areas, where deforestation is
the largest contributor to total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (van der Werf et al.
2009). Here, the major drivers of deforestation have often been identified as timbering,
land conversion to agriculture, cattle ranching, and the establishment of new settlements
(Pfaff et al. 2013). Restricting deforestation would limit the development of such land-
use activities and alter the revenue flow of landowners. To compensate for the foregone
income from deforestation, REDD schemes offer financial rewards for forest
conservation.
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REDD programmes aim to achieve additionality, i.e. payments are intended to reward
reductions in emissions from deforestation below business-as-usual (BaU) levels. How-
ever, the counterfactual deforestation rates and the corresponding emissions, which would
occur in the absence of the policy, are not observable and, therefore, highly challenging to
assess. Thus, REDD payments are linked to reductions below estimations of the BaU lev-
els, called baselines or reference levels.
The reward system of REDD can be financed through the creation of special funds or
be designed as a market mechanism (Palmer 2010; Corbera and Schroeder 2011). In the
second case, reducing emissions from deforestation below a reference level generates
credits eligible for sale on various carbon markets. International emitters2 that are above
their compliance level and short of CO2 permits might find reducing emissions internally
to be expensive (Diaz et al. 2011) and could benefit from the comparative affordability of
REDD permits (Kindermann et al. 2008; Stern 2008). Despite this economic advantage,
REDD projects remain complex to implement and prone to failure. Various aspects
appear problematic: the measurement of reductions in emissions below BaU levels; rais-
ing sufficient funds for implementation or establishing a link with (immature) carbon
markets; the risk that forest loss will be postponed in time (lack of permanence) or trans-
ferred to unregulated areas (leakage); and the existence of clear property rights that would
rule out false permit claims from encroachers (Angelsen 2008a).
The success of REDD is critically sensitive to the incentive structure promoted by the
schemes (Griscom et al. 2009; Cattaneo et al. 2010; Busch et al. 2012). A central aspect
is the establishment of the baseline against which reductions in emissions from deforesta-
tion are measured and financial rewards are granted. However, setting the baseline is not
a straightforward task. First of all, to encourage participation and ensure significant reduc-
tions in GHG emissions, the baseline design would need to ensure that REDD rewards
cover the various opportunity costs of deforestation (Irawan et al. 2013). At the same
time, the selected baseline should achieve emission reductions in a cost-efficient manner,
avoiding that payments greatly exceed opportunity costs and result in windfall profits for
landowners (Busch et al. 2012), instead of being used for reducing deforestation else-
where. As well, flooding the carbon markets with REDD credits in large supply would
drive the CO2 permit price down and possibly reduce the effectiveness of the carbon
markets (Doupe 2014).
Several organisations have emerged with the goal of assisting countries in participat-
ing successfully in REDD programmes, by offering technical, legal, and financial support.
Among them, notable actors are the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, the Amazon
Fund, the UN-REDD programme, Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative
(NICFI), and the German REDD Early Movers Program. So far, the existing REDD ini-
tiatives supported by these organisations have endorsed the decision of the UNFCCC to
compute reference levels based on past deforestation rates, adjusted to account for coun-
try circumstances3 (UNFCCC 2009, Decision 4/CP.15). The decision to opt for historical
reference levels is motivated by the desire to ensure transparency and credibility (The
German REDD Early Movers Program 2014). In order to account for national circumstan-
ces, historical averages can be adjusted upwards for countries with historically low defor-
estation rates and high remaining forest areas; downward adjustments are allowed for
countries with clear decreasing trends in deforestation (FCPF Carbon Fund 2013).
Despite its recognised advantages, the historical baseline lacks the ability to reflect
future drivers of deforestation. Moreover, provided as an average, it neglects the variabil-
ity observed in deforestation rates, coming from fluctuating economic conditions. The
historical baseline might, therefore, fail to account properly for the true opportunity costs
2 A.C. Pana and J. Gheyssens
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that landowners face. Trying to address these issues, several baseline methodologies have
been proposed; for an overview, see Huettner et al. (2009) and Griscom et al. (2009). Our
paper attempts to provide further insights into how to choose the most robust and effec-
tive baseline methodology.
This paper joins the literature dedicated to the optimal contract design of REDD
schemes (Huettner et al. 2009; Busch et al. 2009, 2011; Sathaye et al. 2011). We compare
the impacts of four different baselines on REDD success. We focus on two of the most
popular baseline categories: a retrospective baseline reflecting the historical average
deforestation and a model-implied prospective baseline that proxies the BaU deforesta-
tion path in the absence of the REDD programme. We also analyse the so-called fixed-
corridor approach, which replaces the historical threshold with a lower and an upper
bound below and above the historical deforestation average (Schlamadinger et al. 2005).
Additionally, we propose a new baseline type, the variable-corridor approach, which
aims to gather the strong points of the model-implied and the corridor baselines.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we show how to model land-use decisions in
the presence of REDD in a dynamic setting. Second, we rank baselines according to dif-
ferent performance indicators: (1) a measure of forest preservation (effectiveness), (2) an
indicator of the cost of this preservation per hectare (efficiency), and (3) a measure of
changes in the total income of the landowner (change in welfare). In particular, we check
what are the losses in effectiveness when the BaU deforestation path is estimated with
error, impacting the REDD payments. The economic analysis is further put into perspec-
tive through a qualitative evaluation, accounting for environmental, technical, and social
concerns with REDD. Finally, the paper explores different possibilities to improve the
performance of the corridor baselines, by varying corridor width and symmetry.
Previous research on REDD design overlooked the inter-temporality dimension in for-
est decisions (Huettner et al. 2009; Busch et al. 2009, 2011). Huettner et al. (2009) ran a
survey to qualitatively compare three types of retrospective baselines, based on the histor-
ical deforestation rate, with a forward-looking baseline. We extend the types of baselines
analysed beyond those considered in Huettner et al. (2009) and focus on the economic
incentives generated by each baseline. Busch et al. (2009) approach the ranking of differ-
ent baselines via a one-period partial equilibrium model at the country level. They show
that an effective national baseline simultaneously provides incentives to reduce deforesta-
tion in areas of high rates and ensures the continuation with low deforestation practices in
areas of low previous forest loss. Busch et al. (2011) extend this approach by introducing
different levels of annual REDD financing, either through funds or through access to a
dedicated market. They highlight the importance of designing baselines that minimise
leakage to unregulated areas and are generous enough to guarantee the participation of
both countries with high or low deforestation rates. Cattaneo et al. (2010) use a static par-
tial equilibrium model to compare five different baseline designs from an equity perspec-
tive. They show that the crediting schemes considered obtain similar reductions in
deforestation, but differ greatly in terms of cost-efficiency and two measures of equity.
The highly dynamic nature of land-use practices has been studied in numerous papers
and benefits from a large variety of models; for a review, see Verburg et al. (2004). How-
ever, only a few papers deal explicitly with dynamic land-use change in the presence of
REDD (Ollivier 2012; Lu and Liu 2013; Vitel et al. 2013; Mosnier et al. 2014), and none
of them tests for different baseline methodologies. We attempt to fill this gap by analysing
our selected baselines with a dynamic land-use model. The dynamic model helps us illus-
trate the optimal deforestation decisions at several points in time, and show how land-
owners choose to take part in REDD depending on the time-varying opportunity costs for
Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy 3
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deforestation. Anticipating our results, with the help of the dynamic approach we are able
to demonstrate that some baseline methodologies offer continued incentives to keep
deforestation below BaU levels, while others achieve only temporary effectiveness. This
finding is key to understanding how we could potentially solve non-permanence issues
with REDD and can only be grasped in a dynamic setting.
Another important decision concerning REDD implementation is the choice of the
administrative level at which emission reductions are calculated and payments are made.
While the accounting of emission reductions and the management of REDD payments is
most likely to take place at the national level, land-use decisions are usually taken at the
subnational (regional or household) level. This reinforces the need to understand the
incentives received by the local landowners (Angelsen 2010; Busch et al. 2012). Our
model describes the decisions of a single landowner who optimises over the rate of defor-
estation as he or she expands agriculture activities. The single-agent approach is in line
with the literature on optimal forest extraction (Angelsen 2007) and with a new literature
trend arguing that REDD will face the same issues as traditional integrated conservation
and development projects, since it will have to account for incentives at the community
and individual levels (Blom et al. 2010). It is not intended to suggest that the complexity
of implementing REDD projects can be summarised into a single-player model; nonethe-
less, we believe that our approach is relevant for highlighting the behavioural changes at
the micro level, which can then be used to inform national or jurisdictional policy
decisions.
The choice of the administrative level for REDD is expected to impact the effective-
ness in reducing deforestation. Implementing REDD at the site level, and then aggregat-
ing results at a larger (national) scale, may give way to leakage of deforestation to other
areas (Busch et al. 2012), and raises questions regarding the organisation of carbon pay-
ments at the local level.4 However, the estimation of reference levels is more likely to
reflect the BaU deforestation path if set at the household level, since jurisdictions at lower
scales may have better information regarding the specific drivers of deforestation in the
area (Busch et al. 2012). Potential policies for avoiding leakage include (1) the monitor-
ing of deforestation rates at the national level and (2) the setting of penalties for deforesta-
tion rates that exceed the estimated BaU level, coming from beneficiaries of REDD
payments elsewhere. In this paper, we adopt the view that REDD should focus on provid-
ing incentives for reduced deforestation at the local level, while ensuring national
monitoring.
Our analysis reaches several conclusions that we hold relevant for the design of forest
carbon policies. First, solving for the optimal deforestation rate under a REDD regime,
we show that the baseline choice impacts REDD performance at multiple economic,
social, and environmental levels. None of the considered baselines can fulfil all REDD
criteria simultaneously, and the baseline choice needs to maximise the trade-off between
the different goals. We argue that the widespread current practice of rewarding emissions
below the historical deforestation average could be improved by implementing a for-
ward-looking baseline that would better account for the opportunity costs faced by land-
owners and would result in higher emission reductions. This result depends, however, on
the ability of the forward-looking baseline to predict future deforestation rates without
substantial underestimations. Finally, we advocate the switch from a single-threshold
baseline approach to a corridor methodology; this reduces losses from estimation errors
and provides continued incentives for reduced deforestation, even during periods of high
opportunity costs.
4 A.C. Pana and J. Gheyssens
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces our methodology
and the main assumptions of the dynamic model. In Section 3, a numerical application is
performed and the robustness of our results is tested. Section 4 concludes on the policy
implications of our results and the link with broader issues of REDD implementation.
2. Methodology
2.1. Model setting
In our model, the owner of a large area of forested land decides if, when, and to what
extent to exploit the forest for agricultural activities. To limit his or her deforestation, the
owner is offered the possibility to take part in a REDD programme that grants carbon per-
mits each time the deforestation rate is below a pre-specified threshold. We model the
voluntary participation in REDD along the approach of Busch et al. (2009, 2011), where
the owner can ‘opt in’ as long as he or she considers this to his or her advantage.5 In our
model, reforestation options are not accounted for; this assumes that costs for switching
back from cropland to forest (together with the forgone discounted cash flows from agri-
culture) are large enough to render the reforestation option unattractive.
The landowner’s revenues are a trade-off between the net income from land exploita-
tion and REDD rewards. The more the owner deforests, the higher the incomes from sell-
ing timber and subsequently using land for agricultural activities, and the lower the
number of received REDD permits. Alternatively, lower deforestation (below the defined
baseline level) results in smaller incomes from agriculture and timbering, but higher
REDD revenues. We choose an approach similar to Busch et al. (2009), where the own-
er’s revenues from land exploitation are modelled as a unique composite commodity, rep-
resenting both the harvesting value of timber and a perpetual discounted flow of
agricultural activities on the land.6
The owner maximises the sum of total discounted profits, taking into account the
parameters that define the decision environment: the state of the forest, the dynamics of
composite commodity and REDD permit prices, and the specified deforestation baseline.
In our model, the prices of the composite commodity (Pcc(t)) and of the REDD permit
(PR(t)) are exogenous and follow deterministic dynamics7:
dPccðtÞ ¼ dPccðtÞdt (1)
dPRðtÞ ¼ gPRðtÞdt (2)
where d and g represent the respective growth rates of the two price processes. Being a
composite price, Pcc(t) is a simplification of the actual commodity flow generated from
harvesting one hectare of forest and using the area for perpetual agricultural activities,
which could be modelled as follows:
PccðtÞ ¼ PhðtÞ þ
Z 1
t
AðtÞectdt (3)
where Ph(t) represents the one-time timber harvest selling price, while A(t) are the annual
monetary flows from agricultural activities after land conversion. Land exploitation
involves various operational costs that we model with the help of a quadratic function:
CðtÞ ¼ a1dðtÞ þ a2dðtÞ2 (4)
Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy 5
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where d(t) is the amount of forest converted to agriculture at time t. We assume the
parameters of the cost function (a1, a2) to be constant. This stylised representation is in
line with the classical approach of von Th€unen (1826): when land is abundant and homo-
geneous, the agriculture expansion frontier depends on the cost of accessing new forest
patches, which are farther away from the initial location and thus costlier to exploit
(Angelsen 1999).
The offsetting scheme proposed by REDD imposes no liability: the owner is rewarded
if the deforestation is below a certain reference level, but does not have to pay penalties in
case this limit is exceeded (Griscom et al. 2009; Huettner et al. 2009; Joanneum Research
Institute 2006). The owner’s revenues from REDD (RR(t)) can be described by a step
function:
RRðtÞ ¼ PRðtÞðdB dðtÞÞþ (5)
where PR(t) is the REDD permit price at time t, dB the baseline level, and d(t) the actual
deforestation at t. REDD cash flows are zero for deforestation rates above the baseline,
i.e. (dB ¡ d(t))C D 0 if d(t)  dB. REDD programmes define reference levels (dB) in
terms of tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year. To simplify the presentation of results, we
convert reference levels into hectares of avoided deforestation, as described in Section
2.3. Unlike in the traditional dynamic setting, we introduce a loose constraint on the total
owned patch of forest at t(0) Fð0Þ . However, we impose a time window [0, T] during
which the optimisation occurs. While Fð0Þ is not infinite, we consider its value so large
that forest depletion is not likely8; we allow for a positive terminal stock at period T.
However, future REDD schemes may have an explicit time frame9 (Parker et al. 2008),
which compels us to consider the time constraint as the most binding for the landowner.
We first solve the model for the BaU case (the benchmark when no REDD project is
in place), and then for four REDD crediting baselines: historical, model implied, and two
types of corridor. We proceed now with the presentation of each scenario, and then assess
the incentives for avoiding deforestation observed in each case.
2.2. Baseline alternatives
2.2.1. Business-as-usual scenario (without REDD)
The BaU scenario illustrates the deforestation trend in the absence of REDD or other for-
est conservation projects. Here, the land brings only timbering and agriculture benefits, as
reflected in the net cash flow (p(¢)) at time t:
pðdðtÞÞ ¼ PccðtÞdðtÞ  ða1dðtÞ þ a2dðtÞ2Þ (6)
where Pcc(t) is the composite commodity price, d(t) the deforestation rate, and a1 and a2
are the parameters of the cost function. The optimal control problem can be described as
a maximisation over the deforestation rate of the total discounted net revenues resulting
from land exploitation:
max
dðtÞð Þt2½0;T 
Z T
0
ertpðdðtÞÞdt
 
(7)
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where r is the discount rate and T marks the end of the decision horizon. The variation in
the stock of forested land is given by the following dynamics:
_F ¼ dðtÞ (8)
where F is the stock of forest and _F represents its variation between consecutive periods.
We follow the solution approach of Chiang (1992) for determining the optimal deforesta-
tion path (see the Appendix). The rate of deforestation at each moment of time is recur-
sively linked to the initial deforestation level:
dðtÞ ¼ dð0Þert þ P
ccð0Þðedt  ertÞ  a1ð1 ertÞ
2a2
(9)
Reflecting the optimal deforestation path in the BaU scenario, we denote d(t) D dBaU(t); it
will be used below for computing the REDD rewards in the model-implied and the vari-
able-corridor scenarios.
2.2.2. Historical baseline
Most proposals include the historical average deforestation rate in the computation of the
crediting baseline10; this comes as a recognition of the fact that the average past defores-
tation, although an imperfect measure, is one of the best predictors at hand for short- to
medium-term deforestation (Angelsen et al. 2009). We thus start the analysis of the defor-
estation behaviour under REDD with a simple historical baseline, where the REDD
threshold is flat and equal to the average past deforestation rate. This baseline type is a
simplification of what has been proposed by Brazil (Parker et al. 2008).
The merit of the historical baseline consists of its fair simplicity of computation and
implementation, as well as its appeal to countries and landowners who need to get used to
new operation rules. The baseline has received support also for its ability to reflect local
deforestation trends.
The historical reference level faces, however, a number of limitations. Most impor-
tantly, an imperfect predictor of future deforestation has high chances of undermining the
additionality principle and of distorting country participation, especially if one considers
the specific forest transition stage11 of each country (Angelsen 2007). Forest-rich states
with low past deforestation, but which expect increasing trends, might decide to stay out
of REDD if the programmes are based on historical baselines. On the other hand, nations
with large past deforestation rates and scarce remaining forests would gladly join, since
rewards based on historical averages would be generous relative to the required additional
efforts (Angelsen 2008a).
In the presence of REDD with a historical baseline, cash flows are generated by two
counter-balancing activities, i.e. forest exploitation and REDD:
pðdðtÞÞ ¼ PccðtÞdðtÞ  ða1dðtÞ þ a2dðtÞ2Þ þ PRðtÞ dB dðtÞð Þþ (10)
As captured in Equation (10), the landowner’s profits are determined by the sales of the
composite commodity, less the operational costs; additionally, REDD revenues are eligi-
ble for deforestation rates below the historical threshold (dB).
Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy 7
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2.2.3. Model-implied baseline
An alternative to the retrospective historical baseline is the prospective method12 that
incorporates projections of future deforestation trends. The model-implied baseline relies
on a time-varying level reflecting predicted deforestation paths under the BaU scenario.
Here, the landowner is rewarded for deforesting less than in the absence of the REDD
programme. If the forecasting is accurate, it enforces additionality, since only actual
efforts would be rewarded. However, the model-implied baseline is not exempt from criti-
cism that stems primarily from the baseline’s vulnerability to forecasting errors and the
reliance on model assumptions.
We incorporate the specificity of the model-implied baseline into the revenue func-
tion, accounting for the fact that the reference level (dB(t)) can fluctuate across time
according to the projections of the model used:
pðdðtÞÞ ¼ PccðtÞdðtÞ  ða1dðtÞ þ a2dðtÞ2Þ þ PRðtÞ dBðtÞ  dðtÞð Þþ (11)
Compared to the methodology of the historical baseline (Equation (10)), the key differ-
ence in the model-implied approach is the modification of the baseline level from a static
threshold (dB) to a dynamic one (dB(t)). In our model, dB(t) is chosen to match the esti-
mated deforestation pattern of the BaU scenario, such that
dBðtÞ ¼ dBaUðtÞ 8 t 2 ½0; T  (12)
where dBaU(t) is the optimal deforestation in the BaU scenario.
2.2.4. Fixed corridor
The corridor approach has been first proposed by Schlamadinger et al. (2005), and then
reformulated jointly in 2006 by the Joanneum Research Institute, the Union of Concerned
Scientists, the Woods Hole Research Center, and the Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da
Amazonia (Griscom et al. 2009). This methodology modifies the historical baseline
approach, by replacing the fixed threshold with a corridor whose bounds are computed as
levels below and above the average past deforestation rate.
In this paper, we analyse the so-called corridor 2 methodology,13 whereby the possi-
ble deforestation range is divided into three regions: (1) deforestation levels above the
upper boundary do not receive any REDD payments; (2) rates below the lower boundary
are entirely eligible for REDD permits, as they would under a fixed-baseline scheme; and
(3) deforestation levels within the corridor are discounted proportionally to the distance
from the upper boundary, such that rewards are larger when deforestation approaches the
lower bound, up to full payments if this lower bound is reached, and conversely, rewards
are smaller for deforestation rates close to the upper bound, down to no payment if the
upper bound is reached.
The corridor approach attempts to address an important feature of deforestation,
namely its frequent fluctuations over time. Movements are usually caused by shifts in key
market parameters, such as commodity prices, interest rates, or climate impacts (Joan-
neum Research Institute 2006). The corridor reward system admits that avoiding defores-
tation in boom years implies higher opportunity costs, and is, therefore, more difficult to
sustain than conservation efforts in years of medium to low timber and agriculture prices.
With the corridor system, the landowner is encouraged to keep deforestation rates close
8 A.C. Pana and J. Gheyssens
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to the average historical level, and is rewarded (although modestly) even if slightly above
it. The corridor could also be useful when measurement errors hinder the estimation of
the historical baseline. The corridor creates an ‘error’ band around the threshold, advanta-
geous in the absence of incomplete information about past deforestation rates. In the
words of Joanneum Research Institute (2006), the ‘corridor approach reduces the risk of
missing a single-level target’.
With the corridor approach for REDD, the shape of the profit function reflects the
design of the reward programme:
pðdðtÞÞ ¼ PccðtÞdðtÞ  ða1dðtÞ þ a2dðtÞ2Þ þ PRðtÞw dBU  dðtÞ
 þ
(13)
where dBL D (1¡ x)dB and dBU D (1 C x)dB represent the lower and upper bounds of the
corridor, respectively, dB is the historical deforestation rate, and x the corridor width. w 2
[0, 1] is the weight (discount factor) imposed by the corridor. In Equation (13), the third
term represents the income generated by the REDD project. The weighting system works
as follows:
w ¼ 1 ðdðtÞ  dB
LÞþ
dBU  dBL ¼
1 dðtÞ  dB
L
dBU  dBL ; if dðtÞ> dB
L
1; if dðtÞ dBL
8<
:
If the deforestation rate lies within the corridor (d(t) 2 (dBL, dBU)), a linear weighting
procedure is activated: on one hand, fewer permits will be received than the difference
between the deforestation rate and the upper boundary (w < 1). On the other hand, defor-
estation rates below the lower boundary are rewarded full permits (w D 1). The last term
in the REDD income, (dBU ¡ d(t))C, ensures that rewards are received only for deforesta-
tion rates below the upper bound of the corridor.
2.2.5. Variable corridor
Similar to the difference between the static historical baseline and its dynamic model-
implied counterpart, we suggest to modify the fixed-corridor baseline by giving it a
dynamic feature. The variable corridor replaces the constant lower and upper corridor
bounds with time-varying levels, established below and above the deforestation rate of
the dynamic BaU scenario. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time this baseline
approach is proposed.
The variable corridor aims at bringing together the strong points of both the model-
implied and the fixed-corridor baselines. First, linking corridor bounds to the BaU defor-
estation trend is expected to offer not only a dynamic but also a forward-looking perspec-
tive on deforestation paths, more likely to ensure additionality. Second, the corridor
reward system should be able to better deal with estimation errors of the BaU deforesta-
tion, and account for periodic fluctuations in deforestation levels, similarly to the fixed
corridor. The revenue function follows the methodology of the fixed corridor, but introdu-
ces dynamic corridor bounds:
pðdðtÞÞ ¼ PccðtÞdðtÞ  ða1dðtÞ þ a2dðtÞ2Þ þ PRðtÞwðtÞ dBU ðtÞ  dðtÞ
 þ
(14)
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where the weighting factor is time varying due to the dynamic corridor bounds, with
wðtÞ ¼ 1 ðdðtÞdBLðtÞÞþ
dBU ðtÞdBLðtÞ, dB
L(t) D (1 ¡ x)dB(t), dBU(t) D (1 C x)dB(t), dB(t) D dBaU(t),
and x the corridor width.
Summing up, in this paper we analyse four different REDD scenarios, namely two
static and two dynamic, allowing for either a single-threshold or a corridor approach.
While the static baselines are based on historical estimations of the deforestation rate,
and are therefore retrospective, the dynamic baseline types are based on estimations of
future deforestation trends, and are prospective. We denote the single-threshold
approaches as H  the historical  and MI  the model implied. The fixed and variable
corridors are labelled Cf and Cv, respectively, hereafter. To summarise, the REDD reve-
nues (RR(t)) of each baseline methodology are presented in Table 1.
We solve for the optimal deforestation path under the BaU scenario and the four dif-
ferent baselines.14 We tackle the non-linearity in the profit function with the help of a
numerical approach (see the Appendix).
2.3. Model calibration
Our model is general enough to accommodate the characteristics of many regions where
REDD could be implemented. For the numerical application, we take here the view of a
forest owner from Peru. As the sensitivity analysis shows, the results are robust and gen-
eralisable to different regions of the world (see the Appendix).
Peru is an important REDD candidate in terms of forest resources15 and market vol-
ume.16 The annual deforestation rate for 19902005 is estimated at 0.14%, remaining at
low levels relative to its neighbouring countries (FAO 2005). However, more recent esti-
mates show that during 20002010 deforestation rates experienced an increasing trend,17
which is predicted to persist in the near future mainly due to cropland expansion in the
Andes (Wassenaar et al. 2007). Several local projects developing REDD credits are cur-
rently in the implementation phase in Peru18 (Hajek et al. 2011; Entenmann and Schmitt
2013).
The list of parameters used for model fitting and their sources are presented in Table 2.
In our model, the average deforestation rate obtained in the BaU scenario is about
200 ha/year. We allow the historical baseline level (dB) to vary in a large interval
(between 1 ha and 500 ha per annum), in order to cover a broad spectrum of scenarios.
While REDD credits are granted in terms of tons of CO2 reduced per year, we present our
results in terms of hectares of avoided deforestation. We convert the deforested area into
tons of carbon emitted with the help of a parameter (V) whose value for Peru can be
found in the OSIRIS model for the above and below ground biomass carbon and for soil
carbon (Busch et al. 2009). Another converter (c) transforms the quantity of tons of car-
bon emitted into tons of CO2 emitted (Assante 2011).
Table 1. REDD revenues under different baseline methodologies.
Single threshold Corridor
Static RRH(t) D PR(t)(dB ¡ d(t))C RRCf(t) D PR(t)v(dBU ¡ d(t))C
Dynamic RRMI(t) D PR(t)(dB(t) ¡ d(t))C RRCv(t) D PR(t)v(t)(dBU(t) ¡ d(t))C
Note: H stands for historical baseline, MI for model implied, Cf for fixed corridor, and Cv for variable corridor.
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With the help of the parameter λ, we express the price of the composite commodity
from Eur/m3 into Eur/ha, relying on the IPCC Good Practice Guide LULUCF (Penman et
al. 2003). The initial price of the commodity (Pcc(0)) and its growth rate (d) are computed
for the Peruvian market from the Annual Review and Assessment of the World Timber
Situation (ITTO 2010). We use the State of the Forest Carbon Markets 2011 (Diaz et al.
2011) to set the initial REDD permit price (PR(0)) and its growth rate. In our calibration,
the growth rate of the REDD permit price is above the growth rate of the composite com-
modity price (d > g). As a robustness check, we ran the analysis allowing for the opposite
relationship (d  g). This change impacts the amount of avoided deforestation, but does
not modify the ranking of the baselines.
The chosen level for the discount rate (r) is 2%, placing it slightly lower than the
growth rates of the composite commodity and the permit prices; we make here the
assumption that forest exploitation and REDD bring higher financial benefits than saving
at the discount rate.19 In reality, discount rates in developing countries take usually larger
values and vary widely over time (see the Appendix). Nonetheless, the sensitivity analysis
shows that the ranking of baselines is consistent across different values of the discount
rate (r 2 [0, 0.1]).
Finally, for the calibration of the production cost, we adapt the cost function of Angel-
sen (1996), calibrating it to data from Verissimo et al. (1992) for the Amazonian forest.
Table 2. Calibration parameters for the numerical solution.
Parameter Explanation Value Source
Pcc(0) Composite commodity price 500 Eur/m3 ITTO (2010)
d Growth rate of Pcc(t) 2.3% per annum ITTO (2010)
S.A. [0, 0.4]% per annum
λ Eur/m3 to Eur/ha 158 m3/ha Penman et al. (2003)
PR(0) REDD permit price 5 Eur/tCO2 Diaz et al. (2011)
g Growth rate of PR(t) 2.5% p.a. Diaz et al. (2011)
S.A. [0, 0.4]% per annum
V ha to tC emitted 179 tC/ha Busch et al. (2009)
S.A. [50, 200] tC/ha
c tC to tCO2 3.67 tCO2/tC Assante (2011)
a1 Cost parameter 1 3.3198 Eur/ha Angelsen (1996),
Verissimo et al. (1992)
a2 Cost parameter 2 798.0811 Eur/ha
2 Angelsen (1996),
Verissimo et al. (1992)
r Discount rate 2% per annum 
S.A. [0, 0.1]% per annum
dB Historical baseline 200 ha per annum 
S.A. [1, 500] ha per annum
dBU Corridor upper boundary (1 C x)dB ha 
dBL Corridor lower boundary (1 ¡ x)dB ha 
x0 Initial corridor width 0.1 
x Corridor width [0.1, 0.9] 
T Time horizon 100 years 
Note: The table captures values used for the calibration of the model parameters. S.A. stands for values used in
the sensitivity analysis.
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2.4. Performance indicators
We evaluate the performance of REDD programmes under different baseline methodolo-
gies with the help of three indicators, in line with the 3E Criteria proposed by Stern
(2008).20 The performance measures we consider are: effectiveness, landowner’s welfare,
and efficiency, as detailed in Table 3. First, the effectiveness indicator E1 measures the
avoided deforestation, and the inherent saved emissions. It quantifies the difference
between the deforested area of BaU (no REDD) and the different baseline scenarios for
REDD, being therefore a measure of additionality. Second, we measure the financial co-
benefits of REDD with the help of the E2 indicator, which quantifies the percentage
change in landowner’s income due to joining REDD. Finally, the efficiency indicator E3
provides an estimate of the average cost of forest preservation per hectare of avoided
deforestation. It divides the total received REDD revenues by the number of hectares of
forest saved under each baseline type compared to the BaU scenario. Here, the cost of
each baseline scheme reflects realised (additional) savings in emissions.
3. Results
This section presents the optimal deforestation paths for the BaU and the four REDD
baseline approaches, and discusses the implications for baseline choice. Section 3.1 first
ranks the baselines according to their performance, and then explains the observed differ-
ences by analysing the financial incentives offered by each baseline methodology. At the
end of the section, we check the robustness of the baseline ranking to changes in key
parameters. Section 3.2 relaxes the initial assumptions regarding corridor bandwidth and
symmetry, and underlines possible design adjustments to increase baseline performance.
Section 3.3 extends the analysis of baseline performance to technical, social, and environ-
mental aspects of REDD.
3.1. A first comparison
We solve for the optimal deforestation paths under the BaU and the four REDD baselines
(see Figure 1). With our initial calibration, under each baseline scheme the optimal deforesta-
tion path is increasing in time, as agricultural activities become more attractive due to rising
composite commodity prices.21 We compare the performance of the baseline methodologies
Table 3. Performance indicators of baseline scenarios.
Indicator Definition Formula
(1) Effectiveness Avoided deforestation from BaU (%) Ei1 ¼ S
BaU
Tot
Si
Tot
SBaU
Tot
(E1) S
i
Tot D
R
0
Tdi(t)dt
(2) Landowner’s welfare Change in income from BaU (%) Ei2 ¼ P
i
TotPBaUTot
PBaUTot
(E2) PTot D
R
T
0e
¡ rtp(di(t))dt
(3) Efficiency Average cost of avoiding 1 ha Ei3 ¼ SRR
i
SBaU
Tot
Si
Tot
(E3) of deforestation from BaU (Eur/ha) SRR
i D R T0e¡ rtRRi(t)dt
Note: Three measures of REDD performance under different baselines are computed. d(t) is the deforested area,
p(t) the total income from land, RR(t) the REDD revenue at time t, and i 2 {H, MI, Cf, Cv}; BaU: business-as-
usual, H: historical, MI: model implied, Cf: fixed corridor, Cv: variable corridor.
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based on the indicators introduced in Section 2.4. Table 4 shows that the baselines differ in
their performance, with each indicator revealing a new ranking of baselines.
First, we compare the baselines in terms of the ability to reduce deforestation. Figure
1 is illustrative of the effectiveness of REDD. In all baseline scenarios, the area of defor-
ested land remains lower or equal to the BaU case; over the aggregated time horizon,
REDD programmes are effective in reducing deforestation.22 However, the reduction in
deforestation does not hold at all moments of time for the static baselines: our dynamic
model shows that keeping reference levels constant while the opportunity costs of defor-
estation increase will determine the forest owner to opt out of the REDD project and fol-
low the BaU path. This sheds light on the limited effectiveness of the static baselines, as
opposed to the prospective ones that offer continued incentives for reducing deforesta-
tion. We argue that, with their temporary effectiveness, static baselines face higher non-
permanence risks than dynamic baselines. Analysing the E1 indicator, we indeed observe
that the variable corridor achieves the best results, and it is followed at quite some dis-
tance by the model-implied baseline. The fixed-corridor and the historical baselines lag
far behind in terms of effectiveness.
Figure 1. Optimal deforestation paths under BaU and different REDD baselines.
Note: H stands for historical baseline, MI for model implied, H for historical, Cf for fixed corridor, and
Cv for variable corridor. The historical deforestation rate (dB) is 200 ha/year. Corridor width is x = 0.1.
Table 4. Indicators of REDD performance under different baselines.
Effectiveness Welfare Efficiency
Baseline E1 (%) E2 (%) E3 (Eur/ha)
H 1.54 2.26 73,096.66
MI 4.77 0.23 4,680.18
Cf 1.76 2.76 78,043.75
Cv 9.08 0.92 9,318.13
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Second, imposing no liabilities for deforestation rates above the baseline, all scenarios
have a positive impact on landowner’s welfare compared to the BaU case (E2). The
increase in welfare across all baselines points to the ability of REDD to foster the volun-
tary opting-in of candidate countries, and alleviates some of the concerns with the need
of additional enforcement measures. In particular, the static baselines prove to be more
generous: the fixed corridor is the most attractive for the landowner, followed closely by
the historical baseline. The remaining two baselines achieve only modest changes in wel-
fare, with the model-implied baseline being the last ranked.
Third, in terms of cost-efficiency (E3), the prospective baselines strongly outperform
the static ones: the model-implied baseline is the top performer, with the variable corridor
in the second position. The historical and fixed-corridor baselines require almost 20 times
higher costs than MI.
3.1.1. The incentive structure of the baselines
In order to understand what drives the difference in baseline performance, we compare
the incentive structure of the four baseline methodologies. To ease the comparison, we
explicit the REDD revenues at different ranges of the deforestation rate (see Table 5). In
particular, within the corridor we define the deforestation rate in terms of the reference
level (dB, dB(t)), the corridor width (x), and a variable y, with y 2 (0, x), such that
(1) when d(t) 2 (dBL, dB], we define d(t) D (1 ¡ x C y)dB for the Cf case, and d(t) D
(1 ¡ x C y)dB(t) for Cv;
(2) when d(t) 2 (dB, dBU), d(t) D (1 C y)dB for the Cf case, and d(t) D (1 C y)dB(t)
for Cv, with dB(t) D dBaU(t).
To account for possible misestimations in the BaU deforestation path and to increase par-
ticipation rates, the corridor approaches reward landowners for choosing deforestation
rates below an upper corridor bound, which is set above the corresponding single thresh-
old (dBU D (1 C x)dB, dBU(t) D (1 C x)dB(t), with x > 0). We observe from Table 5 that
by design, for the same deforestation rate, a corridor approach always gives larger or
equal financial incentives to participate in REDD to the corresponding single-threshold
approach. For all t 2 [0, T]
RRHðtÞRRCf ðtÞ (15)
RRMIðtÞRRCvðtÞ (16)
The ranking of REDD payments influences the effectiveness of the baselines. Larger
REDD revenues decrease the opportunity costs of deforestation, bringing stronger incen-
tives to take part in REDD and keep deforestation below the baseline. Any decrease in
deforestation will inevitably take place below dBaU(t).
23 It follows that relations (15) and
(16) hold also for effectiveness with unchanged signs:
EH1 ECf1 (17)
EMI1 ECv1 (18)
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Finally, we analyse the impact of higher REDD revenues on efficiency. Our efficiency
indicator (E3) is defined as a measure of total REDD revenues divided by the hectares of
reduced deforestation below BaU. Therefore, an increase in REDD revenues will have a
double (yet opposed) impact on efficiency. First, higher RR(t) lead to lower efficiency
(higher E3). Second, higher RR(t) raise effectiveness (avoided deforestation), increasing
efficiency (lower E3). As can be observed from Table 4, the effect on welfare dominates
the effect on effectiveness.24 It follows that the single-threshold approaches, with lower
welfare increases, are more efficient than the corresponding corridor approaches, with
higher welfare increases. That is,
EH3 ECf3 (19)
EMI3 ECv3 (20)
Summing up, we have shown that the corridor approaches dominate the correspond-
ing single-threshold approaches in terms of effectiveness and welfare increase, but lag
behind in terms of efficiency. If sufficient funding is available, which remains to be seen,
we argue that REDD promoters should opt for the corridor approach instead of the single-
threshold one, in order to achieve the needed reductions in emissions.
3.1.2. Sensitivity analysis
REDD initiatives are currently being designed in a plethora of tropical countries, with sev-
eral projects being already in the implementation phase (Angelsen 2010). In particular,
Norway  through its International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)  contributes to
different multi- and bi-lateral REDD initiatives in several countries, including Brazil, Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo, Guyana, Indonesia, and Tanzania. These countries are distinct
in terms of forest types, stages in the forest transition, and national forestry policies, apart
from a large diversity in the economic, social, and political contexts. To reach the REDD
goals, NICFI recognises the need to design projects that account for national and sub-
national differences (NIFCI 2011). For instance, the GuyanaNorway cooperation agreed
on a baseline that reflects both the historical average deforestation in Guyana and the mean
deforestation rate in developing countries. Since Guyana had historically very low defores-
tation rates compared with other developing countries, the computed reference level is
much higher than the country’s past average deforestation rate. To allow for positive but
limited increases in deforestation, payments are reduced linearly for deforestation rates that
exceed a certain threshold, similarly to the fixed-corridor approach.
To be able to generalise our findings outside the region of Peru, we test the robustness
of our results across different settings. We focus on several key calibration parameters,
describing the forest type (the carbon content V), the crediting threshold of the static
baselines (dB), the time preference of the forest owner (the discount rate r), and the varia-
bles describing the opportunity costs of deforestation and the received REDD financial
incentives (the growth rates of the composite commodity (d) and REDD permit prices
(g)). The detailed analysis can be found in the Appendix.
We find that the ranking of baselines is robust to different settings. The variable corri-
dor continues to be the most effective in reducing deforestation. The fixed corridor offers
the highest increase in welfare from BaU. The model-implied baseline is the most effi-
cient, having the lowest costs per hectare of avoided deforestation. The sensitivity analy-
sis underlines the importance of understanding the benefits of the variable-corridor
16 A.C. Pana and J. Gheyssens
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approach, whose performance can outpace significantly the other baselines, depending on
the characteristics of the region where REDD is being implemented.
3.2. Corridor bandwidth and symmetry
When large uncertainties surround the BaU deforestation rate, or high variability in
opportunity costs is to be expected, one might be tempted to advocate a corridor approach
with a larger bandwidth, such that a broader range of deforestation rates would be
accounted for in the REDD payments. The corridor bandwidth should in this case be care-
fully chosen, to provide effective incentives for forest protection and, at the same time,
achieve cost-efficiency.
With this motivation, we test the sensitivity of baseline performance to two key
adjustments to the corridor methodology, namely corridor wideness and symmetry. We
allow for increasing bandwidths (x 2 [0.1, 0.9]) that reflect different reward magnitudes
granted for reducing deforestation. Additionally, we check the variation in performance
when allowing for asymmetric corridors. Namely, we consider both an upward- and a
downward-biased corridor. For the variable corridor, bounds are set such that
(1) in the upward-biased case, dBL(t) D (1 ¡ x0)dB(t) and dBU(t) D (1 C x)dB(t);
(2) in the downward-biased case, dBL(t) D (1 ¡ x)dB(t) and dBU(t) D (1 C x0)dB(t);
where dB(t) D dBaU(t), x 2 [0.1, 0.9], and x0 is fixed, with x0D 0.1. The same applies for the
fixed corridor, but dB(t) is replaced as usually by the constant dB. On one side, the upward-
biased corridor approach raises the upper bound of the corridor, leading to an extension of
the range of deforestation rates eligible for REDD revenues. This type of asymmetric corri-
dor is in line with the proposal of Schlamadinger et al. (2005) who suggest setting the upper
bound of the corridor so high that it minimises the probability that the deforestation rate will
exceed this limit. In contrast, the downward-biased approach takes down the lower bound of
the corridor, imposing therefore heavier discounts on REDD rewards for deforestation rates
in the range (dBL, dB] ((dBL(t), dB(t)]) for the fixed (variable) corridor.
Figure 2 displays the performance results of the variable corridor. The change in the
performance of the fixed corridor follows a similar pattern (see Figure E.1 in the Appen-
dix). First, some effectiveness is always achieved (E1 > 0), for all corridor bandwidths
Figure 2. Performance of the variable corridor at different corridor widths.
Notes: The figure captures the performance of the variable corridor across different corridor band-
widths. The performance is compared to the historical and the model-implied baselines. Considered
corridors are symmetric (sym), upward (up), and downward biased (down).
Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy 17
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and all symmetry alternatives. Figure 2 shows that, as bandwidth increases, effectiveness
is higher for the upward-biased corridors, but decreasing for symmetric and downward-
biased corridors. Second, increasing the corridor bandwidth achieves higher welfare
improvements for the symmetric and upward-biased corridor approaches. Downward-
biased corridors exhibit decreasing welfare for wider corridors. Third, cost-efficiency
decreases for symmetric and upward-biased corridors, and improves slightly for the
downward-biased corridor when increasing the corridor width.
3.2.1. The incentive structure of (a)symmetric corridors
The three symmetry scenarios provide distinct financial incentives, causing differences in
performance. The upward-biased corridor is by design the most generous one, followed
by the symmetric, and then the downward-biased corridor, i.e. RRup(t)  RRsym(t) 
RRdown(t) for all bandwidths.25 Moreover, an increase in the corridor bandwidth (x)
impacts the REDD revenues differently, depending on the symmetry assumption. The
overall impact of an increase in bandwidth is twofold: (1) a linear impact on the number
of REDD credits received for keeping deforestation rates below the upper corridor bound,
i.e. on n D dBU(t) ¡ d(t) and (2) a non-linear impact on the weight (v(t)) provided by the
corridor (see Table 6).
The upward-biased approach achieves increasing welfare at larger corridor widths.
With an increase in x, both the number of REDD credits received and the weight provided
by the upward corridor increase. As captured in Figure 2, welfare and effectiveness
change in the same direction when x increases, but the large increase in welfare obtained
at wider corridors is accompanied by only modest improvements in effectiveness that
have the tendency to flatten out as x increases. The stronger financial motivation has a
diminishing effect on forest protection.
Downward-biased corridors exhibit negative partial derivatives with respect to x,
showing that here welfare improvements from BaU are lower for wider corridors. Larger
bandwidths decrease welfare and, as expected, effectiveness.
The symmetric-corridor approach achieves higher welfare but lower effectiveness as
bandwidth increases. The overall positive impact on welfare follows, as usually, from the
fact that its REDD revenues are increasing in the corridor bandwidth. However, although
the total impact is positive, the linear and non-linear effects have opposite signs (Table 6).
Table 6. Sensitivity of REDD revenues to corridor bandwidth and deforestation rate in the case of
the variable corridor. RR(t) D PR(t)v(t)n, with optimal d(t) 2 (dBL(t), dB).
Linear impact Non-linear impact Overall impact Second order impact
on REDD credits on weight on REDD revenues on REDD revenues
Symmetry @n
@x
@vðtÞ
@x
@RRðtÞ
@x
@2RRðtÞ
@x@dðtÞ
Upward biased C C C ¡
Symmetric C ¡ C C
Downward biased 0 ¡ ¡ C
Note: The table captures the sign of the partial derivatives of REDD revenues with respect to corridor width (x)
and deforestation rate (d(t)) across different symmetry scenarios for the variable corridor. The optimal deforesta-
tion rate stays within the corridor, i.e. d(t) 2 (dBL(t), dB(t)). nD dBU(t) ¡ d(t) is the number of REDD credits
awarded, v(t) D 1 ¡ (d(t) ¡ dBL(t))/(dBU(t) ¡ dBL(t)) is the weight imposed by the corridor approach, and the
lower and upper bounds of the corridor (dBL(t), dBU(t)) vary across the three corridor symmetry assumptions.
The computations are detailed in the Appendix.
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As bandwidth increases, the landowner benefits, on one hand, by receiving more REDD
credits (higher n), but loses, on the other hand, from stronger discounts imposed by the
weighting factor (lower v(t)). The impact on effectiveness is confirmed when analysing
the joint sensitivity of REDD revenues to the deforestation rate and corridor bandwidth
(see column (4) in Table 6). The increase in profits due to an increase in x is higher at
larger d(t), as indicated by the positive second-order partial derivatives. At larger corridor
bandwidths, it benefits the landowner to increase d(t), and therefore reduce effectiveness.
Summing up, with a lack of confidence in the estimates of the BaU deforestation, or
with anticipated high seasonality in deforestation rates, wider corridors might need to be
accommodated, in a way that forest protection is still incentivised. Our results show that
increasing the corridor bandwidth ensures a higher effectiveness of reducing deforestation
only in the upward-biased corridor design, and is counter-beneficial for symmetric and
downward-biased cases. Both fixed and variable corridors benefit most from having an
upward-biased corridor reward system of moderate bandwidth (x D 0.4, 0.5), which guar-
antees strong effectiveness and welfare results, at low efficiency losses.
3.3. Extended criteria for baseline evaluation
Our analysis so far has highlighted three baseline alternatives with strong performance
results: the model-implied (MI), the upward-biased fixed corridor (Cf(up)), and the
upward-biased variable corridor (Cv(up)), with each baseline alternative performing best
in a different area.
Although the three performance indicators considered so far capture the most impor-
tant economic aspects of the alternative baselines, other factors play an equally important
role in the REDD implementation process. In order to achieve a more holistic understand-
ing of the baseline characteristics, we complement the economic evaluation with a multi-
tier analysis focusing on the environmental, technical, and social performance of the base-
lines. Based on the study of Huettner et al. (2009), we select five new criteria whose fulfil-
ment can be easily evaluated for our baselines, namely easiness of implementation, low
data requirements, accounting for business cycles, accounting for opportunity costs, and
incentivising a reduction in losses from estimation errors.
The fulfilment of these additional qualitative factors cannot, however, be quantified in
the same manner as our three initial economic indicators. For this reason, we proceed by
giving each baseline type a score26 representing a rough estimation of how well it is
expected to fulfil the performance criteria relative to the other baselines. The scores
awarded to each baseline for the three initial indicators and the new qualitative aspects
are presented in Figure 3. While the economic analysis (based on E1, E2, and E3) favoured
each of the baselines for a different criterion, the integrative analysis sets the four base-
lines further apart, highlighting stronger differences.
One of the new criteria reveals a strong point of the historical baseline (H). REDD
projects, especially in their initial phase, need to be designed as contracts with few and
clear requirements in order to encourage the participation of diverse parties and create
momentum for the development of such forest protection initiatives worldwide. The his-
torical baseline is likely to benefit from the highest ease of implementation among the
considered methodologies. If data availability is not an issue, policy-makers will be
required low efforts for baseline computation and landowners will be provided with con-
tract guidelines they can easily relate to. Together with the fact that historical deforesta-
tion rates have some predictive power for short- to medium-term deforestation (Angelsen
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et al. 2009), the ease of implementation explains why current REDD initiatives have
opted to rely on the historical baseline for computing reductions in deforestation.
The model-implied (MI) baseline provides rewards for reductions below the estimated
counterfactual deforestation, accounting for future opportunity costs. In our model, its
computation does not rely on the availability of data records of past deforestation; instead,
it requires information regarding current agricultural prices and estimations of the future
trend in prices. In this context, we argue that the MI has comparatively less data restric-
tions than all the other baseline methodologies.27 Moreover, if the estimation of the BaU
deforestation path is truthful, the implementation of REDD with the MI baselines favours
additionality. Figure 3 reminds us that this baseline stands out in terms of cost-efficiency,
as highlighted in Section 3.1. This can be a strong point in favour of the MI baseline,
especially if future REDD rewards will be linked with compliance carbon markets.
The upward-biased fixed corridor (Cf(up)) modifies the historical baseline by replac-
ing the single-threshold with a corridor approach. Section 3.2 showed that selecting an
upward-biased corridor can improve its effectiveness and welfare performance. Indeed,
the upward-biased corridor approach is the most attractive for the landowner from a wel-
fare perspective. Despite large financial transfers, the effectiveness and efficiency of the
Cf(up) remain limited.
Overall, the integrative analysis appears to give highest support to the variable corri-
dor approach. The upward-biased variable corridor (Cv(up)) is the most effective in
reducing deforestation below BaU levels (see Section 3.1). Being a prospective method,
based on expectations regarding the future movement of timber and agriculture prices, as
Figure 3. Integrated performance of baseline approaches.
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well as REDD permit prices, the Cv(up) has a better ability to reflect the opportunity costs
faced by the landowner. Additionally, the corridor design brings two advantages. First,
the scheme offers REDD compensation also for deforestation rates that come close to the
time-varying baseline, even if not strictly below it; this accommodates possible future
business cycles and ensures (modest) positive REDD revenues should the economy be
expanding (when opportunity costs are high). Second, replacing the single-threshold
approach by a corridor approach, and introducing the weighting system for deforestation
rates inside the corridor, the baseline has the ability to reduce losses due to misestimation
of the BaU baseline (Joanneum Research Institute 2006).
Summing up, designing a baseline methodology that achieves all REDD goals simul-
taneously proves to be highly challenging. Indeed, the analysed baselines exhibit strong
attributes in different areas. For its ability to enhance environmental and economic perfor-
mance, we consider the upward-biased variable corridor to be the best candidate for
achieving the most important REDD goals.
3.3.1. (Mis)estimation of BaU deforestation
Two delicate issues require further thought. The first one touches on the issue of addition-
ality. REDD aims to reward reductions in deforestation below BaU levels. One limitation
of our analysis is that it is placed in a deterministic setting, where the BaU deforestation
path is known. However, in reality many variables of the decision environment are in fact
stochastic, such as commodity and REDD prices, and asymmetries in information might
lay between REDD promoters (who evaluate emission reductions) and forest owners
(who benefit from REDD payments). This surrounds the estimation of the BaU deforesta-
tion path with significant uncertainties.
REDD projects implemented based on misspecified BaU deforestation levels can pro-
vide undesired incentives to forest owners. Errors in the estimation of the BaU would
directly impact the financial incentives of the prospective baselines, i.e. model-implied
and variable corridors.28 We investigate this hypothesis and solve for the optimal defores-
tation path when the baseline methodology relies on a misspecified BaU path. We define
the estimated BaU deforestation as
dEBaUðtÞ ¼ ð1þ ÞdBaUðtÞ (21)
where dBaU is the true deforestation path when no REDD programme is in place, and e is
the percentage misestimation of the BaU deforestation rate, with  2 [ ¡ 0.05, 0.05].
Our results are detailed in the Appendix. First, we find that the performance of the
variable-corridor methodology is robust if estimation errors stay within [¡5%, C5%]
from the true BaU deforestation path. As the estimation errors increase, the effectiveness
of the variable corridor decreases; however, within the considered range, the variable cor-
ridor remains the most effective in reducing deforestation among the four baseline meth-
odologies, despite the performance loss. Our conclusion that the variable corridor should
be the preferred baseline methodology is, therefore, robust.
Second, an underestimation of BaU decreases the performance of the model-implied
baseline; for estimation errors below ¡3%, the landowner will opt out of the REDD proj-
ect and no reductions in deforestation from BaU will be obtained. On the other hand,
small underestimations (above ¡2%) and overestimations in general do not impact the
landowner’s deforestation reduction decisions, and the MI remains more effective than
the historical or fixed-corridor approaches. This analysis reveals the importance of
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designing baselines that are in line with the future drivers of deforestation. In particular,
for forest-rich regions that have historically very low deforestation rates, like the Congo
Basin, significantly underestimating the baseline would lead to ineffective REDD pro-
grammes. It appears to be less problematic to provide an overestimated baseline than an
underestimated one.
3.3.2. REDD permanence
The second key issue concerns permanence. With REDD, the issue of permanence has a
different dimension from that on compliance carbon markets, like the EU ETS. There,
being restricted to emit less than a pre-specified cap, regulated companies continue with
the same business activity, but are given incentives to switch to a more efficient produc-
tion process.29 Being costly, the switch is likely not to be reverted, and emission reduc-
tions could remain ‘permanent’. The situation is not analogous to REDD, where the
landowners cannot continue with their current occupation (deforesting for expanding
agriculture), but need to stop the expansion if they want to receive payments (they cannot
make the cutting down of trees less emission-intensive). REDD payments are offered on
a per-period basis, being linked to deforestation flows instead of the remaining forest
stocks. Thus, temporary reductions in deforestation can be reverted in later periods, ques-
tioning the long-term success of REDD. Moreover, unlike the current voluntary market
for REDD permits, the EU ETS is a capped market, where regulated players face penalty
costs if their emissions exceed the allowed level.30 We argue that REDD payments could
be contingent on the emissions of the entire owned land parcel, such that all land uses are
covered by the regulation umbrella, and more efficient operations are incentivised, similar
to the mechanism of the cap-and-trade systems. However, this takes us away from the
original REDD concept, and future research could further investigate this topic.
4. Conclusions
REDD programmes target reductions in emissions from deforestation below BaU levels.
A key issue of REDD is the establishment of baselines against which reductions in defor-
estation are measured. This paper assesses the performance of the most frequently pro-
posed baselines: historical, model-implied, and fixed corridors. Additionally, we
introduce a new baseline type  the variable corridor.
We solve for the optimal deforestation path in a dynamic setting where REDD proj-
ects are available. One of our main findings is that the baseline choice has a significant
impact on land-use behaviour. Landowners choose different deforestation paths when
incentivised by distinctive baseline methodologies. We believe this point is key for imple-
menting effective REDD programmes.
We first evaluate the selected baselines according to three economic indicators that
describe the effectiveness, welfare increases, and cost-efficiency of reducing deforesta-
tion. We find that each indicator points to a different baseline as the best performer. Our
analysis shows that a preference for strong effectiveness recommends the variable corri-
dor. The fixed corridor provides the highest increase in landowner’s welfare above BaU.
Efficiency reasons advocate the model-implied baseline.
We then discuss additional environmental, social, and technical aspects important for
REDD implementation and the setting of baselines. This analysis highlights stronger dif-
ferences among the baselines, and reveals that the prospective variable corridor achieves
the best trade-off among the economic and environmental REDD goals. Moreover, this
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performance can be boosted by setting the upper bound of the corridor (asymmetrically)
high above the estimated BaU deforestation.
We conclude that the current widespread use of the historical baseline may be chal-
lenged. Much stronger effectiveness and efficiency could be achieved with the use of a
forward-looking baseline, provided that estimation errors do not largely underestimate
future deforestation. Additionally, the currently used single-threshold methodology is
also not optimal; replacing the single-threshold approach with a corridor formed around
the estimated BaU deforestation rate has higher potential of accounting for real opportu-
nity costs and offering continued incentives for reduced deforestation.
Our results offer potential insights for other emission regulation policies, such as the
EU ETS. There regulated companies are allocated emission allowances based on their
emissions’ history, similar to the historical baseline in REDD. Based on our analysis, we
expect the EU ETS to benefit also in terms of effectiveness and efficiency from replacing
its historical cap with a forward-looking corridor approach. This could potentially address
some of the permit overallocation problems, which have persisted since the opening of
the EU ETS.
Some additional concerns remain. This paper assumes that REDD funding is achieved
through a market-based mechanism. In comparison to voluntary funds, international car-
bon markets can mobilise much larger amounts of money and favour cost-efficient emis-
sion reductions (Angelsen 2008b). However, the weak carbon markets we face
nowadays, characterised by low liquidity and permit overallocation, will most probably
have difficulties in handling additional amounts of permits coming from the forestry sec-
tor. Therefore, when selecting the most appropriate baseline type, one might postpone the
implementation of the most effective one in order to avoid drops in permit prices until the
stabilisation of the carbon market.
Our analysis has relied on the dynamic setting to check the ability of the different
baselines to provide continued, not temporary, incentives to reduce deforestation. How-
ever, we did not address the issue of resetting reference levels, based on updated informa-
tion. This would require the setting and solving of the model under conditions of
uncertainty, where a decision-maker would readjust the baseline based on newly received
information about the deforestation rate of the landowner, and the landowner would sub-
sequently adjust his or her deforestation rate based on the new baseline. This constitutes a
very interesting question for future research; it could bring insights into the response of
landowners to changes (e.g. tightening) in requirements to reduce deforestation.
Finally, a robust understanding of the deforestation process would require an
improved description of the different stakeholders involved in REDD implementation. As
Griscom et al. (2009) point out, the selection of reference levels will be based not only on
technical and economic considerations, but also on political negotiations among partici-
pating countries. REDD projects implemented at the national level will motivate coun-
tries to take a strategic position at the negotiation table and try to influence the
establishment of crediting levels in their favour. Under these conditions, the adjusted
deforestation decision will result in emission reductions of other magnitudes than the
ones presented in this study, and might as well reveal a different ranking of baseline
approaches. Future research, based on dynamic decision models with multiple players
defending contrasting interests, could be relevant for this issue.
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Notes
1. While REDD gives priority to reducing emissions from deforestation, REDD+ targets addi-
tionally the sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of carbon stocks.
2. These emitters could be found among the European polluting companies that are regulated by
the EU ETS and need to comply with emission reduction targets.
3. We thank an anonymous referee for the input.
4. We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this important point.
5. In the paper of Busch et al. (2009, 2011), the owner will ‘opt in’ if the REDD revenues are
higher than the agricultural rental price and ‘opt out’ otherwise.
6. Reducing the complexity of the harvesting function, which is not central for comparing the
reference levels, allows us to focus on the dynamic choice between maintaining the forest
cover and harvesting.
7. Using deterministic processes simplifies the solution to the model, but leaves outside of the
scope of our analysis the role and influence of risk on the optimal land allocation decision.
Under the hypothesis of a risk-neutral landowner, the presence of risk would have no specific
effects. However, in the presence of risk aversion, the decision between preservation and
deforestation will be significantly impacted by the relative volatility of the two prices and
would favour the strategy giving the smallest cash flow variability.
8. We consider this setting to be in line with the reality of many landowners’ decision processes
in tropical countries. In Latin America, ownership rights tend to be concentrated in the hands
of a few proprietors (Brockett 1990; Borras Jr et al. 2012).
9. This time frame is expected to be aligned with the phases of the EU ETS or the successor of
the Kyoto protocol.
10 Out of the 6 baseline methodologies reviewed by Griscom et al. (2009), 5 rely partially or
totally on historical reference levels.
11. According to Angelsen (2007), ‘The FT describes a sequence where a forested region goes
through four stages: (1) initially high forest cover and low deforestation, (2) accelerating and
high deforestation, (3) slow-down of deforestation and forest cover stabilisation, and (4) a
period of reforestation.’
12. According to Huettner et al. (2009), prospective (forward-looking) methods attempt to model
land-use change taking into account the various market drivers. The forecasting can be done
by using either analytical, regression or simulation models.
13. The Corridor 1method proposes that deforestation rates within the corridor accrue credits that
would only be eligible for sale once emissions go below the lower boundary of the corridor
(Joanneum Research Institute 2006).
14. The analytical results can be provided by the authors upon request.
15. With about 68 million hectares of tropical forest covering nearly 53% of its territory, Peru is
fourth in the global ranking, after Brazil, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Indonesia.
About 89% of the total classifies as primary forest (FAO 2010).
16. According to Diaz et al. (2011), the Peruvian and Brazilian Amazon dominate the forest car-
bon market, with Latin America accountable for about 60% of the 2010 total primary market
volume.
17. The annual change in forest area was ¡0.22% for 2005–2010 (FAO 2010).
18. Hajek et al. (2011) compare 12 local REDD+ projects in south-eastern Peru, 5 of which were
at feasibility and 7 at an early implementation stage at the time of writing.
19. Due to the lengthy decision horizon (100 years), we are constrained to select a low value for
the discount rate; otherwise, the discounted value of incomes at later periods of time would be
very close to zero, rendering irrelevant the decisions further away in the future. This approach
is consistent, for instance, with the work of Gollier (2002).
20. Stern (2008) suggests the evaluation of REDD design proposals with the help of three criteria:
effectiveness, efficiency, and equity and co-benefits.
21. In the Appendix, we analyse the case of decreasing deforestation paths, where the growth rate
of the agricultural composite commodity is low (d D 0) (see Figure D.9). We find that the
ranking of baselines is robust across regions with different trajectories in the deforestation
path.
22. For a more detailed illustration of deforestation paths for each period, see Figure B.3 in the
Appendix.
23. d(t) is bounded from above by dBaU(t), due to extraction cost constraints.
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24. For the full demonstration, see the Appendix.
25. For a demonstration, see Table E.1 in the Appendix.
26. The score allocated to each baseline takes values from 1 to 4 (4 is the number of baselines con-
sidered for comparison: historical, model-implied, upward-biased fixed corridor, and upward-
biased variable corridor), such that for each indicator, a score of 4 is awarded to the baseline
believed to be most likely to fulfil the criterion, and a score of 1 to the baseline least likely.
27. This might not always be the case; some proposed forward-looking baselines rely on the his-
torical deforestation average as a starting point for predicting future deforestation rates.
28. Misestimations could also occur in the computation of the historical deforestation rate,
impacting the financial incentives provided by the historical and fixed-corridor baselines. In
this section, we focus only on estimation errors concerning the BaU deforestation path. In our
model, this has no impact on the incentives provided by the historical and fixed-corridor
methodologies.
29. This refers to relying on less emission intensive sources of energy, such as renewables or the
more common switch from coal to gas for the generation of electricity.
30. We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
31. We allow for all possible switching points in the range [0, T].
32. Data source is the OSIRIS v.3-4 spreadsheet, available online at http://sp10.conservation.org/
osiris/Pages/overview.aspx.
33. Of course, not the entire territory of Peru is covered with forest and eligible for REDD proj-
ects. As mentioned in Section 2.3, Peru has about 68 million hectares of tropical forest, cover-
ing nearly 53% of its territory.
34. Various international standards have emerged to distinguish between different forest projects,
such as the Panda Standard in China.
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Appendix
A. Optimal deforestation path in the business-as-usual scenario
When no REDD programme is in place, the net revenue of the landowner at time t is given by
p

dðtÞ

¼ PccðtÞdðtÞ 

a1dðtÞ þ a2dðtÞ2

(A:1)
The optimal control problem can be described as follows:
max
ðdðtÞÞt2½0;T 
Z T
0
ertp

dðtÞ

dt (A:2)
such _F ¼ dðtÞ (A:3)
Fð0Þ ¼ F0 (A:4)
We build the current-value Hamiltonian as
Hc ¼ p

dðtÞ

 mdðtÞ (A:5)
The equations of motion follow immediately:
@Hc
@dðtÞ : p
0

dðtÞ

 m ¼ 0 (A:6)
 @H
c
@F
þ rm ¼ _m (A:7)
_F ¼ dðtÞ (A:8)
The partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the forest stock is zero @H
c
@F
¼ 0 . We
obtain from Equation (A.7) that
_m ¼ rm) dm ¼ mrdt)mðtÞ ¼ mð0Þert (A:9)
From Equation (A.6) we know that p0(d(t)) D m(t), which holds for all t 2 [0, T]. It follows that
p0(d(0)) D m(0). Introducing this result in Equation (A.9), we obtain that
p 0

dðtÞ

¼ p 0

dð0Þ

ert (A:10)
We explicit Equation (A.10) with the help of the profit function given in Equation (A.1). After some
simplifications, the optimal deforestation rate at time t is given by
dðtÞ ¼ dð0Þert þ P
ccð0Þðedt  ertÞ  a1ð1 ertÞ
2a2
(A:11)
The optimal deforestation at time t depends on the initial deforestation rate (d(0)), the discount rate
(r), the initial price of the composite commodity (Pcc(0)) and its growth function (d), and the param-
eters of the cost function (a1, a2). In order to define the optimal deforestation path, the last element
that needs to be defined is the initial deforestation rate (d(0)). We iterate over a large grid of possible
values and choose the initial deforestation that maximises total profits.
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B. Optimal deforestation path under REDD
The simultaneous presence of REDD rewards for lower-than-baseline and absence of penalties for
higher-than-baseline deforestation levels brings discontinuities to the profit function. The resulting
non-smoothness in the objective function impedes the application of standard optimisation methods.
To overcome this difficulty, we develop a solution approach based on regime switches. This method
allows for a break in the continuity of the deforestation path, which would otherwise be forced
under the standard Hamiltonian procedure. A smooth deforestation path would not be able to guar-
antee optimality in the context of a non-smooth objective function. Here, we allow the landowner to
decide at each moment of time whether to deforest below or above the reference level, i.e. they
make their choice between a REDD regime (hereafter Regime 1) and a BaU regime akin to BaU
(hereafter Regime 2).
One observation is key to solving the optimisation problem: in the absence of stochasticities,
the decision regarding deforestation levels at each moment of time can be taken from the beginning
for all future periods. While it could be possible in theory that the landowner switches between
regimes multiple times, in practice the dynamic requirement at equilibrium ensures smooth evolu-
tion for the deforestation path within each regime and limited shifts between regimes over the entire
horizon. We begin by explaining the solution approach for the historical and the model-implied
cases. Since it requires an additional modification, we present the solution to the corridor scenario
at the end of this section.
For the historical and the model-implied baselines, the landowner chooses low deforestation
rates and stays in Regime 1 as long as the total benefits from REDD and forest exploitation below
the reference level remain higher that the total benefits from forest exploitation above the reference
level. Depending on the values of the parameters, the regime switch can occur either from the
beginning, somewhere during the lifetime of the maximisation period, or never at all. Formally, the
optimisation procedure can be described as follows:
max
dðtÞjt2½0;T 
Z t
0
ertpR1

dðtÞ

dt þ
Z T
t
ertpR2ðdðtÞÞdt
 
(B:1)
with R1 and R2 standing for Regime 1 and Regime 2, respectively. t is the switching time from
Regime 1 to Regime 2:
t ¼ infft 0jdðtÞ dBg (B:2)
We adapt the solution method of Chiang (1992) to allow for regime switches. The current-value
Hamiltonian is defined as
Hc ¼ H
R1 ¼ pR1ðdðtÞÞ  m1ðtÞdðtÞ; if t 2 ½0; tÞ
HR2 ¼ pR2ðdðtÞÞ  m2ðtÞdðtÞ; if t 2 ½t; T 

(B:3)
It is important to underline that if Regime 1 occurs in our parametrisation, it will precede Regime 2,
due to the different profit dynamics of the two activities. On one hand, the landowner can gain from
intensifying forest exploitation, as long as their inflows do not exceed operating costs. In time, their
revenues rise due to the increasing price of the composite commodity. On the other hand, even if
revenues from REDD increase due to rising permit prices, these profits are limited, since the defor-
estation rate is bounded from above by the reference level and from below by zero (we do not allow
for reforestation). Therefore, even if initially marginal benefits with REDD could be higher than
BaU marginal benefits, this advantage would decrease over time. As a consequence, remaining in
Regime 1 could become suboptimal at a certain moment of time (t), after which the landowner will
move to Regime 2.
Figure B.1 captures dominant profits of either REDD or BaU regimes at different deforestation
rates. The hashed area represents cases where taking part in the REDD project is optimal, while the
grey area symbolises regions where the BaU scenario is optimal. Within each section of the graph,
lighter colours stand for higher profit values. As long as the deforestation rate is below the fixed
baseline, the optimal regime to choose is the REDD one (see Figure B.2). This holds for initial time
periods. As time passes, the overall optimum is to be found in the BaU regime. The two figures
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show that if a regime switch does occur at some moment of time, this switch is expected to take
place one time only, as the dominance alternation takes place only once. Moreover, Figure B.1
shows that the REDD regime should precede the BaU regime, since for later periods of time profits
are increasing in the deforestation rate and the landowner will be better off opting for the BaU
Figure B.1. Land-use revenues.
Figure B.2. Land-use revenues (view from top).
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regime. The solution for the optimal deforestation path is given by
dðtÞ ¼
dð0Þert þ P
ccð0Þðedt  ertÞ  a1ð1 ertÞ  PRð0Þðegt  ertÞ
2a2
; if t 2 ½0; tÞ
dðtÞert þ P
ccðtÞðedt  ertÞ  a1ð1 ertÞ
2a2
; if t 2 ½t; T 
8>><
>>:
(B:4)
Considering the lack of continuity at t, we solve the landowner’s maximisation using a numerical
search algorithm that combines all possible combinations of Regime 1 and Regime 2 paths at differ-
ent switching points.31 We select the combined path that yields the highest profits.
In the case of the corridor scenarios, the profit function is non-smooth at two points, i.e. at the
boundaries of the corridor (dBU and dBL for the fixed; dBU and dBL for the variable); the landowner
will be able to switch between three different regimes. Depending on the relationship between ini-
tial parameter values, they will choose an optimal deforested area that satisfies
dðtÞ ¼
dð0Þert þ P
ccð0Þ edt; ertð Þ  a1 1 ertð Þ  PRð0Þ egt; ertð Þ
2a2
; if t 2 ½0; t1Þ
dðt1Þert
a2  P
Rðt1Þ
dBU  dBL
a2  P
Rðt1Þegt
dBU  dBL
þ
Pccðt1Þ edt; ertÞ  a1ð1; ertð Þ  PRðt1Þ egt; ertð Þ 1þ dB
U þ dBL
dBU  dBL
 	
2 a2  P
Rðt1Þegt
dBU  dBL
 	 ; if t 2 ½t1; t2Þ
dðt2Þert þ P
ccðt2Þ edt; ertð Þ  a1 1 ertð Þ
2a2
; if t 2 ½t2;T 
8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
(B:5)
in the fixed-corridor case. For the variable corridor, the optimal deforestation rate will take the same
form, with dBU(t) and dBL(t) replacing dBU and dBL, respectively. In our setting, the order of the
switching times (0  t1  t2  T) is due to the combination of two characteristics of our model.
First, the benefits of taking part in REDD decrease over time: for later periods, net revenues from
land exploitation outpace REDD revenues due to higher composite commodity prices and larger
deforestation rates. Second, REDD gains get marginally smaller as the deforestation level gets
closer to the upper corridor boundary until it eventually fades away for rates above the corridor.
Therefore, the motivation to stay in REDD decreases over time, but at different paces within each
Figure B.3. Optimal deforestation paths under BaU and different REDD baselines, detailed for
sub-periods of 25 years.
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interval. The landowner’s optimisation problem accounts for three possible regimes:
max
dðtÞjt2½0;T 
Z t1
0
ert;pR1

dðtÞ

dt þ
Z t2
t1
; ert;pR2

dðtÞ

dt þ
Z T
t2
; ert;pR3

dðtÞ

dt
 
(B:5)
To determine the optimal regime switching times (t1 and t2), we first define optimal paths
within each regime for all possible combinations of switching times. We then use a numerical
search algorithm that selects the combination of the three paths yielding the highest profits.
Figure B.3 captures the optimal deforestation path for the BaU and the four REDD baseline
methodologies. The large box on the left-hand side refers to the entire deforestation path, reproduc-
ing the results in Figure 1. To better understand the differences in optimal deforestation for each
baseline, we detail in the other boxes on the right-hand side the deforestation path for sub-periods
of 25 years each.
C. Efficiency of the single-threshold and corridor approaches
Proposition: The single-threshold baseline approach is more efficient than the corresponding corri-
dor approach, that is,
EH3 ECf3 (C:1)
EMI3 ECv3 (C:2)
where Ei3 ¼ SRR
i
SBaU
Tot
Si
Tot
, where SRRi D R T0RRi(t)dt, SiTot D R 0Tdi(t)dt, i 2 {H, MI, Cf, Cv}, and BaU
stands for business-as-usual.
Proof: Let ST refer to the single-threshold approach and C to the corresponding corridor approach.
For the proof, we will use three results from Section 3.1. First, relations (15) and (16) in Section 3.1
show that
RRST ðtÞRRCðtÞ (C:3)
Since relation (C.3) holds 8t 2 [0; T], we can write that
Z T
0
RRST ðtÞdt
Z T
0
RRCðtÞdt , SRRST  SRRC (C:4)
Let us denote then
SRRST ¼ ð1 aÞSRRC (C:5)
with a 2 [0; 1] such that relation (C.5) is satisfied.
Second, relations (17) and (18) in Section 3.1 show that
EST1 EC1 (C:6)
From the definition of Ei1, it follows that
SBaUTot  SSTTot
SBaUTot
 S
BaU
Tot  SCTot
SBaUTot
, SBaUTot  SSTTot SBaUTot  SCTot (C:7)
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Let us denote then
SBaUTot  SSTTot ¼ ð1 bÞ SBaUTot  SCTot
 
(C:8)
where b 2 [0; 1] such that relation (C.7) is satisfied.
Third, we observe from Table 4 that a > b, i.e. the percentage gain in welfare (a) achieved by
the corridor relative to the single-threshold approach is larger than its gain in effectiveness (b).
Therefore, accounting for relations (C.5) and (C.8), we can compare the efficiency of the single-
threshold and corridor approaches:
EST3  EC3 ¼
SRRST
SBaUTot  SSTTot
 SRR
C
SBaUTot  SCTot
¼ ð1 aÞSRR
C
ð1 bÞðSBaUTot  SCTotÞ
 SRR
C
SBaUTot  SCTot
(C:9)
EST3  EC3 ¼
SRRC
SBaUTot  SCTot
b a
1 b (C:10)
With a > b, we get that
EST3 EC3 (C:11)
D. Parameter calibration and sensitivity analysis
This section verifies the robustness of our results to several key calibration parameters, namely the
carbon content of the forest, the discount rate, and the growth rates of the composite commodity
and REDD permit prices.
D1. Forest carbon content (V)
REDD programmes aim to achieve reductions in emissions from deforestation below BaU levels.
While deforestation can be measured in terms of hectares of land where forest has been removed,
the GHG emissions coming from deforestation depend on the carbon content stored in the trees.
The carbon content of one hectare of forest can vary across geographical regions, depending on tree
type and forest density.
Across the REDD candidate countries, the average carbon content varies widely. Figure D.1
captures the distribution of the average above and below ground carbon content of 85 REDD coun-
tries, grouped according to their deforestation patterns and the geographical region.32 The variabil-
ity of the carbon content is very large even within each geographical and forest transition theory
(FTT) group.
The forest carbon content varies not only from country to country, but also within countries.
Figure D.3 shows the above ground carbon content across the territory of Peru,33 which takes values
from 0 to more than 150 tC/ha. The existence of large differences between the carbon content of dif-
ferent regions brings a strong argument for the need to design REDD projects that take into account
regional characteristics.
The success of REDD is likely to depend on its ability to provide payments that correctly
reflect the carbon content of each project area. We test the sensitivity of the baseline perfor-
mance to different levels of carbon content per hectare of forest. This setting depicts a situation
where REDD projects are implemented in several regions of a country, with the average carbon
content varying from region to region. Holding everything else constant, we assume identical
conditions regarding the composite commodity and REDD permit markets across the different
regions.
Figure D.2 illustrates the performance of the four REDD baselines across different levels
of average carbon content. It demonstrates the robustness of the baseline ranking presented in
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Section 3.1. The variable corridor (Cv) continues to be the most effective in reducing deforestation.
The fixed corridor (Cf) offers the highest increase in welfare from BaU. The model-implied baseline
(MI) is the most efficient, having the lowest costs per hectare of avoided deforestation.
Additionally, we observe an increase in the difference in performance of the static versus
dynamic baselines at higher carbon contents. The results are particularly interesting in terms of
effectiveness; it results that REDD projects employing the variable-corridor (Cv) approach will
have a high potential in reducing deforestation and the inherent GHG emissions, especially if they
target high carbon content (HCC) areas. With the current international fora inclined to direct REDD
programmes towards HCC areas, it appears especially important to understand and underline the
benefits of the variable-corridor approach.
Figure D.1. Distributions of the average above and below ground carbon contents across different
stages of FTT and world regions.
Notes: The right-hand panel groups countries according to the geographical region. The left-hand
panel groups countries based on their deforestation patterns according to the FTT. HFHD is high
forest, high deforestation; HFLD is high forest, low deforestation; LFHD is low forest, high defores-
tation; LFLD is low forest, low deforestation. Source: Authors’ own calculations based on OSIRIS
v.3-4.
Figure D.2. Baseline performance across different average forest carbon contents (V).
Notes: The figure captures the performance of the four baselines for different average carbon
contents per hectare of forest. The historical deforestation rate (dB) is 200 ha/year. Corridor width
is x = 0.1.
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D2. Crediting threshold in the static baselines (dB)
In this section, we verify the change in the performance of the static baseline approaches to different
crediting levels. The REDD rewards of the historical and fixed-corridor approaches depend on the
fixed threshold dB (Table 5). As mentioned in the baseline presentation (Section 2.2), the fixed
threshold can be set equal to the average past deforestation in the area. Aside from data availability
and estimation issues, linking rewards to a single value over a larger horizon can result in payments
Figure D.3. Above ground carbon content in Peru.
Source: The High-resolution Carbon Geography of Peru, Carnegie Institution for Science, 2014,
available online at http://carnegiescience.edu/news/per%C3%BA%E2%80%99s_carbon_quantified_
economic_and_conservation_boon.
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that reflect only partially actual efforts. There remains a certain level of risk involved in choosing a
fixed threshold, and we check now the sensitivity of baseline performance to various levels (dB)
against which rewards are accrued for the historical and fixed-corridor schemes. The results are dis-
played in Figure D.4. We find that the ranking of baselines is robust to variations in the fixed thresh-
old level dB. The historical and the fixed-corridor baselines gain ground at larger fixed thresholds, in
terms of both effectiveness and welfare. However, these improvements come at the high cost of
large losses in efficiency.
The increase in welfare at higher dB follows from the fact that the REDD revenues of the histor-
ical and fixed-corridor schemes are an increasing function of the fixed threshold. This is confirmed
by the positive partial derivatives of the REDD revenue functions of the static baselines with respect
to dB. Moreover, the higher REDD revenues foster increases in effectiveness, but also reductions in
efficiency.
Our findings show that, if a static baseline is selected, the fixed threshold should be set above
the average predicted deforestation rate in order to achieve stronger effectiveness and welfare
results.
Figure D.4. Baseline performance across different fixed thresholds.
Notes: The ranking of the four baselines changes across different historical deforestation rates. For
the historical and fixed-corridor baselines, efficiency is not defined for deforestation averages below
60 ha/year, where deforestation reduction and REDD costs are zero. Corridor width is x D x0 D 0.1.
Figure D.5. Deposit rates (r) in the Latin America region in the years 2000 and 2012.
Source: Authors’ own graphical representation based on the data provided by the World Bank,
World Development Indicators, available online at http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/4.15.
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D3. Discount rate (r)
In our initial calibration, the discount rate was chosen slightly below the growth rates of the com-
posite commodity and REDD permit prices, depicting a setting in which forest exploitation and
REDD bring higher financial benefits than saving at the discount rate. However, the discount rate in
many developing countries varies widely from country to country and across time. Figure D.5
shows the discount rates for the years 2000 and 2012 in the Latin America region, with r taking val-
ues in the range [0.5%, 19.5%].
We test the sensitivity of our results to changes in the discount rate. Figure D.6 shows the total
deforested area under BaU and the four REDD baseline methodologies. The BaU optimal deforesta-
tion rate is a decreasing function in r (Equation (A.11)), with higher impacts at later periods of time
(as t approaches T). We detail the impact on the static and the dynamic baselines separately:
 Higher discount rates reduce the total deforestation of the static baselines. The landowner
switches from REDD to BaU in the second part of the optimisation horizon (see Figure D.7).
After the switch, the optimal deforestation follows the BaU path, achieving reductions in
deforestation due to higher r.
 For the prospective baselines, whose reference levels depend on the BaU deforestation
(dB(t) D dBaU(t)), the impact of an increase in r on total deforestation is non-monoto-
nous. The plots of total deforestation at different r present an inflection point (at r D
8% for MI and r D 2% for Cv). For r lower than the inflection point, an increase in r
leads to a decrease in total deforestation; for r higher than the inflection point, an
increase in r leads to higher deforestation. Below the inflection point, an increase in r
results in lower dB(t), requiring stronger reductions in deforestation for obtaining the
same REDD profits. Reducing the deforestation rate pays off until some point (the
inflection point), above which the time-varying threshold is so low that the opportunity
costs of REDD exceed the benefits, and the landowner is better off following the BaU
scenario (exiting REDD and increasing deforestation) (see Figure D.7).
Figure D.8 shows that the ranking of baselines across the three performance measures is
robust across different discount rates. Additionally, for higher discount rates, the difference in
Figure D.6. Total deforestation across different baselines and discount rates (r).
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performance between the static and dynamic baselines decreases in terms of effectiveness and
efficiency, but widens considerably in terms of welfare. The results need to be interpreted
carefully. Firstly, at higher r, both BaU and static baselines result in lower total welfare. The
impact of higher r on the change in welfare from BaU is measured by the E2 indicator. With
the income under the static baselines decreasing less than the BaU income, the percentage
change in welfare appears to be increasing, despite the fact that welfare itself is decreasing in r.
Figure D.8. Baseline performance across different discount rates (r).
Notes: The figure captures the performance of the four baselines for different discount rates. The
historical deforestation rate (dB) is at 200 ha/year. Corridor width is x = 0.1.
Figure D.7. Optimal deforestation across different baselines (r D 0.1).
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Second, with efficiency measured as total discounted REDD revenues per hectares of avoided
deforestation (the E3 indicator), an increase in r reduces heavily the nominator (lower total
discounted revenues), without increasing the forest area saved (we have seen that effectiveness is
constant across different r). The improvement in efficiency at higher r is, therefore, just a
discounting effect.
Figure D.9. Optimal deforestation across different baselines (d D 0).
Figure D.10. Baseline performance across different growth rates of the composite commodity
price (d).
Notes: The figure captures the performance of the four baselines for different growth rates of the
composite commodity price. The historical deforestation rate (dB) is at 200 ha/year. Corridor width
is x = 0.1.
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Summing up, we find that the ranking of baselines at different discount rates is consistent with
the results presented under the initial calibration (Section 3.1). Higher discount rates lower the
amount of total deforestation, especially for periods of time that are further away in the future. With
lower deforestation also under BaU, there is little room for additionality obtained by REDD, and
the effectiveness of the different baselines decreases. We argue that policy-makers interested in
achieving high effectiveness might prefer to direct REDD projects to countries of higher political
stability, where discount rates are lower.
D4. Growth rate of the composite commodity price (d)
REDD programmes are currently being designed in many developing countries, and the opportunity
costs of avoiding deforestation are likely to vary widely across different regions. The price dynam-
ics of the alternative land use  in our model the growth rate of the composite commodity price
(d)  represents a key parameter influencing the opportunity costs of avoiding deforestation. Intui-
tively, the higher the growth rate of the composite commodity, the larger the price of the commodity
in the future, strengthening the incentives to deforest more at later periods of time. With higher
opportunity costs, REDD programmes are expected to be less effective (Irawan et al. 2013).
Figure D.9 shows that when the growth rate of the price of the agricultural composite commodity
is low (d D 0), the deforestation path will be decreasing in time, since the REDD permit price
increases and makes REDD participation more attractive. With constant, although different, baselines,
the historical, model-implied, and fixed corridors lead to the same deforestation path. With constant
agricultural composite commodity prices, it is the variable corridor that achieves again the best results
in terms of avoided emissions. Although the H, MI, and Cf baselines obtain the same levels of effec-
tiveness, they differ significantly in terms of welfare change and efficiency (see Figure D.10).
We test the sensitivity of baseline ranking to different levels of opportunity costs, by varying
the growth rate of the composite commodity. We observe that, with our calibration, for d > 0.04
REDD projects are no longer effective in reducing deforestation below BaU.
Figure D.10 shows that the ranking of baselines is consistent with the results presented in Sec-
tion 3.1 across all values of d. Higher values of d increase deforestation under BaU and the four
REDD scenarios, reducing the effectiveness of REDD, as expected. As d gets higher, landowners
opt out of REDD and follow BaU, with their welfare converging to the BaU income. At lower effec-
tiveness rates, payments for deforestation reductions under REDD are less cost-efficient.
Figure D.11. Historical forest carbon price distributions (primary market).
Source: Diaz et al. (2011), Ecosystem Marketplace, available online at http://www.forest-trends.org/
documents/files/doc_2963.pdf. Values in parentheses show the number of reported prices included
in each year.
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The policy implication that arises from our analysis is that REDD programmes need to be
accompanied by payments that stand up to the specific opportunity costs of the region; otherwise,
where opportunity costs are very high, REDD programmes will be ineffective. This result is in line
with the of findings of Irawan et al. (2013), who underline that REDD might not be able to compete
with some alternative land uses that have prohibitive opportunity costs.
D5. Growth rate of the REDD permit price (g)
The success of REDD is critically dependent on the incentive structure offered by the scheme. A
key element is the amount of money rewarded per hectare of avoided deforestation, given by the
REDD permit price (PR) and its growth rate over time (g).
Forest carbon projects have started their slow but steady increase at the end of the 1980s, and
since then the largest part of demand for forest offsets has come from the voluntary carbon markets.
Since 2005, forest carbon markets have experienced a significant boom, clearly marked by the
development of REDD projects starting with 2010 (Diaz et al. 2011). REDD projects do not result
in unique prices per ton of avoided emissions from deforestation; instead, prices vary according to
demand levels, international regulations, and the quality of the specific projects.34 Figure D.11 cap-
tures the historical distribution of forest carbon prices and illustrates two key characteristics of the
market: (1) forest carbon prices present large variability; and (2) the trend in average prices after
2008 was increasing.
Motivated by the high price variability observed empirically, and by the fact that only increas-
ing prices can motivate the sustained reduction of deforestation in the long run, we test the robust-
ness of our results to different growth rates of the REDD credits price (g).
Figure D.12 captures the performance of the four REDD baseline methodologies across differ-
ent levels of g. The baseline ranking presented in Section 3.1 is robust to changes in the growth rate
of the REDD price. As expected, low future REDD prices diminish the incentives to avoid defores-
tation, and the modest reductions in deforestation are cost-inefficient. In contrast, if forest owners
expect large future increases in REDD prices, they are motivated to keep the deforestation rates sig-
nificantly lower than the BaU scenario; REDD projects are in this case likely to achieve high effec-
tiveness. Moreover, the higher is the growth rate, the larger becomes the difference in effectiveness
between the static and the dynamic baselines.
The policy implication that results from our analysis is that it is not enough to ensure high future
REDD payments in order to achieve large reductions in deforestation, but it is necessary to choose
carefully the baseline methodology. While static baselines achieve limited effectiveness at high
REDD rewards, a dynamic baseline approach, designed as a corridor around the estimated BaU
deforestation rate, will strongly increase the effectiveness of REDD.
Figure D.12. Baseline performance across different growth rates of the REDD permit (g).
Notes: The figure captures the performance of the four baselines for different growth rates of the
REDD permit price. The historical deforestation rate (dB) is at 200 ha/year. Corridor width is
x = 0.1.
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E Corridor bandwidth and symmetry
E1. Fixed corridor
Figure E.2. Performance of the fixed corridor at different fixed thresholds (dB).
Notes: The figure captures performance results of the fixed (symmetric, upward, and downward
biased) corridor. Three cases of corridor width are considered (x 2 {0.2, 0.4, 0.6}) for different fixed
thresholds (dB 2 [1, 500] ha/year).
Figure E.1. Performance of the fixed corridor at different corridor bandwidths (x).
Notes: The figure captures the performance of the fixed corridor for different corridor widths and
symmetry assumptions. Considered corridors are symmetric (sym), upward (up), and downward
biased (down). Bounds in the downward-biased case are set as dBU D (1 C x0)dB, dBL D (1 ¡ x)dB;
in the upward-biased case, dBU D (1 C x)dB, dBL D (1 ¡ x0)dB, with x 2 [0.1, 0.9] and x0 D 0.1
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F Misestimations in the business-as-usual deforestation path
REDD projects implemented based on misspecified BaU deforestation levels can provide undesired
incentives to forest owners and undermine the effectiveness performance of REDD. The two base-
lines methodologies that could be affected by the errors in the BaU deforestation are the prospective
ones, i.e. model-implied or variable corridor. We investigate this hypothesis and solve for the opti-
mal deforestation path when the baseline methodology relies on a misspecified BaU path, such that
dEBaUðtÞ ¼ ð1þ eÞdBaUðtÞ (F:1)
where dBaU is the true deforestation path when no REDD programme is in place, and e is the per-
centage misestimation of the BaU deforestation rate, with e 2 [ ¡ 0.05, 0.05]. The corresponding
Table E.3 Double impact of varying the corridor width on REDD revenues.
Symmetry Characteristics Linear impact Non-linear impact
on REDD credits (n) on weight (v)
Cf
Symmetric dBL D (1 ¡ x)dB @n
@x
¼ dB> 0 @v
@x
¼ dðtÞdB
2x2dB
dBU D (1 C x)dB (@v
@x
< 0 if d(t) < dB)
n D (1 C x)dB ¡ d(t) (@v
@x
 0 if d(t)  dB)
v ¼ 1 dðtÞð1xÞdBð1þxÞdBð1xÞdB
Upward biased dBL D (1 ¡ x0)dB @n@x ¼ dB> 0 @v@x ¼ dðtÞð1x0ÞdBðxþx0Þ2dB > 0
dBU D (1 C x)dB
n D (1 C x)dB ¡ d(t)
v ¼ 1 dðtÞð1x0ÞdBð1þxÞdBð1x0ÞdB
Downward biased dBL D (1 ¡ x)dB @n
@x
¼ 0 @v
@x
¼ dðtÞð1þx0ÞdBðxþx0Þ2dB < 0
dBU D (1 C x0)dB
n D (1 C x0)dB ¡ d(t)
v ¼ 1 dðtÞð1xÞdBð1þx0ÞdBð1xÞdB
Cv
Symmetric dBL(t) D (1 ¡ x)dB(t) @n
@x
¼ dBðtÞ> 0 @vðtÞ
@x
¼ dðtÞdBðtÞ
2x2dBðtÞ < 0
dBU(t) D (1 C x)dB(t) (since optimal d(t) < dB(t))
n D (1 C x)dB(t) ¡ d(t)
vðtÞ ¼ 1 dðtÞð1xÞdBðtÞð1þxÞdBðtÞð1xÞdBðtÞ
Upward biased dBL(t) D (1 ¡ x0)dB(t) @n@x ¼ dBðtÞ> 0 @vðtÞ@x ¼ dðtÞð1x0ÞdBðtÞðxþx0Þ2dBðtÞ > 0
dBU(t) D (1 C x)dB(t)
n D (1 C x)dB(t) ¡ d(t)
vðtÞ ¼ 1 dðtÞð1x0ÞdBðtÞð1þxÞdBðtÞð1x0ÞdBðtÞ
Downward biased dBL(t) D (1 ¡ x)dB(t) @n
@x
¼ 0 @vðtÞ
@x
¼ dðtÞð1þx0ÞdBðtÞðxþx0Þ2dBðtÞ < 0
dBU(t) D (1 C x0)dB(t)
n D (1 C x0)dB(t) ¡ d(t)
vðtÞ ¼ 1 dðtÞð1xÞdBðtÞð1þx0ÞdBðtÞð1xÞdBðtÞ
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REDD revenues (RR(t)) take the form
RRðtÞ ¼
PRðtÞ

dEBaUðtÞ  dðtÞ
þ
; if MI
PRðtÞ

ð1þ xÞdEBaUðtÞ  dðtÞ
þ
1

dðtÞ  ð1 xÞdEBaUðtÞ
þ
ð1þ xÞdEBaUðtÞ  ð1 xÞdEBaUðtÞ
0
B@
1
CA; if Cv
8>>><
>>>:
where PR is the price of the carbon permit and x is the corridor wideness, as always.
Figure F.1 captures the effectiveness performance of the four baseline methodologies, when
there are estimation errors in the specification of the BaU deforestation. First, for estimation errors
that underestimated the BaU deforestation by more than 3%, the landowner will opt out of the
REDD project under the model-implied (MI) baseline methodology. Larger estimation errors do
not impact their deforestation reduction decisions, and the MI remains more effective than the his-
torical or fixed-corridor approaches.
Second, we find that the variable-corridor methodology is robust if estimation errors stay within
[¡5%, C5%] from the true BaU deforestation path. Our conclusion that the variable corridor should
be the preferred baseline methodology is, therefore, robust.
Figure F.1. Realised effectiveness in reducing deforestation when the BaU deforestation is esti-
mated with error (e 2 [ ¡ 0.05, 0.05]).
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